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A bstract
This thesis analyses interconnections between educational policies and different aspects of mo­
bility. In the first chapter I use the dismissal of scientists in Nazi Germany to analyse peer effects 
among university scientists. The usual problems related to estimating peer effects are addressed 
by using the dismissal of researchers by the Nazi government as a source of exogenous variation 
in the scientists’ peer group. Using a dataset of all physicists, chemists, and mathematicians at 
all German universities from 1925 until 1938 I investigate spillovers at different levels of peer 
interactions. There is no evidence for peer effects at the department level or the specialization 
level. I find, however, that peer quality matters for coauthors. Losing a coauthor of average 
quality reduces the productivity of a scientist by about 12.5 percent in physics and 16.5 percent 
in chemistry. The second chapter analyses the effect of studying abroad on international labour 
market mobility later in life. I have collaborated with Matthias Parey for this research project. 
We exploit the introduction of the ERASMUS student exchange programme as a source of ex­
ogenous variation in student mobility. Our results indicate that student exchange mobility is an 
important determinant of international labour market mobility: Studying abroad increases an 
individual’s probability of working in a foreign country by about 15 to 20 percentage points. We 
investigate heterogeneity in returns and find that studying abroad has a stronger effect for credit 
constrained students. The last chapter of the thesis investigates the effect of school tracking on 
social mobility of students. In particular I investigate whether ability tracking exacerbates the 
role of parental background for students’ educational achievement. Using microdata from differ­
ent educational studies I exploit cross-country variation in tracking policies to identify the effect 
of tracking. Controlling for unobserved country level variables using difference-in-differences, I 
find no increase in the importance of a student’s family background after tracking has taken 
place. This result runs contrary to the findings of the current literature. I show tha t the results 
of the existing literature are not robust to slight changes in specification.
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This thesis analyses different interlinkages between education and mobility. In this context 
mobility is broadly defined to encompass physical mobility but also social mobility.
Links between education and mobility have become more salient in the public debate but also 
in economic research in recent years. These links are important at all educational levels. In this 
thesis I investigate issues of mobility and education at the university level but also at the school 
level. At the former, it is widely acknowledged tha t universities willing to produce first class 
research and teaching have to attract scholars and students from abroad. Many universities, 
therefore, benefit from more international mobility. The flip side of increased mobility may be 
that countries with less attractive universities might lose their brightest students and researchers 
if they move abroad. Whether the countries which lose students and researchers are truly 
harmed by the increase in international mobility is, however, not entirely clear. The migrants 
might return later in life or promote the home country’s interests abroad. This thesis analyses 
a subset of issues linked to international mobility of scientists and students.
In the first chapter I use the forced mobility of scientists in Nazi Germany to identify peer effects 
among university scientists. The Nazi government dismissed all Jewish and so-called ‘politically 
unreliable’ scholars from the German universities as soon as they came into power. The vast 
majority left Germany and was therefore no longer able to closely collaborate with their former 
colleagues in Germany. As the number of dismissed scholars varied widely across different 
universities and departments I can use this dismissal to identify peer effects among scientists. 
The dismissals not only affected the size of the scientists’ peer group but also their average 
quality. I can therefore separately identify the effect of the number of peers and the effect of 
average peer quality on a scientist’s productivity. I also investigate peer effects at different 
levels of interactions, namely at the department level (e.g. within the physics department), 
the specialization level (e.g. among the theoretical physicists in a department), and among 
coauthors.
Student mobility is another important phenomenon in higher education. Especially since stu­
dents have become more and mobile in recent years. The second chapter of this thesis analyses 
how studying abroad affects international labour market mobility later in life. Estimates of the 
effect of student mobility on later labour market mobility are often contaminated by the fact 
that individuals who study abroad are probably more mobile than students who do not study 
abroad. We therefore use the introduction of the ERASMUS student exchange programme 
as a source of exogenous variation in the probability of studying abroad. We show that the 
introduction of the ERASMUS programme in a student’s department did indeed increase her 
probability of studying for some time in a foreign country. We can therefore use the ERASMUS 
programme to identify the causal effect of educational mobility on later labour market mobility. 
Mobility or the lack thereof is also an important issue at the school level. Parents move closer 
to attractive school in order to improve the education of their children. The vast literature on 
the links between school quality and houseprices analyses some of the consequences of this be­
7haviour. Another important aspect of mobility in schools is social mobility. The third chapter 
of my thesis analyses one potentially important determinant of social mobility within school 
systems; namely whether students are placed into different school tracks. In particular I in­
vestigate whether the tracking regime affects the role of a student’s family background for her 
educational attainment. As countries differ not only in their tracking regime I try to control for 
the pre-tracking importance of parental background by using a difference-in-differences strategy. 
Using a test score before tracking has occurred in any of the countries of my sample and one 
after tracking occurred in some countries I identify the causal effect of tracking.
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E vidence from  th e  D ism issal o f  Scientists in  N azi G erm any
1.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses peer effects among university scientists. It is widely believed that peer 
effects are an important element of academic research. Individual researchers, however, may not 
consider these effects when deciding about their place of employment. This could potentially 
lead to a misallocation of talent and to underinvestment in academic research. Having a good 
understanding of peer effects is therefore crucial for researchers and policy makers alike. Despite 
the widespread belief in the presence of peer effects among scientists there is only limited 
empirical evidence for these effects.
The main reason for this lack of evidence lies in the fact that obtaining causal estimates of peer 
effects is very challenging. An important problem for any estimation of peer effects is caused 
by sorting of scientists. Highly productive scientists often work alongside other productive 
researchers while less productive researchers often work in universities with less productive 
colleagues. The key question is whether productive scientists are more productive because they 
are collaborating with successful peers or because their productivity is higher per se. Estimation 
techniques which do not address the sorting of researchers will thus overestimate the importance 
of peer effects. Another problem corroborating the estimation of peer effects is the presence 
of unobservable factors which affect a researcher’s productivity but also the productivity of 
his peers. For scientists these factors could be the construction of a new laboratory which the 
econometrician may not observe. These unobserved factors would usually lead to an upward bias 
of peer effects. Estimates of spill-over effects may also be distorted by measurement problems. 
The main problem is the correct measurement of a researcher’s peer group. It is not only 
difficult to identify the peers of any given scientist but also to ascertain the quality of these 
peers. These problems will complicate any attem pt to obtain unbiased estimates of peer effects. 
A promising strategy to estimate peer effects is therefore to analyse a scientist’s productivity if 
his peer group changes due to reasons which are unrelated to his own productivity.
In this chapter I propose the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government as an exogenous and 
dramatic change in the peer group of researchers in Germany. Almost immediately after Hitler’s 
National Socialist party secured power in 1933 the Nazi government dismissed all Jewish and 
so called "politically unreliable" scholars from German universities. Around 13 to  18 percent of 
all scientists were dismissed between 1933 and 1934 (13.6 percent of physicists, 13.1 of chemists, 
and 18.3 percent of mathematicians). Many of the dismissed scholars were outstanding members 
of their profession, among them the famous physicist and Nobel Laureate Albert Einstein, the 
chemist Georg von Hevesy who would receive the Nobel Prize in 1943, and the Hungarian 
mathematician Johann von Neumann. Scientists at the affected departments were thus exposed 
to a dramatic change in their peer group. Researchers in unaffected departments, however, did 
not lose a single colleague. I use this dramatic change in the peer group of scientists who remain
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in Germany to identify peer effects among physicists, chemists, and mathematicians.
I focus on these subjects because advancements in these fields are widely believed to be an im­
portant source of technological progress. Other reasons for focusing on science are the following. 
The productivity of scientists can be well approximated by analysing publications in academic 
journals. It was part of the scientific culture to publish results in scientific journals already in 
the 1920s and 1930s, which is the time period studied in this chapter. I also concentrate on the 
sciences because of the attem pt of the Nazi regime to ideologize all parts of society after 1933. 
These policies also affected university research. The impact on different subjects, however, was 
very different. Subjects such as economics, psychology, history, or sociology were affected much 
more than the sciences.1 The last reason for focusing on physics, chemistry, and mathematics 
is the fact tha t researchers at the German universities were in many cases the leading figures 
in those fields in the early 20th century. Examples for this leading role of German science at 
the time are the Nobel Prize awards to researchers from German universities. Between 1910 
and 1940, 27 percent of Nobel laureates in physics and 42 percent of Nobel prize winners in 
chemistry were affiliated with a German university; this is a much larger fraction than tha t of 
any other country at tha t time. If peer effects are an important determinant of a researcher’s 
productivity they are likely to be especially important in a flourishing research environment 
such as Germany in the early 20th century.
In order to investigate peer effects, I construct a new dataset of all physicists, chemists, and 
mathematicians teaching at all 33 universities and technical universities (Technische Hochschulen) 
in Germany at the time. Using data from historical university calendars I obtain a panel dataset 
of all scientists at these universities covering the years 1925 until 1938. I do not consider the 
years after 1938 because of the start of World War II in 1939. In order to assess the extent of 
the dismissal I compile a list of all dismissed physicists, chemists and mathematicians from a 
number of different data sources. Finally, I obtain data on publications and citations of these 
researchers in the leading academic journals of the time. More details on the data sources are 
given in the data section below.
This dataset allows me to investigate spill-over effects among scientists. The collaboration 
of researchers can take different levels of intensity. A very direct way of peer interaction is 
the collaboration on joint research projects involving joint publication of results. There are, 
however, more subtle interactions of colleagues in universities. Peer effects would also be present 
if researchers discuss ideas and comment on each other’s work but do not copublish. Yet another 
way in which peers may affect a researcher’s productivity is through peer pressure. A scientist’s 
work effort may depend on the effort of his peers because he may want to match or surpass 
their research output. Having more (less) productive peers would thus increase (reduce) a 
researcher’s productivity. The definition of peer effects in this chapter encompasses any of these 
different types. In addition to these different levels in the intensity of peer interactions there
1The sciences were not completely unaffected by the Nazi regime. The most famous example is the "German 
Physics" movement by a small group of physicists which tried to ideologize physical research. The consensus 
among historians of science, however, is that the movement never mangaged to have a strong impact on the 
physics community as a whole. See Beyerchen (1977) for details.
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are two main dimensions of peer groups which may m atter for academic research. The first 
dimension is the number of peers a researcher can interact with. Another important dimension 
of a scientist’s peer group is the quality of his colleagues. The work presented in this chapter is 
the first to separately identify the importance of these two aspects of peer interactions.
This thesis is also the first to analyse three different geographic dimensions of spill-over effects, 
namely at the department level, at the specialization level, and at the level of coauthors. Many 
researchers believe that peer interactions occur at the level of academic departments. The first 
part of the analysis therefore investigates spill-over effects at the department level. The dismissal 
is a very strong and precise predictor of changes in the number and the average quality of peers. 
I find, however, tha t neither the number of dismissed colleagues nor the dismissal induced change 
in average department quality significantly affects the productivity of physicists, chemists or 
mathematicians. I also estimate a more structural model of peer effects instrumenting the peer 
group variables with the dismissal. I do not find any significant effects of the number of peers 
or their average quality at the department level.
Using the same methodology I can also analyse peer effects at the level of a researcher’s spe­
cialization within the department. I t is therefore possible to investigate the presence of peer 
effects among all theoretical physicists in a department for example. The dismissal is a very 
strong predictor for the number and the quality of peers at the specialization level. Neither 
the number of dismissed peers in a researcher’s specialization nor their average quality have a 
significant impact on a researcher’s productivity over time. When instrumenting a researcher’s 
peer group with the dismissal I do not find evidence for peer effects at the specialization level. 
In addition to tha t I investigate an even narrower definition of a researcher’s peer group by 
estimating peer effects among coauthors for physics and chemistry. Due to the very low level of 
coauthorships in mathematics I cannot analyses spill-over effects for coauthors in mathematics. 
I find that losing a coauthor of average quality reduces the average researcher’s productivity by 
about 12.5 percent in physics and 16.5 percent in chemistry. Losing coauthors of higher than 
average quality leads to an even larger productivity loss. Furthermore, I show tha t the effect is 
solely driven by recent collaborations. The productivity of scientists who lose a colleague with 
whom they did not coauthor in the last four years before the dismissal does not fall due to the 
dismissal. It is not entirely clear whether one would like to call the joint publication of papers 
a real spill-over effect. I therefore investigate whether authors who lose a coauthor also publish 
less if one focuses on the publications which were not coauthored with the dismissed coauthor. 
Finding a drop in these publications after the dismissal would suggest classic spill-over effects 
between coauthors. I find a negative and significant effect from losing a high quality coauthor 
even on the publications which were published without the dismissed coauthor. This is evidence 
for peer effects among coauthors.
Understanding the effects of the dismissal of a large number of scientists during the Nazi period 
is interesting in its own right. The findings of this thesis may also lead to a better understanding 
of similar events which occurred in other countries. One example is the purge of thousands of 
scientists who did not adhere to the communist ideology in the Soviet Union under Stalin.
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The scope of this work, however, goes beyond the understanding of historical events, because it 
allows the identification of peer effects using an exogenous variation in a researcher’s peer group. 
The question remains whether evidence on peer effects in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s can 
be used to understand peer interactions today. A number of reasons suggest that the findings 
of this study may be relevant for understanding spillovers among present-day researchers. The 
three subjects studied in this chapter were already well established at that time; especially 
in Germany. Scientific research followed practices and conventions which were very similar 
to current research methods. Researchers were publishing their results in refereed academic 
journals, conferences were common, and researchers were surprisingly mobile. Unlike today, 
they could not communicate via E-mail. They did, however, vividly discuss research questions 
in letters. Given the dramatic fall in communication and transportation costs it is quite likely 
that localized peer interactions are even less important today than in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The increased specialization in scientific research makes it harder to  find researchers working 
on similar topics in the same department. This will further contribute to the fact that today’s 
department level and within department specialization level peer effects axe less important than 
in the past.
As described before I do find that peer effects among coauthors are important. The reduction 
in transportation and communication costs would suggest tha t potential benefits from collabo­
rating with researchers who are located in a different university may be even more important 
today. The increased importance of teams in the production of scientific research and increased 
cooperation between researchers from different universities and even countries may be a result 
of peer effects among coauthors.2 Thus my results are likely to provide a lower bound for peer 
effects among coauthors.
This study contributes to a growing literature on peer effects among university researchers. It 
is, however, one of the first to analyse peer effects among scientists using credibly exogenous 
variation in peer quality. To my knowledge it is the first study which is able to separate the 
effects from the number of colleagues and the average quality of those peers. Furthermore, it 
is the first work to directly analyse peer effects a three levels of peer interactions: at the level 
of academic departments, at the level of specializations within those departments, and among 
coauthors.
Azoulay, Wang and Zivin (2007) investigate peer effects among coauthors in the life sciences. 
Using the death of a prolific researcher as an exogenous source of variation in a scientist’s 
peer group they find tha t deaths of coauthors lead to a decline in a researcher’s productivity. 
They find stronger effects for more prolific coauthors. Furthermore, they find that co-location of 
scientists does not increase the effect of a dead coauthor. Surprisingly, they do not find a stronger 
decline for recent coauthors compared to coauthors who coauthored with the dead scientist long 
before he died. As they only observe coauthors but not the universe of peers at the university 
of a dying researcher they cannot directly investigate department level or specialization level
2 Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi (2007) show that the number of co-authors in science research increased dramatically 
since 1955. Furthermore, Adams et al. (2005) show an increase in the geographic dispersion of research teams in 
the US.
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peer effects. A recent study by Weinberg (2007) analyses peer effects among Nobel Prize 
winners in physics. He finds evidence for mild peer effects among physics Nobel laureates. 
Using the timing of starting Nobel Prize winning work he tries to establish causality. It is 
quite likely, however, that this does not fully address the endogeneity problem which may affect 
his results on spillovers. Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2006) estimate peer effects in economics 
and finance faculties and find positive peer effects for the 1970s, and 1980s, but negative peer 
effects for the 1990s. They show some evidence that their results are not contaminated by 
endogeneity problems. The regression specifically analysing peer effects, however, does not 
control for endogenous selection of peers.3
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section gives a brief description 
of historical details. A particular focus is given to the description of the quantitative and 
qualitative loss to German science. Section 1.3 gives a more detailed description of the data 
sources used in the analysis. Section 1.4 describes the identification strategy in further detail. 
The effect of the dismissal on the productivity of department level and specialization level peers 
remaining in Germany is analysed in section 1.5. Using the dismissal as an exogenous source 
of variation in peer quality I then present instrumental variable results of department level and 
specialization level peer effects in section 1.6. Regressions presented in Section 1.7 probe the 
robustness of these findings. In section 1.8 I then present evidence on peer effects between 
coauthors. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 T h e E xpulsion  o f  Jew ish  and ‘P o litica lly  U nreliab le’ Scholars from  Ger­
m an U niversities
Shortly after the National Socialist Party seized power in 1933 the Nazi government implemented 
the "Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service" on the 7th of April of 1933. 
Despite this misleading title the law was used to expel all Jewish and "politically unreliable" 
persons from civil service in Germany. At that time most German university professors were 
civil servants. Therefore the law was directly applicable to them. Via additional ordinances the 
law was also applied to university employees who were not civil servants. Thus the law affected 
all researchers at the German universities. The main parts of the law read:
Paragraph 3: Civil servants who are not of Aryan descent axe to be placed in 
retirement... (this) does not apply to officials who had already been in the service 
since the 1st of August, 1914, or who had fought in the World War at the front for 
the German Reich or for its allies, or whose fathers or sons had been casualties in 
the World War.
3 Another related strand of the literature focuses on regional spill-over effects of patent citations. Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) use an ingenious method to control for pre-existing regional concentration of 
patent citations. They find that citations of patents are more geographically clustered than one would expect 
if there were no regional spill-over effects. Thompson and Fox-Keane (2005) challenge those findings in a later 
paper.
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Paragraph 4: Civil servants who, based on their previous political activities, 
cannot guarantee tha t they have always unreservedly supported the national state, 
can be dismissed from service.
["Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service", quoted after Hentschel 
(1996)]
In an implementation decree it was further specified tha t all members of the Communist Party 
were to be expelled. The decree also specified "Aryan decent" in further detail as: "Anyone 
descended from Non-Aryan, and in particular Jewish, parents or grandparents, is considered 
non-Aryan. It is sufficient that one parent or one grandparent be non-Aryan." The law was 
immediately implemented and resulted in a wave of dismissals and early retirement from the 
German universities. A careful early study by Harthorne published in 1937 counts 1111 re­
searchers from German universities and technical universities4 who were dismissed between 
1933 and 1934. This amounts to about 15 percent of the 7266 university researchers present at 
the beginning of 1933. Most dismissals occurred in 1933 immediately after the law was imple­
mented. Not everybody was dismissed as soon as 1933 because the law allowed Jewish scholars 
to remain in office if they had been in office since 1914 or if they had fought in the First World 
War or had lost a father or son in the War. Nonetheless, many of the scholars who could stay 
according to this exception decided to leave voluntarily; for example the Nobel laureates James 
Franck and Fritz Haber. They were just anticipating a later dismissal as the Reich citizenship 
laws (Reichsbiirgergesetz) of 1935 revoked the exception clause.
Table 1.1 reports the number of dismissals in the three subjects studied in this chapter: physics, 
chemistry, and mathematics. Similarly to Harthorne, I focus my analysis on researchers who 
had the Right to Teach (venia legendi) at a German university. According to my calculation 
about 13.6 percent of the physicists who were present at the beginning of 1933 were dismissed 
between 1933 and 1934.5 In chemistry the loss between 1933 and 1934 was about 13.1 percent 
and thus slightly lower than in physics.6 Mathematics experienced the biggest loss of the three 
subjects with about 18.3 percent dismissals between 1933 and 1934.7 It is interesting to note, 
tha t the percentage of dismissals in these three subjects and at the German universities overall 
was much higher than the fraction of Jews living in Germany. It is estimated tha t about 0.7 
percent of the total population in Germany was Jewish at the beginning of 1933.
My data does not allow me to identify whether the researchers were dismissed because they were 
Jewish or because of their political orientation. Other researchers, however, have investigated 
this issue. Deichmann (2001) studies chemists in German and Austrian universities (after
4 The German university system had a number of different university types. The main ones were the traditional 
universities and the technical universities. The traditional universities usually covered the full spectrum of 
subjects. The technical universities focused on technical subjects.
5This number is consistent with the number obtained by Fischer (1991) who reports that 15.5 percent of 
physicists were dismissed between 1933 and 1940.
6 Deichmann (2001) calculates a loss of about 24 percent from 1933 to 1939. The difference between the two 
figures can be explained by the fact that she includes all dismissals from 1933 to 1939. Furthermore my sample 
includes 5 more universities which all have below average dismissals.
7 Unfortunately there are no comparable numbers for mathematics by other researchers.
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the German annexation of Austria in 1938 the Nazi government extended the aforementioned 
laws to  researchers at Austrian universities). She finds that about 87 percent of the dismissed 
chemists were Jewish or of Jewish decent. The remaining 13 percent were dismissed for political 
reasons. Siegmund-Schultze (1998) estimates that about 79 percent of the dismissed scholars 
in mathematics were Jewish. This suggests that the vast majority of the dismissed were either 
Jewish or of Jewish decent.
Before giving further details on the distribution of dismissals across the different universities I 
am going to provide a brief overview over the fate of the dismissed researchers. Immediately 
after the first wave of dismissals in 1933 foreign Emigre aid organizations were founded to assist 
the dismissed scholars with obtaining positions in foreign universities. The first organization to 
be founded was the English "Academic Assistance Council" (later renamed into "Society for the 
Protection of Science and Learning"). It was established as early as April 1933 by the director 
of the London School of Economics, Sir William Beveridge. In the US the "Emergency Com­
mittee in Aid of Displaced Scholars" was founded in 1933. Another important aid organization, 
founded in 1935 by some of the dismissed scholars themselves, was the Emergency Alliance 
of German Scholars Abroad ("Notgemeinschaft Deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland"). The 
main purpose of these and other, albeit smaller, organizations were to  assist the dismissed schol­
ars in finding positions abroad. In addition to tha t prominent individuals like Eugen Wigner, 
Albert Einstein or Hermann Weyl tried to use their extensive network of personal contacts to 
find employment for less well-known scientists. Due to the very high international reputation 
of German physicists, chemists, and mathematicians many of them could find positions without 
the help of the aid organizations. Less renowned and older scientists had more problems in 
finding adequate positions abroad. Initially many dismissed scholars fled to European coun­
tries. Many of these countries were only temporary refuges because the dismissed researchers 
often obtained temporary positions, only. The expanding territory of Nazi Germany in the 
early stages of World War II led to a second wave of emigration from the countries which were 
invaded by the German army. The main destinations of dismissed physicists, chemists, and 
mathematicians were the United States, England, Turkey, and Palestine. The biggest propor­
tion of dismissed scholars in all three subject eventually moved to the United States. For the 
purposes of this research it is important to note that the vast majority of the emigrations took 
place immediately after the researchers were dismissed from their university positions. Further 
collaborations with researchers staying in Germany were thus extremely difficult and did hardly 
occur. A minority of the dismissed, however, did not leave Germany and most of them died 
in concentration camps or committed suicide. Very few, managed to stay in Germany and 
survive the Nazi regime. Even these scientists who stayed in Germany were no longer allowed 
to use university laboratories and other resources. The possibility of ongoing collaboration of 
the dismissed scientists with researchers staying at the German universities was thus extremely 
limited.
The aggregate numbers of dismissals hides the fact that the German universities were affected 
very differently by the dismissals. Even within a university there was a lot of variation across
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different departments. Whereas some departments did not experience any dismissals others 
lost more than 50 percent of their personnel. The vast majority of dismissals occurred in 1933 
and 1934. Only a limited number of scientists was dismissed after these years. All dismissals 
occurring after 1933 affected researchers who had been exempted under the clause for war 
veterans or for having obtained their position before 1914. In order to have a sharp dismissal 
measure I thus focus on the dismissals in 1933 and 1934. Table 1.2 reports the number of 
dismissals in the different universities and departments. An example for the huge variation in 
dismissals is the university of Gottingen, one of the leading universities at the time. It lost 
40 percent of its researchers in physics and almost 60 percent in mathematics. The reduction 
of peer quality in physics and mathematics was even higher than the fraction of dismissed 
scholars. In chemistry, however, no a single scholar was dismissed in Gottingen. Table 1.2 also 
demonstrates tha t the dismissal did not always have a negative impact on average peer quality. 
Negative signs in the "Fall in Peer Quality" variable indicate an improvement in the average 
quality of the stayers’ peers. An improvement in average peer quality could occur if below 
department average researchers were dismissed.
Table 1.3 gives a more detailed picture of the quantitative and qualitative loss in the three 
subjects. In physics about 13 percent of all researchers were dismissed between 1933 and 1934. 
The proportion of chaired professors among the dismissals was, however, slightly lower at about 
11 percent. The dismissed were on average about 5 years younger than the stayers. It is 
remarkable tha t the proportion of Nobel laureates (who either already had received the Nobel 
Prize or were to receive it in later years) among the dismissed was far higher than one would 
expect given the total number of dismissals. The fact tha t the dismissed made above average 
scientific contributions is also exemplified by the fact tha t the proportion of publications in 
the leading journals was about 20 percent which is higher than the 13 percent which would 
correspond to their head count.8 When considering a publication’s quality by weighting the 
publications with subsequent citations of a paper, the high productivity of the dismissed becomes 
even more apparent. The dismissed physicists published about 39 percent of citation weighted 
publications. The fact that the dismissed physicists were of above average quality has already 
been noticed by Fischer (1991).
About 33 percent of the publications in the top journals were co-written papers. About 11 
percent (for the dismissed 14 percent) of all papers were written with a coauthor who was 
teaching at a university in Germany. There are two main reasons for the fact tha t only one 
third of the coauthors were teaching at a German university. Presumably, a large fraction of 
coauthors of the physicists in my dataset are their assistants or PhD. students. Furthermore, 
coauthors could teach at a foreign university or be employed by a research institute. The last 
line of Table 1.3 shows the low level of cooperation within a department; only about 4 percent 
(9 percent of the dismissed) of all publications were coauthored with a member of staff from 
the same university.
8 For a more detailed description of the publications data see the Data Section.
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The dismissed chemists are more similar to the average in their field as can be seen from 
the second panel of Table 1.3. The proportion of full professors among the dismissed almost 
corresponded to their proportion among all chemists. Also their average age was very close to 
the population average in chemistry. The proportions of Nobel Prize winners, publications and 
citation weighted publications was higher than one would expect from their proportion in the 
overall population. These differences, however, were smaller than in physics. The percentage 
of co-written papers was much higher in chemistry compared to physics. About 76 percent of 
published papers were published by more than one author. Interestingly only about 12 percent 
of the top publications in chemistry were published with coauthors who had the Right to Teach 
at a German university. Only about 5 percent of all published papers were copublished with a 
coauthor who was a member of staff in the same department. This is low given the overall high 
level of coauthorship in chemistry.
In mathematics the differences between the dismissed scholars and the stayers are even more 
pronounced than in physics. The dismissed scholars were less likely to be full professors but they 
were also on average about 7 years younger than the stayers. The dismissed not only published 
more than their counterparts who remained at the German universities but their publications 
seem to be of much higher scientific importance. This is exemplified by the fact that their 
publications were cited far more often than their proportion in the general population would 
suggest. Only about 11 percent (15 percent for the dismissed) of the publications in mathematics 
were coauthored. An even smaller fraction of the papers were coauthored with researchers who 
had the right to teach at the German universities. Coauthorships with mathematicians from 
the same department only accounted for 3 percent of all published papers (4 percents for the 
dismissed). This suggests an even lower level of inter-departmental cooperation in mathematics 
compared to the other two subjects.
Despite a relatively similar quantitative loss in all three subjects the qualitative loss in chemistry 
was lower than in physics. The qualitative loss in mathematics was even higher than in physics. 
Before investigating the effect of the dismissal on the productivity of researchers who stayed in 
Germany I first describe my data sources in the next section.
1.3 D ata
1.3.1 Data on Dismissed Scholars
The data on the dismissed scholars is obtained from a number of different sources. The main 
source is the "List of Displaced German Scholars". This list was compiled by the relief orga­
nization "Emergency Alliance of German Scholars Abroad". W ith the aid of the Rockefeller 
Foundation it was published in 1936. The purpose of publishing this list was to secure positions 
for the dismissed researchers in countries outside Nazi Germany. Overall, the list contained 
about 1650 names of researchers from all university subjects. The list gives a very complete 
picture of the dismissal of scholars by the Nazi government. I extracted all dismissed physicists, 
chemists, and mathematicians from the list. In the appendix I show a sample page from the
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physics section of that list. Interestingly, there are four physicists on that page who had already 
received the Nobel Prize or were to receive it in later years. Out of various reasons a small 
number of dismissed scholars did not appear in that list. To get a more comprehensive picture 
of all dismissals I complement the information in the "List of Displaced German Scholars" with 
information from other sources.
The main additional source is the "Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 
nach 1933 - Vol. II : The arts, sciences, and literature". The compilation of the handbook 
was initiated by the "Institut fur Zeitgeschichte Mtinchen" and the "Research Foundation for 
Jewish Immigration New York". Published in 1983 it contained short biographies of artists and 
university researchers who emigrated from Nazi Germany. Kroner (1983) extracted a list of all 
dismissed university researchers from the handbook. I use Kroner’s list to append my list of all 
dismissed scholars.
In addition to these two main data sources I rely on data compiled by historians who studied 
individual academic subjects during the Nazi era. Beyerchen (1977) included a list of dismissed 
physicists in his book about the physics community in Nazi Germany. I use the information 
included in that list to amend my list of dismissed scholars. Furthermore, I use data which is 
contained in an extensive list of dismissed chemists which was compiled by Deichmann (2001). 
In a similar fashion I complement my list with the information listed in Siegmund-Schultze’s 
(1998) book on dismissed mathematicians.
It is important to note that my list of dismissals also contains the few researchers who were 
initially exempted from being dismissed but resigned voluntarily. The vast majority of them 
would have been dismissed due to the racial laws of 1935 anyway and were thus only anticipating 
their dismissal. All of these voluntary resignations were directly caused by the discriminatory 
policies of the Nazi regime.
1.3.2 Data on all Scientists at German Universities between 1925 and 1938
To investigate the impact of the dismissals on the researchers who stayed at the German univer­
sities I construct a full list of all scientists at the German universities from 1925 to 1938. Using 
the semi-official University Calendar9 I compile an annual roster of all physicists, chemists, and 
mathematicians at the German universities from the winter semester 1924/1925 (lasting from 
November 1924 until April 1925) until the winter semester 1937/1938. The data for the tech­
nical universities starts in 1927/1928, because the University Calendar included the technical 
universities only after that date. The University Calendar is a compilation of all individual uni­
versity calendars fisting the lectures held by each scholar in a given department. If a researcher 
was not lecturing in a given semester he was still listed under the heading "not lecturing". From 
this list of lectures I infer the subject of each researcher to  construct yearly faculty lists of all
9 The University Calender was published by J.A. Barth. He collected the official university calenders from all 
German universities and compiled them into one volume. Originally named "Deutscher Universitatskalender". 
It was renamed into "Kalender der deutschen Universitaten und technischen Hochschulen" in 1927/1928. From 
1929/1930 it was renamed into "Kalender der Deutschen Universitaten und Hochschulen". In 1933 it was again 
renamed into "Kalender der reichsdeutschen Universitaten und Hochschulen".
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physics, chemistry, and mathematics departments. This allows me to track yearly changes of 
all researchers of individual departments between 1925 and 1938.10,11
To assess a researcher’s specialization I consult seven volumes of "Kurschners deutscher Gelehrten- 
Kalender". These books are listings of German researchers compiled in irregular intervals since
1925.12 The editors of the book obtained their data by sending out questionnaires to the re­
searchers asking them to provide information on their scientific career. I use the information in 
all volumes published until 1950 to ascertain a scientist’s specialization. Because of the blurred 
boundaries of the specializations in mathematics many mathematicians did not provide their 
specialization. In those cases I infer their specialization from the main publications they list 
in the " Gelehrtenkalender". As the participation of the researchers in the complication was 
voluntary not all of them provided their personal information to the editor. If I cannot find 
a scientist’s specialization in any of the volumes of the "Gelehrtenkalender", which occurs for 
about 10 percent of the scientists, I conduct an internet-search for the scientist to obtain his 
specialization. Overall I obtain the scientist’s specialization for about 98 percent of all re­
searchers.13 Table 1.18 in the appendix of chapter 1 gives an overview of all specializations and 
the fraction of scientists in each of them.
1.3.3 Publication Data
To measure a researcher’s productivity I construct a dataset containing the publications of each 
researcher in the top academic journals of the time. At that time most German researchers 
published in German journals. The quality of these German journals was usually very high 
because many of the German physicists, chemists, and mathematicians were among the leaders 
in their field. This is especially true for the time before the dismissal as is exemplified by the 
following quote; "Before the advent of the Nazis the German physics journals (Zeitschrift fur  
Physik, Annalen der Physik, Physikalische Zeitschrift) had always served as the central organs 
of world science in this domain... In 1930 approximately 700 scientific papers were printed
10 At that time a researcher could hold a number of different university positions. Ordinary Professors held a 
chair for a certain subfield and were all civil servants. Furthermore there were different types of Extraordinary 
Professors. First, they could be either civil servants (beamteter Extraordinarus) or not have the status of a civil 
servant (nichtbeamteter Extraordinarius). Universities also distinguished between extraordinary extraordinary 
professors (ausserplanmafiiger Extraordinarus) and planned extraordinary professors (planmafliger Extraordinar­
ius). Then as the lowest level of university teachers there were the Privatdozenten who were never civil servants. 
Privatdozent is the first university position a researcher could obtain after the ’venia legendi’.
11 The dismissed researchers who were not civil servants (Privatdozenten and some Extraordinary Professors) all 
disappear from the University Calendar between the winter semester 1932/1933 to the winter semester 1933/1934. 
Some of the dismissed researchers who were civil servants (Ordinary Professors and some Extraordinary Profes­
sors), however, were still listed even after they were dismissed. The original law forced Jewish civil servants into 
early retirement. As they were still on the states’ payroll some universities still listed them in the University 
Calendar even though they were not allowed to teach or do research anymore. My fist of dismissals includes the 
exact year after which somebody was barred from teaching and researching at a German university. I thus use 
the dismissal data to determine the actual dismissal date and not the date a dismissed scholar disappears from 
the University Calendars.
12The first volume was compiled in 1925. The other volumes I have used were published for the years 1926, 
1928/29, 1931, 1935, 1940/41, and 1950.
13 Some researchers cite more than one specialization. Therefore, physicists and chemists have up to two 
specializations and mathematicians up to four.
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in its (the Zeitschrift ftir Physik's) seven volumes of which 280 were by foreign scientists." 
(American Association for the Advancement of Science (1941)). Simonsohn (2007) shows that 
neither the volume nor the content of the "Zeitschrift ftir Physik" changed dramatically in the 
post dismissal years until 1938. Not surprisingly, however, he finds that the dismissed physicists 
published less and less in the German journals after the dismissal. It is important to note that 
the identification strategy outlined below relies on changes in publications of researchers in 
different German departments which were differentially affected by the dismissal. A decline in 
the quality of the considered journals would therefore not affect my results as all regressions are 
estimated including year fixed effects.
The list of top publications is based on all German general science, physics, chemistry, and 
mathematics journals which are included in the "ISI Web of Science" for the time period 1915 
to 1940. Furthermore I add the leading general journals which were not published in Germany, 
namely Nature, Science, and the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London to the dataset. I 
also add four non-German top specialized journals which were suggested by historians of science 
as journals of some importance for the German scientific community.14 The "Web of Science" 
is an electronic database provided by Thomson Scientific containing all contributions in a very 
large number of science journals. In 2004 the database was extended to include publications 
between 1900 and 1945. The journals included in that extension were all journals which had 
published the most relevant articles in the years 1900 to 1945.15 This process insures that all 
publications which can be obtained for the early time period 1900 to 1945 were published in 
the most important journals.
Table 1.4 lists all journals used in my analysis. For each of these journals I obtain all articles 
published between 1925 and 1940 from the "ISI Web of Science". A very small number of the 
contributions in the top journals were letters to the editor or comments. I restrict my analysis 
to contributions classified as "articles" as they provide a cleaner measure for a researcher’s 
productivity. The database includes the names of the authors of each article and statistics on 
the number of subsequent citations of each of these articles. For each researcher I then calculate 
two yearly productivity measures. The first measure is equal to the sum of publications in top 
journals in a given year. In order to quantify an article’s quality I construct a second measure 
which accounts for the number of times the article was cited in any journal included in the Web 
of Science in the first 50 years after its publication. This includes citations in journals which 
are not in my fist of journals but which appear in the Web of Science. This therefore includes 
citations from the international scientific community and is not as heavily based on Germany as 
the publications measure. This measure, which I call citation weighted publications, is defined 
as the sum of citations (in the first 50 years after publication) of all articles published in a
14 The relevant journals for chemists were suggested by Ute Deichmann and John Andraos who both work on 
chemistry in the early 20th century. Additional journals for mathematics were suggested by Reinhard Siegmund- 
Schultze and David Wilkins; both are specialists in the history of mathematics.
15For that extension Thomson Scientific judged the importance of a journal by the later citatons (cited between 
1945 and 2004) in the Web of Science of articles published between 1900 and 1945. This measure insures that 
the most relevant journals for the time period 1900 to 1945 were included in the extention. For more details on 
the process see www.thomsonscientific.com/media/presentrep/facts/centuryofscience.pdf.
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certain year. The following simple example illustrates the construction of the citation weighted 
publications measure. Suppose a researcher published two top journal articles in 1932. One is 
cited 5 times in any journal covered by the Web of Science in the 50 years after its publication. 
The other article is cited 7 times in 50 years. Therefore the researcher’s citation weighed 
publications measure for 1932 is 5+7=12.
Table 1.19 lists the top researchers for each subject according to the citation weighted publi­
cations measure. The researchers in this table are the 20 researchers with the highest yearly 
averages of citation weighted publications for publications between 1925 and 1932. It is reassur­
ing to realize that the vast majority of these top 20 researchers are well known in the scientific 
community. Economists will find it interesting that Johann von Neumann is the most cited 
mathematician. The large number of Nobel laureates among the top 20 researchers indicates 
tha t citation weighted publications are a good measure of a scholar’s productivity. Nevertheless, 
the measure is not perfect. As the "Web of Science” only reports last name and the initial of 
the first name for each author there axe some cases where I cannot unambiguously match re­
searchers and publications. In these cases I assign the publication to the researcher whose field 
is most closely related to the field of the journal in which the article was published. In cases 
where this assignment rule is still ambiguous between two researchers I assign each researcher 
half of the publications (and half of the citations). Another problem is the relatively large 
number of misspellings of authors’ names. All articles published between 1925 and 1940 were 
of course published on paper. In order to include these articles into the electronic database 
Thomson Scientific employees scanned all articles published in the historically most relevant 
journals. The scanning was error prone and thus lead to misspellings of some names. As far as 
I discovered these misspellings I manually corrected them. It is possible, however, that there 
are still misspellings which I could not detect. Therefore, there may still be articles which are 
not or wrongly assigned to the relevant author.
I merged the publications data to the roster of all German physicists, chemists, and mathemati­
cians. From the list of dismissed scholars I can identify the researchers who were dismissed and 
those who stayed at the German universities. The end result is a panel dataset of all physicists, 
chemists, and mathematicians at all German universities from 1925 until 1938 with detailed 
information on their publications in the top academic journals and their dismissal status.
1.4 Identification
The main purpose of this chapter is to estimate peer effects among scientists. The standard 
approach when estimating peer effects consists of regressing an individual’s productivity on the 
average productivity of his peers. The productivity of academic researchers, however, is not only 
affected by the average quality of their peers but also by the number of peers they can interact 
with. Having smart colleagues may be useful in many ways: coauthored work may be of higher 
quality and comments from prolific peers may be useful for their own work. Furthermore, peers 
may attract more research funding to the department, or have better contacts to researchers
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outside the department. Having more colleagues in your department may be important because 
all these interactions are more likely to occur if there are more peers to interact with, especially 
because it may be easier to find colleagues who are working on similar research questions. 
Researchers in larger departments may also benefit from a lower teaching load and from teaching 
more specialized courses which are more related to their current research.
As university departments differ substantially in the average quality of its researchers and also 
in size it is important to distinguish these two dimensions of peer effects for academic research. 
In order to estimate peer effects among scientists I therefore propose the following regression:
(1) #  Publications^ =  + ^ ( #  of Peers)ut +  ^ (A vg . Peer Quality)ut
+  /34A ge D um m iesiut +  /35YearFE t  +  /SgUniversityFEu +  j97IndividualFE j +  £ iUt
1 regress the number of publications of researcher i in university u and year t on measures of 
the peer group and other controls. In order to control for the quality of a published article I 
also use a second dependent variable, namely citation weighted publications. As the subjects in 
consideration are quite different I estimate these regressions separately for physics, chemistry, 
and mathematics. The peer group measures are a researcher’s number of peers and the average 
quality of these peers. Average peer quality is calculated as the mean of the average productivity 
(between 1925 and 1932)16 of a researcher’s peers.17 Over time changes in the average peer 
quality measure will therefore occur only if the composition of the department changes. The 
yearly fluctuations in publications of the same set of peers will not affect the peer group measure. 
The underlying assumption of this measure is therefore that Albert Einstein always has the same 
effect on his peers independent of how much he publishes in a given year.
It is quite likely that the effect of peers is only measurable after a certain time lag. Peers 
influence the creation of new ideas and papers before the actual date of publication. Another 
delay is caused by the publication lag (the time it takes for a paper to appear in a journal 
after the paper was submitted by the author). Science research, however, is published faster 
than research in other subjects like economics. Anecdotal evidence suggests tha t the effect 
of peers should thus be measured with a lag of about one year. An illustrative example of 
the timing of peer interactions in science research at the relevant time is the postulation of the 
"uncertainty principle" by Heisenberg in 1927. In 1926 Heisenberg was working with Niels Bohr 
in Copenhagen. It is reported tha t during that time Heisenberg and Bohr spent days and nights 
discussing the concepts of quantum mechanics in order to refine them. In early 1927 Niels Bohr 
went on a holiday and it was during tha t time that Heisenberg discovered and formulated his 
famous "uncertainty principle". He published this discovery in the "Zeitschrift ftir Physik" in
1927.18 Therefore I use a lag of one year for the peer group variables when estimating equation
161 use the pre-dismissal period to measure the average quality of peers as this measure will not be affected by 
the dismissal. Using a measure which considers the average productivity of each researchers from 1925 to 1938 
does not have a substantial impact on my findings.
17Say a department has 3 researchers in 1930. One published on average 10 (citation weighted) publications 
between 1925 and 1932. The other two have 20 and 15 citation weighted publications respectively. Then the 
average peer quality variable for researcher 1 in 1930 will be (20+15)/2 =  17.5. Average peer quality for researcher
2 will be (10+15)/2  =  12.5 and so on.
18 For a detailed historic description of the discovery of the uncertainty principle see Lindley (2007).
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(1).
As further controls I include a full set of 5-year age group dummies to control for life-cycle 
changes in productivity when estimating equation ( l) .19 Furthermore, I control for yearly 
fluctuations in publications which affect all researchers by including year fixed effects. To 
control for individual differences in a researcher’s talent I also add individual fixed effects to 
all specifications. Furthermore, I add university fixed effects to control for university specific 
factors affecting a researcher’s productivity. These can be separately identified because some 
scientists change universities. I show below tha t the results are hardly affected by including 
university fixed effects in addition to individual fixed effects.
A number of issues occur when using OLS to estimate equation (1). One problem is caused 
by the fact tha t a researcher’s productivity is affected by his peers but at the same time the 
researcher affects the productivity of his peers. Manski (1993) refers to this problem as the 
reflection problem. It is therefore important to keep in mind tha t the estimated effects will be 
total effects after all productivity adjustments have taken place.
Other problems, however, are potentially more severe in this context. An important problem 
is caused by selection effects. These occur not only because of self selection of researchers into 
departments with peers of similar quality but also because departments appoint professors of 
similar quality. Furthermore, larger departments tend to hire researchers with above average 
qualities. The inclusion of university fixed effects would in principle address this problem. 
Differential time trends of different departments, however, would make selection issues an im­
portant problem even in models which include university fixed effects. These selection effects 
introduce a correlation of the peer group measures with the error term and will thus bias the 
estimates of j32 and /33.
Another problem may be caused by omitted variables. Omitted factors may not only affect a 
researcher’s productivity but also the size of the department or the average productivity of his 
peers. This would again bias OLS estimates of fi2 and fi3.
Furthermore, measurement error could bias the estimates of regression (1). An important 
measurement problem is the correct peer group of a researcher. In addition to tha t are average 
number of publications (citation weighted) of peers are by no means a perfect measure for the 
quality of a researcher’s peer group. Even if the number of publications were a perfect measure 
of peer quality the variable would still suffer from measurement error due to misspelling of 
names in the publications data. Omitted variables and measurement error will thus introduce 
further biases of (32 and /?3.
An instrumental variables strategy can deal with the selection issues, the omitted variables 
bias, and the measurement error problem. I therefore propose the dismissal of scholars by the 
Nazi government as an instrument for the scientists’ peer group. Figure 1.1 shows the effect 
of the dismissal on the peer group of physicists. The top panel shows the average department 
size for two groups of physicists: physicists in departments with dismissals in 1933 or 1934 
and physicists in departments without dismissals. It becomes clear from Figure 1.1 that the
19Levin and Stephan (1991) show that age is an important determinant of scientists’ productivity.
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F igure  1.1: Physics: First Stages
affected departments were of above average size. The size of departments without dismissals 
did hardly change over this time period. In the affected departments, however, the dismissal 
led to a strong reduction in the number of physicists. The top panel of Figure 1.1 also shows 
that the dismissals affected the German university system for years after the actual dismissal. 
This is because the affected departments could not immediately fill their vacancies due to the 
lack of suitable researchers without a position and the slow appointment procedures. Successors 
for dismissed chaired professors, for example, could only be appointed if the dismissed scholars 
gave up all their pension rights because the dismissed professors were originally placed into early 
retirement. The states did not want to pay the salary for the replacement and the pension for 
the dismissed professor at the same time. As some of the dismissed hoped to recuperate their 
chair after what they hoped would be a short Nazi interlude many of them did not immediately 
cede they pension rights. It thus took years to fill open positions in most cases. Highlighting 
this problem Max Wien, a physicist in Jena, wrote a letter to Bernhard Rust, the Minister of 
Education in late November 1934. Describing the situation for chaired professorships at the 
German universities he stated in this letter that "out of the 100 existing [chaired professor] 
teaching positions, 17 are not filled at present, while under natural retirements maybe two or
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three would be vacant. This state of affairs gives cause for the gravest concern..." (cited after 
Hentschel 1996).
The second panel of Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of average peer quality in the two types of 
departments. Obviously one would expect a change in the average quality of peers only if the 
quality of the dismissed was either above or below the pre-dismissal department average. The 
bottom panel of Figure 1.1 demonstrates two interesting points: the dismissals occurred at de­
partments of above average quality and within those departments the dismissed were on average 
more productive than the physicists who were not dismissed. As a result the average quality 
of peers in affected departments fell after 1933 while it remained very stable for researchers in 
unaffected departments. This graphs only shows averages of the two groups of departments. 
As can be seen from Table 1.3 some departments with dismissals also lost below average peers. 
For those departments the average quality increased due to the dismissal. Overall, however, the 
dismissal reduced average department quality in physics.
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Figure  1.2: Chemistry: First Stages
Figure 1.2 explores the effect of the dismissal on the peer group of chemists. The top panel of 
Figure 1.2 plots the department size for chemists in affected and unaffected universities. Like 
in physics most of the dismissals occurred in larger departments and had a strong effect on the 
department size of these departments. The bottom panel of Figure 1.2 explores the effect of the
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dismissal on the average quality of peers. The affected departments were also of above average 
quality but the difference was less pronounced than in physics. As suggested by the summary 
statistics presented before the dismissal had a smaller overall effect on the average quality of 
the affected chemistry departments. Despite the fact that the dismissal did not have a large 
effect on peer quality for the average across all departments it did indeed have strong effects 
on peer quality as can be seen from Table 1.3. The effects in departments with reductions in 
peer quality and in departments with improvements in peer quality, however, almost cancel 
out in the aggregate. Figure 1.3 investigates the effect of the dismissals on the peer group 
of mathematicians. The top panel of Figure 1.3 shows the evolution of department sizes for 
mathematicians in departments with and without dismissals. Similarly to physics and chemistry 
the affected departments were larger before the dismissal. After 1933 the department size fell 
sharply in the affected universities. The bottom panel of Figure 1.3 investigates the effect of 
the dismissal on the average quality of the researchers’ peer group. The mathematicians in 
the affected departments were above average quality before the dismissal. Due to the dismissal 
average peer quality fell drastically in the affected departments because average productivity of 
the dismissed was above average productivity of their respective department.
Mathematics
with dismissals
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with dismissals
F igure 1.3: Mathematics: First Stages
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Figures 1.1 to 1.3 suggest that the dismissal had indeed an effect on the number of peers and 
their average quality. It is therefore possible to use the dismissal as an instrumental variable for 
the endogenous peer group variables. In this setting there are two endogenous variables: the 
number of peers and the average quality of peers. This gives rise to  two first stage equations:
(2) #  o f Peers,,* =  7 i  +  7 2 ( #  D ism issed),,* +  7 3(D ism issal induced R eduction in Peer Q uality),,*
+  7 4 A ge D um m ies,,,* +  7 sY earFE t +  7 6U niversityFE u +  7 7Ind ividualFE , +  £iut
(3) A vg. Peer Quality,,* =  <5i +  <^2 ( #  D ism issed)„t +  ^ (D ism issa l induced R eduction  in Peer Q uality)„*
+  7 4 A ge D um m ies,,,* +  7 sYearFE* +  7 6U niversityFE u +  7 7IndividualFE j +  £iUt
It is important to note tha t all regressions estimated in this chapter are estimated for scientists 
who were present at the beginning of 1933 and were not dismissed (the so called stayers). The 
dismissal is then used as a source of exogenous variation in their peer group. Equation (2) is the 
first stage regression for department size. The main instrument for department size is the num­
ber of dismissed peers between 1933 and 1934 in a given department which is 0 until 1933 and 
equal to the number of dismissals thereafter.20 I also include another instrument which captures 
the dismissal induced reduction in average quality of peers. This will be more im portant for 
equation (3), the first stage equation for average peer quality. The dismissal induced reduction 
in average peer quality is measured as the pre-dismissal average quality of all researchers in the 
department minus the average quality of the researchers who were not dismissed. The dismissal 
induced reduction in average quality variable is 0 until 1933. Researchers in departments with 
dismissals of colleagues of above average quality (relative to the department average) have a 
positive value of the dismissal induced reduction in peer quality variable after 1933. Scientists 
in departments with dismissal of below average quality have a negative value of the reduction in 
peer quality variable after 1933. The variable will remain 0 for researchers who did not experi­
ence any dismissal in their department or for scientists who lost peers who’s quality was exactly 
equal to the department level average. The dismissals between 1933 and 1934 may have caused 
some researchers to switch university after 1933. This switching behaviour, however, will be 
endogenous and thus have a direct effect on the researchers’ productivity. To circumvent this 
problem I assign each scientist the relevant dismissal variables for the department he attended 
in the beginning of 1933.
The dismissals did affect all stayers in a department in a similar fashion. I therefore account 
for any dependence between observations within a department by clustering all results at the 
department level. This not only allows the error to be arbitrarily correlated for all researchers 
in one department at a given point in time but it also allows for serial correlation of these error 
terms.
20This variable is 0 until. 1933 for all departments (As I use a one year lag in the dismissal variables it is 
0 for 1933 inclusive). In 1934 it is equal to the number of researchers who were dismissed in 1933 in a given 
department. From 1935 onwards it is equal to the number of dismissals in 1933 and 1934. The following example 
illustrates this. In Gottingen there were 10 dismissals in mathematics in 1933 and one dismissal in 1934. The 
#  dismissed variable for mathematicians in Gottingen will therefore take the value 0 until 1933. It will be 10 in 
1934 and 11 from 1935 onwards.
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Using the dismissal as an instrumental variable relies on the assumption that the dismissal 
had no other effect on a researcher’s productivity than through its effect on the researcher’s 
peer group. Dismissal induced disruption effects would therefore be a potential threat to  the 
identification strategy. These could have occurred if the remaining scientists in the department 
had to take over more administrative or teaching responsibilities due to the dismissal. These 
effects would most probably lead to an upward bias of the instrumental variable results. The 
fact that I do not find evidence for peer effects neither at the department level nor at the 
specialization level, however, reduces the worry tha t this problem affects the findings of this 
chapter.
Another worry may be that the dismissals changed the incentive structure for stayers in the 
affected departments. Researchers in departments or specializations with many dismissals may 
have an incentive to work more to obtain one of the free chairs within the department. Their 
incentives could also be affected in the opposite direction if they lost an important advocate who 
was fostering their career. In this case they may decide to work less as the chances of obtaining 
a chair either in their own department or at another university could be lower. In order to 
address this concern I estimate a regression which regresses a dummy variable of holding a 
chair (equivalent to  being an ordinary professor) on the department level (and specialization 
level) variables of number dismissed and dismissal induced reduction in average peer quality 
and the same controls as the regressions proposed before.21 The results from this regression 
are presented in Table 1.20. The coefficients on the dismissal variables are all very small and 
none of them is significantly different from 0. This suggests tha t the results of this chapter are 
probably not contaminated by changes in the incentive structures in the affected departments. 
Before turning to the estimation of peer effects I now investigate the effect of the dismissals on 
the stayers’ productivity.
1.5 Effect o f  D ism issal on  R esearchers w ho rem ained in G erm any
1.5.1 Department Level Dismissal Effect
There is no doubt tha t the dismissal of the Jewish and "politically unreliable" scholars had 
a negative impact on the German universities. In this context it is especially interesting to 
investigate how the dismissal affected the researchers who stayed at the German universities. 
Did their research productivity suffer because they had less and worse peers? The following 
figures try to give a graphical answer to this question. Figure 1.4 plots the publications for 
stayers in two sets of physics departments: those with dismissals and those without dismissals. 
The yearly fluctuation in top journal publications is relatively large. Despite this fluctuation the 
figure suggests tha t the dismissal does not seem to have a very obvious effect on the publications 
of the stayers.
21 The estimated regression is:
(Holder of Chair)™* =  Pi +  /32( #  Dismissed)ut +  j03 (Dismissal induced |  in Peer Quality)ut +  /34Age 
Dummies™* +  /?5YearFEt +  /36UniversityFEu +  /37IndividualFEi +  e™t
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with dismissals
no dismissals
F igure 1.4: Reduced Form Physics
Figure 1.5 shows the evolution of the stayers’ publications in chemistry departments. The figure 
suggests no effect of the dismissal on the stayers’ productivity in chemistry.
Chemistry
with dsmissals
no dismissals
Figure 1.5: Reduced Form Chemistry
Figure 1.6 plots the top journal publications of mathematicians. Similarly to the other two 
subjects the dismissal does not seem to have a pronounced effect on the publications of the 
stayers.
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F igu re  1.6: Reduced Form Mathematics
Figures 1.4 to 1.6 seem to suggest that the dismissal did not have an effect on the publications 
of stayers in the affected department. In order to quantify the effect of the dismissal on the 
stayers I estimate the following reduced form equation.
(4) #  Publications,,,* =  f i\  +  /32( #  Dismissed),!* +  /33(Dism issal induced R eduction in Peer Quality),,*
+  /?4Age Dum m ies,,,* +  /35YearFEt /36U niversityFEu +  /37IndividualFE* +  £i„*
Using only the stayers I regress the researchers’ (citation weighted) publications in each year 
on the instruments proposed above. Namely the number of dismissed peers and the dismissal 
induced reduction in peer quality. Researchers in departments which were not affected will have 
a value of 0 for the dismissal variables. Researchers in departments with dismissals will have 0 
until 1933 and then the relevant value for the department to which they were affiliated at the 
beginning of 1933. I also include the same control variables as the ones proposed for regressions
(1) to (3). This regression is essentially a difference-in-differences estimate of the dismissal 
effect. It compares the change in publications from the pre to the post dismissal period for 
researchers at the affected departments to the change between the two periods for unaffected 
researchers.
Table 1.5 reports the reduced form results for the three subjects under consideration using 
the peers in a researcher’s department as the relevant peer group. Column (1) shows the 
results from estimating equation (4) without university fixed effects for physicists using the 
number of publications as the dependent variable. If the dismissal had a negative effect on the 
number of publications one would expect negative coefficients on the dismissal variables. Both 
the coefficient on the number of dismissed researchers and the one on the dismissal induced 
reduction in peer quality are very close to 0 and not significant. The coefficient on the dismissal 
induced reduction in peer quality is even positive in sign. This supports the graphical evidence 
that the publications of the stayers in the affected departments were not strongly affected by
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the dismissals. In column (2) I add university fixed effects to the specification. The inclusion of 
university fixed effects hardly affects the results. The dismissal does not have a significant effect 
on the stayers’ productivity. Column (3) shows the results for citation weighted publications 
as the dependent variable. Also these results are close to 0 and insignificant. Not surprisingly 
the coefficient is larger than in column (1) because the mean of citation weighted publications 
variable is 5.1 and thus higher than the mean of publications which is 0.5. The coefficient on 
the change in peer quality even has the ’wrong’ sign if one assumes that losing high quality 
peers should negatively affect a researcher’s productivity. The results including university fixed 
effects are reported in column (4). As for publications the inclusion of university fixed effects 
does hardly change the results and does not affect the finding that the dismissal did not affect 
the stayers’ productivity.
Columns (5) to (8) present the same regressions for chemists. The results using publications as 
the dependent variable not including university fixed effects are reported in column (5). The 
dismissal induced reduction in peer quality variable is again insignificant and even shows the 
wrong sign. There is some evidence that the number of dismissed researchers in a stayer’s 
department has a small negative effect on publications. After controlling for university fixed 
effects, however, the coefficient on the number of dismissed scholars is no longer significantly 
different from 0. The coefficient on the dismissal induced reduction in peer quality remains 
insignificant with the wrong sign. Using citation weighted publications all the coefficients are 
close to 0 and none of the coefficients is significant even without university fixed effects.
The results for mathematicians are reported in columns (9) to  (12). Once again the coefficients 
are very small and all insignificant. These results are a first indication that peers, measured 
at the department level, may not affect the productivity of scientists. As departments are 
comprised of scientists with different specializations I want to investigate whether the dismissal 
had an effect on the stayer’s productivity if one considers a narrower definition of his peer group. 
These results are reported in the next subsection.
1.5.2 Specialization Level Dismissal Effect
It may be the case that the researchers in a scientist’s department are an inadequate measure 
for his peer group if he mostly benefits from interactions with peers in his own specialization 
within the department. The idea is that theoretical physicists mostly interact with the other 
theoretical physicists in the department and less with experimental physicists. I therefore 
explore the dismissal effect on the stayers using only peers from a researcher’s own specialization 
as the relevant peer group.22 The regression is the same as regression (4) but instead of using 
the number of department level dismissals I use the number of specialization level dismissals. 
Similarly I use the reduction in average peer quality in a researcher’s specialization instead of 
the reduction at the department level.
2 2 If a researcher has more than one specialization his relevant peer group is defined as the sum of the peers of 
his specializations.
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The results for the specialization level peers are reported in Table 1.6.23 Columns (1) and
(2) show the results for physicists using the number of publications as the dependent variable. 
The estimated coefficients are very close to 0 and all insignificant. Using citation weighted 
publications the results are all insignificant as well, as can be seen in columns (3) and (4). 
Furthermore, all results for physicists have the wrong sign if one expects a negative dismissal 
effect.
The results for chemistry are reported in columns (5) to (8). None of the coefficients on the 
dismissal variables is significantly different from 0. The mathematics results are reported in 
columns (9) to (12). The coefficients on the dismissal variables are small and insignificant when 
using publications as the productivity measure. When using citation weighted publications as 
dependent variable I find significant negative effects for the dismissal induced reduction in peer 
quality. The number of dismissals in a mathematician’s specialization however does not affect 
his productivity.
The department level results suggest tha t neither the number of peers nor their average quality 
is very important for a researchers’ productivity. Furthermore, the specialization level results 
indicate tha t specialization level peer interactions are not im portant in physics and in chem­
istry. There is some indication that average peer quality in a researcher’s specialization may 
affect the productivity of mathematicians. The following section explores this in further detail 
by estimating the peer effects equation (1) instrumenting the peer group variables with the 
dismissal.
1.6 U sing  th e  D ism issa l to  Identify  Peer E ffects in Science
1.6.1 Department Level Peer Effects
As suggested by Figures 1.1 to 1.3 the dismissal had a strong effect on the peer group of the 
stayers at the German universities. I therefore use this exogenous source of variation in a 
researcher’s peer group to identify peer effects. I start by analysing department level peer effect 
before I investigate specialization level peer effects in the following subsection. As explained in 
the identification section I estimate two first stage equations: one for the number of peers (i.e. 
department size) and one for the average quality of peers in a researcher’s department. The 
first stage results are presented in Table 1.7.
Column (1) reports the results from estimating the first stage regression for physicists with 
department size as the dependent variable. The number of dismissed physicists in a researcher’s 
department has a very strong and significant effect on department size. Reassuringly, the 
dismissal induced change in the average quality of peers does not seem to have a large effect on 
department size. The first stage regression for the average peer quality in physics is presented 
in column (2). The number of dismissals in the department does not have a significant effect on
23 Due to a small number of missing values for the specialization of a researcher the number of observations is 
slighly lower than for the department level specifications.
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the average quality of peers. The dismissal induced change in peer quality, however, is a very 
strong and significant predictor of average peer quality for physicists.
Columns (3) and (4) report the first stage regressions for chemists. The results are very similar: 
the number of dismissals in a department is a very good predictor for department size and the 
dismissal induced change in peer quality is a very good predictor for the average quality of 
peers. The regressions for mathematics are presented in columns (5) and (6) and also exhibit a 
very similar pattern. Overall, the dismissal seems to be a very strong instrument not only for 
department size but also for the average quality of peers.
Table 1.8 reports the results from estimating the peer effects model as proposed in equation 
(1). The first columns of Table 1.8 show the results for physicists. Column (1) reports the OLS 
results with publications as the dependent variable. The OLS results are not very informative 
due to the problems illustrated in the identification section. I therefore turn immediately to 
discussing the IV results presented in column (2) in which I use the dismissal to instrument the 
peer group variables.24 The coefficient on the number of peers is very small and not significantly 
different from 0. The coefficient on peer quality is also very small and not significant. It even has 
the wrong sign if one were expecting positive peer effects from interactions with high quality 
peers. The standard error implies tha t one can rule out any positive effects of average peer 
quality with 89 percent confidence. For the number of peers one can rule out any positive 
effect larger than .087 with 95 percent confidence. Column (3) reports the OLS result using 
citation weighted publications as the dependent variable. The IV results with citation weighted 
publications as the dependent variable are reported in column (4). Once again, the coefficients 
on the peer group variables are not significantly different from 0 and the coefficient on average 
peer quality is even negative. Not surprisingly the coefficients are larger in magnitude because 
the mean of citation weighted publications is much larger than the mean of publications.
The chemistry results are reported in the next few columns of Table 1.8. Column (6) reports IV 
results when using publications as the dependent variable. The coefficients on department size 
and on the average number of peers are both very close to 0 and insignificant. The coefficient 
on the average quality of peers even has a negative coefficient. These results are mirrored in 
column (8) when using citation weighted publications as the dependent variable. The results 
for mathematicians are shown in the last few columns of Table 1.8 and are very similar to the 
ones in physics and chemistry: the coefficients on the peer group variables are all small and not 
significantly different from 0.
The results presented in Table 1.8 show no evidence for department level peer effects in any 
of the three subjects. The fact that the results are very similar for all three subjects can be 
seen as a confirmation that there are indeed no department level peer effects in this setting.
24In this setup the instruments are strong predictors of the peer group variables. Furthermore, the model is 
just identified as the number of instruments is equal to the number of endogenous variables. There is thus no 
worry of bias due to weak instruments. Stock and Jogo (2005) characterize instruments to be weak not only if 
they lead to biased IV results but also if hypothesis tests of IV parameters suffer from severe size distortions. 
They propose values of the Cragg-Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue statistic for which a Wald test at the 5 
percent level will have an actual rejection rate of no more than 10 percent. In this case the critical value is 7.03 
and thus far below the Cragg-Donald statistics for the first stages for physics, chemistry, and mathematics which 
is reported at the bottom of Table 8.
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Also the fact tha t I find very similar results for publications and citation weighted publications 
is reassuring. This indicates that differences in citation behaviour of articles from scientists in 
departments with or without dismissals cannot explain these findings. The following subsection 
analyses peer effects using a narrower definition of a researcher’s peer group.
1.6.2 Specialization Level Peer Effects
The relevant peer group considered for the following regressions is defined as all researchers 
with the same specialization in the scientist’s department. For an experimental physicist his 
peers are now only the other experimentalists in his department but not the theoretical physi­
cists, technical physicists or astrophysicists. The first stage results for specialization level peers 
are reported in Table 1.9. The first stage results are again very strong and show tha t the 
dismissal is a good predictor for a scientist’s number of (specialization level) peers and their 
respective quality especially in physics in chemistry. For mathematicians the dismissal variables 
are slightly less significant which is due to the fact that many mathematicians have more than 
one specialization.
Table 1.10 reports the results from estimating equation (1) with specialization level peer vari­
ables. The IV results for physics using publications as the relevant dependent variable are 
reported in column (2). Similarly to before the estimated peer group coefficients are very close 
to 0 and all insignificant. Both peer group variables even have a negative sign. The standard 
errors implies than one can rule out any positive effects for the number of peers larger than 0.04 
with 95 percent confidence. Similarly any positive effects larger than 0.04 can be ruled out for 
the quality of peers. Keeping in mind tha t the mean of the publication variable is about 0.5 
for physicists these are precisely estimated zeros. Using citation weighted publications as the 
dependent variable does not affect these conclusions as can be seen from the results reported in 
column (4)..
The results for chemists are all close to 0 and insignificant, too. For publications one can rule 
out any positive effects of having one more peer greater than 0.098 with 95 percent confidence. 
For the average quality one can rule out any positive effects greater than 0.009 with 95 percent 
confidence. These are again very small coefficients if one considers the mean of the publication 
variable for chemistry which is about 1.7.
The results for mathematics are less precisely estimated than for physics and chemistry.25 But 
also for mathematics there is no evidence for any significant peer effects. The results on peer 
effects in a researcher’s specialization confirm the finding tha t peer effects do not seem to play 
an important role within academic departments. The following section probes the robustness 
of these results before I turn to investigating peer effects among coauthors.
25 The Cragg-Donald statistics shows that there is no problem of weak instruments as the relevant critical value 
is 7.03 in this setup.
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1.7  S en sitiv ity  o f  D epartm ent Level IV  R esu lts
Table 1.11 shows results from a number of robustness checks for department level peer effects for 
physics. Columns (1) and (2) show the baseline results for publications and citation weighted 
publications respectively. The fact that I do not find any significant peer effects may be due to 
including data from 1933 and 1934 in my estimation. A major part of the dismissals occurred in 
those two years. The concomitant circumstances of the dismissal may have affected the research 
and publishing process in a way that made me underestimate peer effects. In order to address 
this issue I therefore re-estimate the IV equation omitting the data from 1933 of 1934. The 
results from this exercise are presented in columns (3) and (4). These results suggest tha t the 
disruption of 1933 and 1934 does not drive my findings for physicists.
Another hypothesis may be tha t peer effects are more im portant in the early stages of a re­
searcher’s career. Alternatively they may be more important for older researchers. These 
hypotheses are investigated in regressions reported in columns (5) to (8). I split the sample into 
researchers younger than 45 and researchers older than 45. The results indicate th a t neither 
young physicists nor old physicists benefit from the number of quality of the peers in their 
department.
Another worry may be tha t the productivity of stayers in the affected departments was following 
an upward trend before the dismissal. This would lead to an underestimate of the dismissal 
effect and thus bias the IV results downwards. This issue is addressed by including university 
specific time trends when estimating the IV model. The results for physics including university 
specific time trends are presented in columns (9) and (10) of Table 1.11. Including university 
specific time trends does not affect the findings presented before.
Tables 1.12 and 1.13 show the same regressions for department level peer effects among chemists 
and mathematicians. None of the peer group variables is significantly different from 0 in any of 
the robustness checks. This indicates that peer effects are indeed absent at the department level. 
The same robustness checks for specialization level peer effects are presented in Tables 1.21 to 
1.23 in the appendix of chapter 1. The coefficients on the peer group variables for specialization 
level peers do not change much for any of the three subjects. Almost all coefficients remain very 
close to zero and are insignificant. For older physicists the number of peers variable is significant 
at the 5 percent level with an unexpected sign. This result would indicate that having more 
peers negatively affects the productivity of older physicists.
The robustness checks support the evidence that peer effects are inexistent at the department 
level and at the specialization level. In the following section I explore peer effects among an 
even smaller set of peers, namely among coauthors.
1.8 Effect o f  D ism issal on  C oauthors
This section analyses peer effects among coauthors. Interactions among coauthors can take very 
different levels of intensity. The most intense form of interaction is the coauthoring of papers. 
It is not clear whether one would like to call this interaction a peer effect. Most people would
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probably call the coauthoring of papers joint production. Nonetheless there are other possible 
interactions among coauthors. They may also discuss work which they will not publish together. 
This form of interaction would be a real peer effect.
I investigate peer interactions among coauthors by analysing the change in productivity of 
scientists who lose a coauthor due to the dismissal. As the fraction of papers coauthored with 
another faculty level researcher is only 6.3 percent in mathematics, only one mathematician 
who stayed in Germany lost a coauthor due to the dismissal. Therefore I cannot analyse the 
effect of losing a coauthor for mathematics. In physics and chemistry, however, there were 
enough researchers who lost a coauthor due to the dismissal. Figure 1.7 illustrates the impact 
of losing a coauthor for physics. The figure plots average yearly publications for two groups of 
researchers; researchers who lost a high quality coauthor due to the dismissal and researchers 
without dismissed coauthors. Figure 1.7 suggests that physicists who lost a prolific coauthor 
had a drop in their research productivity but managed to recover after some years.
Physics
Publications of S
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F igure 1.7: Effect of Dismissal on Coauthors Physics
Figure 1.8 shows the same graph for chemists. The productivity of chemists who lost a coauthor 
falls after the dismissal. Similarly to the effect in physics the productivity of chemists with 
dismissed coauthors recovers some years after the dismissal.
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F igure  1.8: Effect of Dismissal on Coauthors Chemistry
In the following I investigate the effect of the dismissal in further detail. I therefore estimate 
the following reduced form equation:
(5) #  Publicationsiut =  + /? 2 ( #  Dismissed Coauthors)iut +  ^ (A v g .  Q uality of Dismissed C oauthors)iUt
+  /34Age Dum m iesjUt +  /35YearFEt +  /96UniversityFEu +  /37IndividualFEj +
I regress the number of (citation weighted) publications of researcher i in period t and university 
u on the number of dismissed coauthors, the average quality (measured as before as the yearly 
average of pre-dismissal citation weighted publications) of the dismissed coauthors, and the same 
controls as in the regressions reported above. For the basic regression a scientist’s coauthors are 
defined as all colleagues who have coauthored a paper with the scientist in the last five years 
before the dismissal; i.e. from 1928 to 1932. It is important to note that the dismissed coauthors 
do not have to be from the same department and indeed are rarely so. As before I estimate 
this regression for researchers staying in Germany only (the so-called stayers). This regression 
corresponds to the reduced form regressions reported for the department and specialization 
level peers. An equivalent instrumental variable approach as before is not feasible for coauthors 
because the timing of the peer interactions cannot be well defined for coauthors. It is neither 
clear when peer interactions among coauthors start nor when these interactions end because 
they are likely to interact also before and after they have coauthored papers. I therefore focus 
on the reduced form results for coauthors.
The regression estimates of equation (5) are reported in Table 1.14.26 Columns (1) and (2)
261 am  e s tim a tin g  th e se  regression s on  th e  sam e sa m p le  a s th e  d ep a rtm en t le v e l regression s rep orted  before. 
T h e  n u m b er o f  o b serv a tio n s d iffers s lig h tly  from  th e  n u m b er o f  o b ser v a tio n s in th e  d ep a rtm en t lev e l sp ec ifica tio n  
b eca u se  th e  d ep a rtm en t level sp ec ifica tio n s  in clu d e a  researcher tw ic e  if  he h a s a  jo in t a p p o in tm en t a t  tw o  
u n iv ersities  (T h is  o ccu rs very  rarely. E s tim a tin g  th e  d ep a rtm en t an d  sp e c ia liz a tio n  level w ith  w e ig h ts to  acco u n t  
for th e  few  researchers w h o  are a p p o in ted  at tw o  d ep a rtm en ts  d o e s  n o t a lter  th o se  resu lts ). T h e  n u m b er o f  
researchers in  th e  tw o se ts  o f  regression s, how ever, is  e x a c t ly  th e  sa m e  as ca n  b e  se en  from  th e  n u m b er o f  
in clu d ed  researchers.
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show the results for physics. The coefficient on the number of dismissed coauthors is not 
significantly different from 0. The coefficient on the average quality of dismissed coauthors, 
however, in column (2) shows tha t losing a coauthor of average quality reduces the productivity 
of a physicist of average quality by about 12.5 percent. The results for chemists are reported in 
columns (3) and (4). The number of dismissed coauthors does not seem to play an important 
role for the productivity of chemists. The average quality of the dismissed coauthors is, however, 
highly significant. The estimated coefficient for citation weighted publications indicates that 
losing a coauthor of average quality reduces the productivity of the average chemist by about
16.5 percent. The regressions reported in Table 1.14 use the total number of publications and 
citations weighted publications as dependent variable. A coauthored publication is counted as 
a full publication for both coauthors. Another approach is to normalize joint publications by 
dividing each publication and the citations of each publication by the number of coauthors. 
Table 1.15 shows the results obtained when using normalized (citation weighted) publications 
as the dependent variable. The results are very similar to before.
These results show that scientists who lost high quality coauthors suffered more than scientists 
who lost less prolific coauthors. The fact tha t I do not find a significant effect on the number 
of dismissed coauthors suggests that this effect is not driven by the fact that researchers who 
lost a coauthor published less because they were lamenting the loss of a coauthor.
The effect of losing a coauthor may depend on the time span which elapsed since the last col­
laboration. The regressions reported in Table 1.16 explore this in further detail. I split the 
dismissed coauthors into two groups; recent coauthors who had collaborated with a stayer be­
tween 1929 and 1932, and former coauthors who had co-written papers with the stayer between 
1924 and 1928 and not thereafter. As expected the estimates indicate tha t only the dismissal 
of recent coauthors m atter for a stayer’s productivity. The dismissal of a former coauthor does 
not affect the productivity of the stayers.
As mentioned above it is not clear whether one would call the joint publication of papers a real 
peer effect. I therefore investigate how the dismissal affected the number of publications exclud­
ing joint publications with the dismissed coauthors. Finding a negative effect of the dismissal 
on the publications without the dismissed coauthors would suggest the presence of peer effects 
among coauthors which are more subtle than coauthoring. This is even more true as one would 
expect that researchers who lose a coauthor substitute towards single-authored publications and 
publications with other coauthors. This latter effect should reduce any dismissal effect. The 
results on publications without the dismissed coauthors are reported in Table 1.17. As before 
the number of dismissed coauthors does not affect the productivity of scientists. The quality of 
the dismissed coauthors, however, remains negative and significant. These results suggest the 
presence of peer effects between coauthors.
1.9 C onclusion
This chapter uses the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government to identify peer effects 
in science. I use a newly constructed dataset to estimate a peer effects model including the
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number of peers and their average quality as determinants of a researcher’s productivity. I do 
not find evidence for peer effects among researchers in the same department. Furthermore, I 
do not find evidence for peer effects among researchers of the same specialization within the 
same department. These results are very similar for physicists, chemistry, and mathematics and 
robust to a number of sensitivity checks.
I also investigate peer effects among coauthors. The number of coauthors does not m atter for a 
researcher’s productivity. The quality of coauthors, however, is important for the productivity of 
physicists and chemists. I find tha t losing a coauthor of average quality reduces the productivity 
of an average scientists by 12.5 percent in physics and by 16.5 percent in chemistry. I also 
show that the loss of coauthors lead to a reduction in the publications excluding the joint 
publications with the dismissed coauthor. This evidence suggests that there are peer effects 
between coauthors more subtle than the joint production of research papers.
It is important to note that these results do not mean that being at a good university does not 
have a positive effect on a researcher’s productivity. The regressions reported above include 
university fixed effects which control for unobserved differences in the quality of laboratories, 
research seminars, research students, and the like. University quality does m atter as the joint 
significance of the university fixed effects suggests. There is, however, no evidence for peer 
effects at the university or specialization level.
The evidence in this chapter comes from scientists in Germany from 1925 to 1938. It is quite 
likely tha t department level and within department specialization level peer interactions are even 
less important nowadays as communication and transportation costs have fallen dramatically 
since then. Furthermore, it is quite likely that my estimates of peer effects among coauthors 
constitute a lower bound as coauthored papers have become more and more important due to 
increased specialization and the increased importance of ’big science’ projects. See Wuchty et 
al. (2007) for a description of the increased importance of teams in scientific research.
These results suggest some strong policy conclusions. Just co-locating researchers in order to 
increase their productivity through spillovers does not seem a useful policy. W hat seems much 
more important is to increase the possibility for coauthorships by fostering the mobility of 
researchers and their exposure to meeting researchers with similar research interests.
1.10 Tables
T able 1.1: Number of Dismissed Scientists across different Subjects
Year of 
D ism issal
Physics C hem istry M athem atics
Num ber of  
D ism issals
% o f all 
P hysicists  
in 1933
Num ber of  
D ism issals
% of all 
C hem ists 
in 1933
Num ber of 
D ism issals
% of all 
M athem aticians  
in 1933
1933 34 11.8 51 10.9 35 15.6
1934 6 2.1 11 2.4 6 2.7
1935 4 1.4 5 1.1 5 2.2
1936 1 0.3 7 1.5 1 0.4
1937 1 0.3 3 0.6 2 0.9
1938 1 0.3 4 0.9 1 0.4
1939 1 0.3 2 0.4 1 0.4
1940 1 0.3 0 0.0 1 0.4
1933 - 1934 40 13.9 62 13.3 41 18.3
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Table 1.2: Dismissals across different Universities
Physics Chem istry M athem atics
Fall in #  of Peers Loss to  Peer Q uality Fall in #  of Peers Loss to  Peer Q uality Fall in #  o f Peers Loss to  Peer Q uality
Scien­ D ism issed Fall in Scien­ D ism issed Fall in Scien- D ism issed  Fall in
tists 1933-34 Q uality Peer Q uality tists 1933-34 Q uality Peer Q uality tis ts  1933-34 Q uality Peer Q uality
U niversity 1933 # in % 1933 # in % 1933 # in % 1933 # in % 1933 # in % 1933 # in %
A achen TU 3 0 0 2.53 0 0 12 2 16 .7 6.24 -0.58 -9 .3 7 3 42.9 0.10 -0.03 -33 .3
Berlin 38 8 21.1 6.48 4.52 69.8 45 15 33 .3 26.03 6.06 23.3 13 5 38.5 5.74 4.17 72.7
Berlin T U 21 6 28 .6 8.16 1.40 17.2 41 13 3 1 .7 13.38 3.39 25.4 14 2 14.3 0.07 -0.01 -18 .2
Bonn 12 1 8 .3 1.03 -0.10 -9 .8 16 1 6.3 12.03 2.28 19.0 7 1 14.3 0.75 -0.10 -13 .3
Braunschweig T U 4 0 0 0.97 0 0 8 0 0 6.26 0 0 3 0 0 0.00 0 0
Breslau 12 2 16 .7 3.22 -0.11 -3 .6 10 1 10.0 21.33 5.18 24 .3 6 3 50.0 2.74 2.74 100.0
Breslau T U 1 0 0 5.63 0 0 14 2 14.3 30.68 4.06 13.2 5 2 40.0 2.76 2.23 80 .7
D arm stadt T U 9 1 11.1 10.49 -0.26 -2 .5 18 5 27.8 2.23 1.26 56 .6 9 1 11.1 0.33 -0.04 -12 .5
Dresden T U 6 1 16 .7 8.16 8.16 100.0 17 1 5.9 18.56 14.48 78.0 10 0 0 0.65 0 0
Erlangen 4 0 0 0.41 0 0 8 0 0 9.02 0 0 3 0 0 4.29 0 0
Frankfurt 12 1 8 .3 1.43 0.10 6.8 18 5 27 .8 15.51 -4.98 -32.1 8 1 12.5 2.35 -0.18 -7 .8
Freiburg 8 0 0 1.09 0 0 15 3 20 .0 15.79 -2.36 -15 .0 9 1 11.1 1.10 0.35 31.5
G iessen 5 1 20 .0 1.67 1.58 94.9 10 0 0 4.22 0 0 7 1 14.3 0.33 -0.05 -16 .7
G ottingen 21 9 4 2 .9 14.59 10.58 72.5 17 0 0 37.08 0 0 17 10 58.8 3.44 2.34 67.9
Greifswald 6 0 0 5.30 0 0 5 0 0 23.09 0 0 3 0 0 2.33 0 0
Halle 4 0 0 2.36 0 0 9 1 11.1 12.25 -1.64 -13.4 7 1 14.3 0.96 -0.04 -3 .7
Hamburg 11 2 18.2 0.40 -0.03 -8.3 11 2 18.2 6.32 -0.25 -4-0 8 0 0 1.65 0 0
Hannover T U 3 0 0 0.00 0 0 14 0 0 29.19 0 0 6 0 0 0.28 0 0
H eidelberg 8 0 0 2.53 0 0.0 18 1 5 .6 59.47 -3.82 -6.4 5 1 20.0 2.02 -0.50 -25 .0
Jena 13 1 7 .7 4.66 -0.38 -8.1 10 0 0 31.82 0 0 5 0 0 0.00 0 0
Karlsruhe T U 8 0 0 2.10 0 0 14 4 28 .6 32.66 -6.58 -20.1 6 1 16.7 0.00 0 0
Kiel 8 1 12.5 1.00 0.08 8.3 11 0 0 9.10 0 0 5 2 40.0 0.63 -0.29 -46 .7
KOln 8 1 12.5 10.14 -1.41 -13.9 4 1 25 .0 10.88 6.42 59.0 6 2 33.3 0.41 -0.23 -56.4
KOnigsberg -8 0 0 5.76 0.00 0.0 11 1 9.1 6.69 3.62 54.1 5 2 40.0 4.90 1.53 31.1
Leipzig 11 2 18.2 3.67 -0.23 -6.2 24 2 8 .3 18.67 0.29 1.6 8 2 25.0 1.48 0.49 33.1
Marburg 6 0 0 2.10 0 0 8 0 0 15.74 0 0 8 0 0 0.17 0 0
Mtinchen 12 3 2 5 .0 9.18 -3.06 -33 .3 18 1 5 .6 10.80 0.79 7.3 9 0 0 1.89 0 0
MUnchen T U 10 1 10 0.95 -0.11 -11.1 15 0 0 7.41 0 0 5 0 0 0.20 0 0
MUnster 5 0 0 1.15 0 0 12 0 0 9.95 0 0 5 0 0 0.85 0 0
R ostock 3 0 0 1.49 0 0 8 0 0 9.74 0 0 2 0 0 0.08 0 0
Stuttgart T U 5 0 0 2.36 0 0 9 1 11.1 9.19 -1.53 -16 .6 6 0 0 0.04 0 0
T ubingen 2 0 0 7.54 0 0 10 0 0 7.59 0 0 6 0 0 1.73 0 0
WUrzburg 3 0 0 0.00 0 0 11 0 0 10.34 0 0 4 0 0 0.03 0 0
T ab le  1.3: Characteristics of Dismissed Scholars
P hysics C hem istry M athem atics
A ll
S tay­
ers
D ism issed
33-34 A ll
Stay­
ers
D ism issed
33-34 All
S tay­
ers
D ism issed
33-34
#
%
Loss #
%
Loss #
%
Loss
Researchers 
(B eginning o f 1933)
287 248 39 13.6 466 405 61 13.1 224 183 41 18.3
#  of Chaired Profs. 109 97 12 11.0 156 136 20 12.8 117 99 18 15.4
A verage A ge (1933) 49.5 50.2 45.1 - 50.4 50.5 49.7 - 48.7 50.0 43.0 -
#  o f N obel Laureates 15 9 6 40.0 14 11 3 21.4 - - - -
A vg. publications 
(1925-1932)
0.47 0.43 0.71 20.5 1.69 1.59 2.31 17.9 0.33 0.27 0.56 31.1
A vg. publications 
(cita tion  w eighted)
5.1 3.5 14.8 39.4 17.3 16.1 25.1 19.0 1.45 0.93 3.71 46.8
% P ub l. coauthored 33.3 33.6 31.6 - 76.0 75.8 77.1 - 11.3 9.7 14.8 -
% P ubl. coauthored  
(C oaut. in G erm any)
10.6 9.9 13.9 - 11.7 12.1 9.7 - 6.3 5.9 6.7 -
% P ubl. coauthored  
(C oaut. sam e uni)
4.2 3.4 8.7
'
5.1 5.4 3.8
"
2.7 2.0 4.1
T ab le  1.4: Top Journals
Journal Nam e Published in
G e n e r a l  J o u r n a ls
N aturw issenschaften Germany
Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akadem ie der W issenschaften Physikalisch M athem atische Klasse Germany
N ature UK
Proceedings of the R oyal Society o f London A  (M athem atics and P hysics) UK
Science USA
P h y s ic s
A nnalen der Physik Germany
Physikalische Zeitschrift Germany
P hysical R eview USA
C h e m is tr y
Berichte der D eutschen C hem ischen G esellschaft Germany
Biochem ische Zeitschrift Germany
Journal ftir Praktische Chem ie Germany
Justus Liebigs A nnalen Chem ie Germany
Kolloid Zeitschrift Germany
Zeitschrift ftir Anorganische Chem ie und A llgem eine Chem ie Germany
Zeitschrift ftir Elektrochem ie und A ngew andte Physikalische Chem ie Germany
Zeitschrift ftir Physikalische Chem ie Germany
Journal of the C hem ical Society UK
M a t h e m a t ic s
Jounal ftir d ie reine und angew andte M athem atik Germany
Journal of th e  London M athem atical Society Germany
M athem atische Annalen Germany
M athem atische Zeitschrift Germany
Zeitschrift ftir angew andte M athem atik  und M echanik Germany
A cta  M athem atica Sweden
Proceedings o f the London M athem atical Society UK
A nother m ajor journal for physicists at th e  tim e was th e  "Zeitschrift ftir Physik". U nfortunately, th e  W eb of Science does 
not include th e  articles in th a t journal after 1927. Therefore, I exclude th e  "Zeitschrift ftir Physik" from the analysis.
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Table 1.5: Reduced Form (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
P hysics Chem istry M athem atics
C itation C itation C itation C itation C itation C itation
P ubli­ P ub li­ W eighted W eighted P ubli­ P ubli­ W eighted W eighted P ubli­ Pub li­ W eighted W eighted
D ependent Variable: cations cations Pub. Pub. cations cations Pub. Pub. cations cations P ub. Pub.
Num ber D ism issed -0.018 -0.022 -0.220 -0.369 -0.019 -0.017 -0.176 -0.106 -0.022 -0.022 0.009 0.027
(0.014) (0.018) (0.336) (0.378) (0.008)* (0.009) (0.213) (0.205) (0.017) (0.017) (0.182) (0.161)
D ism issal Induced 0.026 0.028 0.546 0.653 0.020 0.016 0.782 0.718 0.030 0.035 -0.441 -0.266
j. in Peer Q uality (0.013) (0.015) (0.320) (0.367) (0.013) (0.011) (0.471) (0.466) (0.036) (0.041) (0.279) (0.333)
A ge D um m ies / / / / / / / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / / /
O bservations 2261 2261 2261 2261 3584 3584 3584 3584 1538 1538 1538 1538
#  of researchers 258 258 258 258 413 413 413 413 183 183 183 183
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.25 0.27 0.67 0.67 0.53 0.54 0.32 0.33 0.2 0.21
**significant at 1% level *significant at 5% level (A ll standard errors clustered at departm ent level)
Publications  are the  sum  of a sc ien tist’s publications in top  journals in one year.
C itation  Weighted Publications  are defined as the sum  of subsequent citations (in th e  first 50 years after publication in any journal included in the "Web of Science", including  
international journals) o f all articles published in a given year.
Num ber d ismissed  is equal to  th e  number of dism issed sc ien tists in a researcher’s departm ent. T he variable is 0 until 1933 for researchers in all departm ents. In 1934 it  is equal to  
the number of d ism issals in 1933 at a researcher’s departm ent. From 1935 onwards it is equal to  the number of dism issals in 1933 and 1934 in a researcher’s departm ent.
D ism issa l  induced  j  in P e e r  Quali ty  is 0 for all researchers until 1933. In 1934 it is equal to  (A vg. quality o f to ta l departm ent before d ism issal) - (A vg. quality o f researchers 
not dism issed in 1933). From 1935 onwards it w ill be equal to  (A vg. quality o f to ta l departm ent before dism issal) - (A vg. quality of researchers not d ism issed in 1933 and 1934). 
Researchers in departm ents w ith  stayers of below departm ent level average quality have a positive value o f the quality dism issal variable. T he quality dism issal variable is negative  
for sc ien tists in departm ents w ith  stayers o f above average quality. Average quality is measured as the  departm ent level average of cita tion  weighted publications betw een 1925 and 
1932.
Table 1.6: Reduced Form (Specialization Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Physics Chem istry M athem atics
C itation C itation C itation C itation C itation C itation
P ubli­ P ub li­ W eighted W eighted P ubli­ P ubli­ W eighted W eighted P ubli­ P ub li­ W eighted W eighted
D ependent Variable: cations cations Pub. Pub. cations cations Pub. Pub. cations cations Pub. P ub.
Num ber D ism issed 0.021 0.012 0.641 0.499 -0.011 -0.007 0.837 1.055 -0.034 -0.034 0.272 0.349
(0.026) (0.027) (0.423) (0.419) (0.047) (0.048) (0.869) (0.840) (0.035) (0.035) -0.369 (0.375)
D ism issal Induced 0.007 0.006 0.163 0.160 0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.023 0.020 0.027 -0.556 -0 .537
j. in Peer Q uality (0.018) (0.021) (0.319) (0.335) (0.008) (0.008) (0.098) (0.096) (0.032) (0.032) (0.262)* (0.250)*
Age D um m ies / / / / / / / / / / / • /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / / /
O bservations 2257 2257 2257 2257 3567 3567 3567 3567 1538 1538 1538 1538
#  of researchers 256 256 256 256 405 405 413 405 183 183 183 183
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.25 0.27 0.67 0.67 0.53 0.54 0.32 0.33 0.2 0.21
**significant at 1% level ^significant at 5% level (A ll standard errors are clustered at th e  departm ent level)
Num ber dismissed  is equal to  the number of dism issed sc ien tists w ithin  th e  sam e specialization  as the researcher (e.g. it w ill be equal to  the number of dism issed theoretical physicists  
at a researcher’s departm ent for a theoretical physicist). T he variable is 0 until 1933 for all researchers. In 1934 it is equal to  the number of d ism issals in 1933 at a researcher’s 
specialization . From 1935 onwards it  is equal to  the  number of d ism issals in 1933 and 1934 in a researcher’s specialization.
D ism issa l  induced  J. in  P e e r  Quali ty  is 0 for all researchers until 1933. In 1934 it is equal to  (A vg. quality of all researchers w ithin  a specialization  in the sc ien tist’s departm ent 
before dism issal) - (A vg. quality o f researchers w ithin  a specialization  in a  sc ien tist’s not dism issed in 1933). From 1935 onwards it is equal to  (A vg. quality  o f all researchers w ithin  
a specialization  in the sc ien tist’s departm ent before dism issal) - (A vg. quality  o f researchers w ithin  a specialization in a sc ien tist’s not dism issed in 1933 or 1934). A verage quality  
is measured as the  specia lization  level average o f c itation  weighted publications betw een 1925 and 1932.
Table 1.7: First Stages (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physics Chem istry M athem atics
D epartm ent A vg. Q uality D epartm ent A vg. Q uality D epartm ent A vg. Q uality
D ependent Variable: Size of Peers Size of Peers Size of Peers
Num ber D ism issed -0.566 0.180 -0.964 -0.077 -0.540 0.013
(0.110)** (0.090) (0.101)** (0.223) (0.063)** (0.031)
D ism issal Induced -0.054 -0.919 0.011 -1.117 0.188 -1.299
i  in Peer Q uality (0.111) (0.079)** (0.082) (0.138)** (0.197) (0.181)**
A ge D um m ies / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / / /
O bservations 2261 2261 3584 3584 1538 1538
#  of researchers 258 258 413 413 183 183
R-squared 0.93 0.77 0.94 0.76 0.86 0.78
F - T est on Instrum ents 85.9 231.1 46.0 33.3 84.8 61.5
T able 1.8: Instrumental Variables (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
D ependent Variable:
P hysics Chem istry M athem atics
P ublications C it.W eighted Pub. Publications C it.W eighted Pub. P ublications C it.W eighted Pub.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
D epartm ent Size -0.003 0.028 -0.196 0.419 -0.011 0.019 0.044 0.161 0.008 0.040 -0.004 -0.044
(0.005) (0.029) (0.116) (0.514) (0.008) (0.011) (0.266) (0.288) (0.013) (0.032) (0.080) (0.300)
Peer Q uality 0.011 -0.032 0.018 -0.736 0.007 -0.014 0.107 -0.641 0.009 -0.021 0.507 0.198
(0.007) (0.020) (0.097) (0.395) (0.003)* (0.010) (0.065) (0.389) (0.018) (0.029) (0.210)* (0.257)
A ge D um m ies / / / / / / / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / / / / / / / / /
Observations 2261 2261 2261 2261 3584 3584 3584 3584 1538 1538 1538 1538
#  of researchers 258 258 258 258 413 413 413 413 183 183 183 183
R-Squared 0.40 0.27 0.67 0.54 0.33 0.21
Cragg-Donald EV S ta tistic 36.37 36.37 189.49 189.49 56.08 56.08
**significant at 1 percent level *significant at 5 percent level (A ll standard errors clustered at the  departm ent level)
Table 1.9: First Stages (Specialization Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physics Chem istry M athem atics
D epartm ent A vg. Q uality D epartm ent A vg. Q uality D epartm ent A vg. Q uality
D ependent Variable: Size of Peers Size of Peers Size of Peers
Num ber D ism issed -0.817 0.330 -0.987 0.143 -0.419 -0.201
(0.139)** (0.203) (0.108)** (1.370) (0.159)* (0.162)
D ism issal Induced 0.059 -0.869 0.011 -1.096 -0.114 -0.866
I  in Peer Q uality (0.042) (0.206)** (0.015) (0.146)** (0.110) (0.193)**
Age D um m ies / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / /
U niversity F E / / / / / /
Observations 2257 2257 3567 3567 1538 1538
#  of researchers 256 256 405 405 183 183
R-squared 0.92 0.70 0.92 0.73 0.88 0.77
F - Test on Instrum ents 18.3 19.4 42.2 40.8 22.3 60.0
Table 1.10: Instrumental Variables (Specialization Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
D ependent Variable:
Physics Chem istry M athem atics
Publications C it.W eighted Pub. P ublications C it.W eighted Pub. P ublications C it.W eighted Pub.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
#  of Peers in Specialization -0.006 -0.018 -0.353 -0.704 -0.054 0.006 -0.539 -1.067 -0.001 0.101 -0.171 -1.205
(0.017) (0.028) (0.249) (0.494) (0.029) (0.046) (0.376) (0.850) (0.017) (0.126) (0.167) (1.423)
Peer Q uality (Specialization) 0.007 -0.008 -0.039 -0.231 -0.002 -0.005 0.031 0.010 0.007 -0.045 0.689 0.778
(0.004) (0.024) (0.063) (0.414) (0.002) (0.007) (0.039) (0.091) (0.015) (0.059) (0.331)* (0.505)
A ge D um m ies / / / / / / / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / / / /
O bservations 2257 2257 2257 2257 3567 3567 3567 3567 1538 1538 1538 1538
#  of researchers 256 256 256 256 405 405 405 405 183 183 183 183
R-Squared 0.40 0.27 0.67 0.54 0.33 0.22
Cragg-Donald EV S ta tistic 116.53 116.53 206.12 206.12 8.56 8.56
**significant at 1 percent level *significant at 5 percent level (A ll standard errors clustered at the  departm ent level)
Table 1.11: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Physics (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Full Full om itting om itting younger 45 or younger 45 or Full Full
Sample Sam ple Sam ple 33 & 34 33 & 34 than  45 older than 45 older Sam ple Sam ple
P ubli­ C it. weight. P ub li­ Cit. weight. P ubli­ P ubli­ Cit. weight. Cit. weight. P ub li­ Cit. weight.
D ependent Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ. cations Publ.
D epartm ent Size 0.028 0.419 0.003 0.356 0.113 -0.015 1.887 -0.586 0.068 0.545
(0.029) (0.514) (0.029) (0.812) (0.068) (0.039) (0.980) (0.529) (0.042) (0.612)
Peer Q uality -0.032 -0.736 -0.018 -0.956 -0.067 -0.005 -1.030 -0.243 -0.039 -0.509
(0.020) (0.395) (0.018) (0.752) (0.047) (0.029) (0.703) (0.330) (0.030) (0.349)
A ge D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity specific. T im e Trends / /
O bservations 2261 2261 1866 1866 840 1421 840 1421 2261 2261
#  of researchers 258 258 256 256 138 179 138 179 258 258
Cragg-Donald EV  S tatistic 36.37 36.37 18.80 18.80 10.11 30.88 10.11 30.88 24.36 24.36
Table 1.12: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Chemistry (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Full Full om itting om itting younger 45 or younger 45 or Full Full
Sample Sam ple Sam ple 33 & 34 33 & 34 than  45 older than  45 older Sam ple Sam ple
P ubli­ C it. weight. P ub li­ Cit. weight. P ubli­ P ubli­ Cit. weight. C it. weight. P ub li­ C it. weight.
D ependent Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ. cations Publ.
D epartm ent Size 0.019 0.161 0.023 0.246 -0.006 0.024 0.325 0.153 0.014 0.239
(0.011) (0.288) (0.015) (0.197) (0.040) (0.015) (1.305) (0.151) (0.029) (0.525)
Peer Q uality -0.014 -0.641 -0.010 -0.187 -0.018 -0.013 -1.650 -0.168 0.019 -1.080
(0.010) (0.389) (0.010) (0.170) (0.027) (0.016) (1.398) (0.219) (0.031) (1.011)
A ge D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity FE
U niversity specific. T im e Trends
/ / / / / / / / /
/
/
/
O bservations 3584 3584 2926 2926 1308 2276 1308 2276 3584 3584
#  of researchers 413 413 411 411 206 295 206 295 413 413
Cragg-Donald EV  S tatistic 189.49 189.49 167.87 167.87 46.81 145.75 46.81 145.75 41.69 41.69
**significant at 1 percent level *significant at 5 percent level
Table 1.13: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Mathematics (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Full Full om itting om itting younger 45 or younger 45 or Full Full
Sam ple Sam ple Sam ple 33 & 34 33 & 34 than  45 older than  45 older Sam ple Sam ple
P ubli­ Cit. weight. P ubli­ Cit. weight. P ubli­ P ub li­ Cit. weight. Cit. w eight. P ub li­ Cit. weight.
D ependent Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ. cations Publ.
D epartm ent Size 0.040 -0.044 0.066 0.046 0.066 -0.014 -0.160 0.061 0.005 -0.109
(0.032) (0.300) (0.053) (0.483) (0.053) (0.049) (0.385) (0.496) (0.028) (0.244)
Peer Q uality -0.021 0.198 -0.038 0.254 -0.092 0.030 -0.442 0.048 0.018 0.108
(0.029) (0.257) (0.035) (0.355) (0.081) (0.028) (1.147) (0.274) (0.034) (0.425)
A ge D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity FE
U niversity specific. T im e Trends
/ / / / / / / / /
/
/
/
O bservations 1538 1538 1256 1256 672 866 672 866 1538 1538
#  of researchers 183 183 183 183 106 119 106 119 183 183
Cragg-Donald E V  Statistic 56.08 56.08 17.68 17.68 23.99 24.9 23.99 24.9 54.03 54.03
**significant at 1 percent level ^significant at 5 percent level (A ll standard errors clustered at the departm ent level)
Table 1.14: Effect of Dismissal on Coauthors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physics Chem istry
Publi­
C itation
W eighted P u b li­
C itation
W eighted
D ependent Variable cations Pub. cations Pub.
#  o f D ism issed C oauthors 0.328 7.668 0.398 -1.020
(0.525) (7.888) (0.366) (5.766)
A vg. Q uality o f D ism . Coauthors -0.007 -0.125 -0.013 -0.165
(0.003)* (0.045)** (0.003)** (0.036)**
A ge D um m ies / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / /
U niversity FE / / / /
Individual FE / / / /
O bservations 2243 2243 3575 3575
#  o f researchers 258 258 413 413
R-squared 0.40 0.27 0.67 0.54
**significant at 1% level *significant at 5% level 
(A ll standard errors are clustered at th e  individual level)
Table 1.15: Coauthors: Normalized Publications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D ependent Variable
P hysics C hem istry
P ubli­
cations
C itation
W eighted
Pub.
P ub li­
cations
C itation
W eighted
P ub.
#  o f D ism issed C oauthors 0.574 8.441 0.268 -0.652
(0.553) (7.209) (0.188) (3.688)
A vg. Q uality o f D ism . Coauthors -0.006 -0.100 -0.008 -0.086
(0.003) (0.042)* (0.002)** (0.026)**
Age D um m ies / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / /
U niversity FE / / / /
Individual FE / / / /
Observations 2243 2243 3575 3575
#  of researchers 258 258 413 413
R-squared 0.39 0.26 0.68 0.49
**significant a t 1% level *significant a t 5% level
(All standard errors are clustered at th e  individual level)
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Table 1.16: Coauthors: Timing of Coauthorship
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P hysics Chem istry
C itation C itation
Publi­ W eighted Publi­ W eighted
D ependent Variable cations Pub. cations Pub.
C o a u th o r s  1 9 2 9  -  1 9 3 2
#  of D ism issed C oauthors 0.322 7.990 0.048 -8.156
(0.572) (7.889) (0.619) (11.506)
A vg. Q uality o f D ism . C oauthors -0.007 -0.123 -0.012 -0.156
(0.003)* (0.039)** (0.003)** (0.050)**
C o a u th o r s  1 9 2 4  -  1 9 2 8  (n o t  la te r )
#  o f D ism issed  C oauthors -0.011 -2.214 -0.005 -0.087
(0.959) (23.495) (0.405) (4.609)
A vg. Q uality o f D ism . C oauthors 0.007 0.108 0.003 0.064
(0.019) (0.437) (0.004) (0.064)
A ge D um m ies / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / /
U niversity FE / / / /
Individual F E / / / /
O bservations 2243 2243 3575 3575
#  of researchers 258 258 413 413
R-squared
__;-G__i 07! 1_________ 1
0.40
__:c___ .
0.27
A ^ C Ox Ia.vaI
0.67 0.54
^^significant at 1% level *significant at 5% level
(A ll standard errors are clustered at the  individual level)
Table 1.17: Coauthors: Publications without dismissed Coauthors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P hysics Chem istry
C itation C itation
P ubli­ W eighted P ub li­ W eighted
D ependent Variable cations Pub. cations Pub.
#  o f D ism issed C oauthors 0.458 10.777 0.558 -1.523
(0.553) (9.978) (0.360) (8.019)
Avg. Q uality o f D ism . C oauthors -0.007 -0.144 -0.012 -0.290
(0.003)* (0.058)* (0.003)** (0.048)**
Age D um m ies / / / • /
Year D um m ies / / / /
University FE / / / /
Individual F E / / / /
Observations 2243 2243 3575 3575
#  of researchers 258 258 413 413
R-squared 0.39 0.28 0.67 0.53
**significant at 1% level *significant at 5% level
(All standard errors are clustered at the  individual level)
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1.11 A p p en d ix  for C hapter 1
P hysics
B E E R , D r . A rthur P .,  Researcher; b. 1900., 
m arried. 1 child. (E nglish , French, Csech.) 
1 9 2 8 /3 3 :  R esearcher U niveisita .tsstem w artc,
Breslau, an d  D eu tsche Stern w arte, H am burg, 
sin ce  1934: Researcher Solar P h ysics O bservatory, 
C am bridge U niversity . SPE’C .: A stron om y;
A stra - and C eo-P hysics, Tem p.
B B R G , D r. W olfgan g, P . ,  A ssistant; b . OS., 
m arried. (E n glish , French.) 1930/38: A ssistant 
P h ysik a liscb es In stitu t. B erlin  U niversity, 
1934 /3 6 :  R esearcher P h ysica l L ab .. Manchester 
U niversity; since 1936: Industrial A ctiv ity ,
L ondon. S P E C .: E xperim en ta l P h ysics. F luores­
cence o f A to m s  and M olecules; S tru ctu re an d  
D eform ation  o f C rysta ls; X -R a y  M ethods. Temp.
B E R G ST R A SSB R , D r. M artin, A ssistant; 
b. 0 2 ., married. (E nglish . F rench .) 1927/83. 
A ssistan t T cchnische H cchschuie. Dresden; 
1933 /34 : A ssistan t D eu tsche V ersuchsanstalt filr 
I ,uftfahrt, Berlin, SPEC . : Technical Physics;
T estin g  of M aterials; S o lid ity ;  M echanics. U npl.
B E T H E , D r. H an s, Privatdoxent; b. 06 ., 
s ingle. (E nglish .) Till 1933: Privatdoxent
G ottin gen  U niversity; 1934/35 : Researcher Bristol 
U niversity; since 1935: Cornell U niversity .
Ithaca  (N .Y .). SPEC . : Theoretica l P h ysics.
Q u an tu m  M echanics. Perm .
B IE L , D r. Erw in, Privatdo*ent; b. 99 ., married, 
1 ch ild . (E nglish . French, Ita lia n .)  T ill 1929: 
A ssistan t Gcographisches In stitu t, V ienna U n i­
versity ; 1920/33: C lim atologist M eteorologiscbes 
O bservatorium , Breslau; 1932/33: Privatdozent
Breslau U niversity . S P E C .; G eo-Physics; C lim a­
to lo g y . U npl.
BLO C H , D r. F elix , Privatdoxont; b- 05., single. 
(E n glish .) T ill 1933: Privatdoxont and A ssistan t 
P hysikallsches In stitu t, L c lr ijg  U niversity; since 
1933: Prof. Stanford U niversity , California.
SPEC . : Theoretica l P h ysics; A to m ic  P h ysics.
Perm .
B O A S, D r. W alter, A ssistant; b . 04 ., tingle. 
(E n glish , French.) 1928 /32: R esearcher Kaiser 
W ilhelm  In stitu t fttr M etallfonschung, Berlin; 
1933 /35: A ssistan t Fribourg U niversity; siuco
1936: R esearcher Physikalischcs In stitu t, Tech- 
n ische H ocbschule, Zurich. S P E C .: Technical 
P h ysic s; M etallography; P la s tic ity  an d  S tru ctu re  
of M etals; X -R a y s .  U npl.
B O E H M , D r. G undo, A ssistan t. T ill 1983: 
A ssistant Phyaikalisches In stitu t. Freiburg U ni­
versity . SPEC. : M icellar S tru ctu re  o f M uscles. 
U npl.
B O R N , D r. M ax, o . Professor; b . 82 ., married, 
3 children. (English .) 1915/10: a .o , Prof. Berlin  
U niversity; 1919/21: o . Prof, Frankfurt U n i­
versity; 1921/88; o. Prof, GOUingcn U niversity; 
1 933/33: Lecturer Cambridge U niversity; since
1936: Prof, E dinburgh U niversity . S P E C .:
T h eoretica l P h ysics; Q uantum  T h eory; A tom ic  
S tru c tu re; O ptics; M athem atical P h ysics. Perm .
B U R S T Y N , D r. W alther, a .o . Professor; b . 77., 
married. (English , French.) 1920/83: a .o . Prof. 
Tcchnische H ochschule, Berlin . SPEC .: Technical 
Ph ysics. U npl.
B Y K , D r. Alfred, a o Professor; b. 78 ,. 
married, 2  children. (E nglish . French, Ita lian . 
D utch.) 1905: P rivatdouent Tcchnische H och- 
schule, Berlin; 1909/33: P r iva td osen t, later a .o . 
Prof. Berlin U niversity and Techiiische U och- 
schule. SPEC. : M ath em atica l P h ysics; Theoretical 
E lectro technics; Quantum  T h eory; B oundaries of 
P h ysics an d  C h em istry . U np l.
C O H N P E T E R S , D r. H . Jurgen , Researcher; b . 
07- T ill 1983: Researcher Berlin U niversity;
since 1984: U .5 .S .R . S P E C .: E xperim en tal
P kysics. H igh  Tension. Perm ,
D E M B E R , D r. A lexia, A ssistant; b. 12., single. 
(English, French.) s ince 1935: A ssistant
Physical In stitu te, Istanbul U niversity . S P E C .: 
E lec tro ly tes; P h o to e lec tr ic ity . Tem p.
D E M B E R , D r. H arry, o . Professor; b. 82 ., 
married, 2 children. (E nglish , French, Spanish, 
Turkish.) 1909/83: P rivatd ozcn t, later o . Prof. 
Tcchnische H ocbschulc, D resden; and D irector  
Physikalischcs Institut; s in ce 1833; o. Prof. 
Istanbul U niversity and D irector Physical 
Institu te. SPEC . : Cathode an d  X -R a y s ;  P h oto-  
E le c tr ic ity ;  A tm osph eric  O p tic s; A tm osph eric  
E le c tr ic ity .  Perm.
DUSC H 1N SK Y  D r. F . ,  A ssistant; b. 07 ., 
single. (French, Italian , Spanish , D u tch .) 1933: 
A ssistan t Kaiser W ilhelm  In stitu t fur Ph ysik , 
Berlin; since 1934; A ssistan t B russels U niversity . 
S P E C .: E x p erim en ta l P h ysics; Fluorescence; Mole­
cular S pectra ; O ptics; H igh  F requ en cy Technics. 
Tem p.
E H R E N B B R G , D r. W erner, A ssistant; b . 01 ., 
single. (English, French.) 1924/27: A ssistant 
Kaiser W ilhelm In stitu t ftir Faserstoffchcm ic. 
Berlin; 1928/80: R esearcher Berlin  U niversity  and  
Tcchnische H ochschuie, S tuttgart; 1930/33: 
A ssistan t T echnische H ochschuie, Stuttgart: since  
1935: E lectric and Musical Industries, L td .,
H ayes (Middlesex). S P E C .: E x perim en ta l P h ysics. 
X -R a ys; C athode R a ys; Cosm ic R ad ia tion . Perm .
B ISE N SC H IT 2, Dr. R obert, Researcher; 
b. 98 ., married. (English, French.) 1824/27: 
Researcher A llgem eine E lelaririt& tsgcsellschaft. 
Berlin; 1 9 2 7 /3 3 : R esearcher Kaiser W ilhelm
In stitu t fhr Physikalischc Chcmie und Elelctro- 
chem ic, Berlin; since 1934: Researcher JRoval 
Institu tion , London. S P E C .: Theoretical and
E xperim en ta l P h ysics; S pectro scopy; V iscosity; 
A pplica tion  of P h ysical Theories to  C hem ical Pro  
Stem s. Tem p.
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GlbJf/f L IN , D r. A lbert, o . Professor; b. 79., 
married. (E nglish .) 1919/33: o. Prof. Berlin  
U niversity and D irector K aiser W ilhelm  In stitu t  
filr Physik; 1921 N obel Prize; since 1934: Prof. 
Institu te for A dvanced S tu d y , P rinceton  (N .J .) .
F igure 1.9: List of Displaced German Scholars: Sample Page
Squares were added by the author to highlight the researchers who had already received the Noble prize or were to receive 
it after 1936.
55
Table 1.18: Specializations
Physics C hem istry M athem atics
Specialization
% scientists  
in speciali­
zation Specialization
% scien tists  
in specia li­
zation
% scien tists  
in speciali- 
Specialization zation
E xperim ental Physics 48.5 Organic Chem istry 26.6 Analysis 45.9
T heoretical P hysics 22.3 P hysical Chem istry 23.8 A pplied M athem atics 36.2
Technical Physics 20.6 Technical C hem istry 19.4 Algebra 19.7
A stronom y 14.7 Inorganic C hem istry 18.6 Num ber Theory 13.5
Pharm acology 10.2 M etha M athem atics 5.2
M edical Chem istry 8.0 Topology 4.8
B iochem istry 6.7 Foundations o f M ath. 4.4
P ercentages add to  m ore than  100 percent because som e physicists and chem ists have two specializations. 
M athem aticians have up to  four specializations.
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T ab le  1.19: Top Researchers 1925-1932 (Citation Weighted Publications Measure)
U niversity First Second Third A vg. Cit. A vg. N obel D is­
N am e beginning Special­ Special­ Special­ weighted Publ. Prize m issed
of 1933 ization ization ization Publ. 33-34
P h y s ic s
Fritz London Berlin T heo. Phy. 149.3 1.3 /
Lother Nordheim G ottingen T heo. Phy. 110.0 0.7 /
Gerhard Herzberg D arm stadt T U E xp. Phy. 78.0 2.0 /
Carl Ram sauer Berlin TU Exp. Phy. 75.6 3.0
M ax Born G ottingen T heo. Phy. 62.5 1.3 / /
H ans Falkenhagen Koln Theo. Phy. 57.5 1.9
A rnold  Somm erfeld Mtlnchen T heo. Phy. 44.4 1.8
E ugen W igner Berlin T U T heo. Phy. 44.3 0.5 / /
H einrich Kuhn G ottingen E xp. Phy. T heo. Phy. 42.0 4.0 /
Harry D em ber Dresden T U E xp. Phy. 40.8 1.0 /
K arl Herzfeld Theo. Phy. 33.7 1.3
Richard G ans KOnigsberg Exp. Phy. 29.4 1.6
W alter Gerlach M tlnchen Exp. Phy. 29.1 3.1
W olfgang P auli T heo. Phy. 28.0 3.8 /
M ax W ien Jena Exp. Phy. 25.4 2.0
W erner H eisenberg Leipzig T heo. Phy. 25.3 1.0 /
L udw ig P randtl G ottingen Tech. P. 23.3 1.1
Fritz Kirchner Mtlnchen Exp. Phy. 22.5 2.5
Johannes M alsch Koln Exp. Phy. 22.0 1.5
E m il Rupp Berlin T U Exp. Phy. 21.4 5.2 /
C h e m is t r y
W erner K uhn Karlsruhe T U P hysical 262.0 7.0
M ax Bergm ann Dresden T U Organic B ioc. 250.2 6.8 /
Karl Lohm ann H eidelberg M edical 224.0 6.0
Ernst Bergm ann Berlin P hysical 223.3 17.0 /
Carl N euberg Berlin Biochem . 184.9 15.1
Carl W agner Jena P hysical 177.5 5.0
O tto  M eyerhof H eidelberg M edical 176.3 5.8 /
O tto  Ruff Breslau T U Inorganic 133.4 7.2
W olfgang O stwald Leipzig Inorganic 127.0 8.6
H erm ann Staudinger Freiburg Organic 126.8 8.5 /
G ustav Tam m ann G ottingen Physical. 118.4 19.0
M ichael Polanyi Berlin T U Physical. 116.8 5.6 /
M ax Volmer Berlin T U Physical. 114.0 4.2
Karl Freudenberg H eidelberg Organic 111.8 7.0
Ulrich H ofm ann Berlin T U Inorganic Physical 109.0 6.0
Richard Johann K uhn H eidelberg P hysical M edical 92.1 8.0 /
M ax Trautz H eidelberg P hysical 91.9 5.3
W ilhelm  K lem m Hannover T U Inorganic 91.4 5.2
M a t h e m a t ic s
Johann von N eum ann Berlin A pplied M Foundation A nalysis 36.3 1.5 /
Richard Courant G ottingen A nalysis Applied M 22.3 1.3 /
Richard von M ises Berlin A pplied M A nalysis 15.6 0.9 /
H einz H opf Algebra Topology G eom etry 13.3 1.3
P au l E pstein Frankfurt G eom etry Num ber T Algebra 11.5 0.6
Oskar Perron Mtlnchen Algebra A nalysis 10.6 1.5
W illy  Prager G ottingen Applied M 10.0 0.4 /
G abiel Szegd KOnigsberg Applied M G eom etry 9.4 1.4 /
W erner Rogosinski KOnigsberg N um ber T A nalysis 9.1 0.6
W olfgang Krull Erlangen Algebra 8.9 1.4
Erich R othe Breslau T U A nalysis A pplied M 8.0 1.0 /
H ans Peterssonn Hamburg Num ber T A nalysis 8.0 2.0
A d olf H am m erstein Berlin Num ber T A nalysis 8.0 0.5
A lexander W einstein Breslau T U A pplied M 6.3 0.7 /
Erich Kam ke Tubingen Num ber T Foundation A nalysis 6.3 0.8
H ellm uth K neser Greifswald A pplied M A nalysis Topology 6.3 0.6
B artel van der W aerden Leipzig Algebra G eom etry 5.8 1.8
M ax Mtiller H eidelberg A nalysis 5.3 0.3
Richard Brauer KOnigsberg Algebra 5.0 0.6 /
Leon L ichtenstein Leipzig A nalysis A pplied M 4.9 1.5
U niversity is m issing for scientists who retired before 1933
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Table 1.20: Probability of Being Chaired Professor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D ependent Variable: 
Chaired Prof. D um m y Physics Chem istry M athem atics
D epartm ent Specialization D epartm ent Specialization D epartm ent Specialization
Peer Group: Level Level Level Level Level Level
Num ber D ism issed -0.000 -0.020 0.004 0.011 0.010 0.032
(0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021)
D ism issal Induced -0.009 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.021 -0.035
|  in Peer Q uality (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.035) (0.023)
Age D um m ies / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / /
University FE / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / /
Observations 2261 2257 3584 3567 1538 1538
#  of researchers 258 256 413 405 183 183
R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.92
Cn
T able 1.21: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Physics (Specialization Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Full Full om itting om itting younger 45 or younger 45 or Full Full
Sam ple Sam ple Sam ple 33 & 34 33 & 34 than 45 older than 45 older Sam ple Sam ple
P ubli­ Cit. weight. P ubli­ Cit. weight. P ubli­ P ubli­ Cit. weight. C it. weight. P ub li­ C it. weight.
D ependent Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ. cations Publ.
Departm ent Size -0.018 -0.704 -0.044 -1.052 -0.013 -0.057 0.653 -1.847 -0.005 -0.430
(0.028) (0.494) (0.033) (0.610) (0.052) (0.022)* (0.766) (0.723)* (0.039) (0.588)
Peer Q uality -0.008 -0.231 -0.023 -0.471 0.041 -0.023 0.637 -0.357 -0.003 -0.212
(0.024) (0.414) (0.029) (0.434) (0.037) (0.030) (0.586) (0.602) (0.025) (0.454)
Age D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / /
University FE / / / / / / / / / /
University specific. T im e Trends / /
Observations 2257 2257 1863 1863 838 1419 838 1419 2257 2257
#  o f researchers 256 256 254 254 137 178 137 178 256 256
Cragg-Donald E V  S tatistic 116.53 116.53 61.68 61.68 24.19 89.61 24.19 89.61 131.53 131.53
**significant at 1 percent level *significant at 5 percent level (A ll standard errors clustered at the departm ent level)
Table 1.22: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Chemistry (Specialization Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Full Full om itting om itting younger 45 or younger 45 or Full Full
Sam ple Sam ple Sam ple 33 & 34 33 & 34 than  45 older than  45 older Sam ple Sam ple
Publi­ C it. weight. P ubli­ Cit. weight. Publi­ P ubli­ Cit. weight. C it. w eight. Pub li­ Cit. weight.
D ependent Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ. cations Publ.
D epartm ent Size 0.006 -1.067 0.024 -0.528 -0.065 0.040 -2.284 -0.179 -0.005 -2.016
(0.046) (0.850) (0.046) (0.683) (0.138) (0.048) (3.051) (0.472) (0.083) (1.031)
Peer Q uality -0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.055 0.005 -0.007 -0.051 0.024 -0.004 0.077
(0.007) (0.091) (0.007) (0.087) (0.014) (0.009) (0.235) (0.097) (0.009) (0.170)
A ge D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity FE
U niversity specific. T im e Trends
/ / / / / / / / /
/
/
/
Observations 3567 3567 2913 2913 1303 2264 1303 2264 3567 3567
#  of researchers 405 405 404 404 203 290 203 290 405 405
Cragg-Donald E V  S tatistic 206.12 206.12 190.64 190.64 40.11 164.86 40.11 164.86 151.67 151.67
T able 1.23: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Mathematics (Specialization Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Full Full om itting om itting younger 45 or younger 45 or Full Full
Sam ple Sam ple Sam ple 33 & 34 33 & 34 than 45 older than  45 older Sam ple Sam ple
P ubli­ Cit. weight. P ub li­ C it. weight. Publi­ P ubli­ Cit. weight. Cit. weight. P ub li­ C it. weight.
D ependent Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ. cations Publ.
D epartm ent Size 0.101 -1.205 -2.141 25.734 0.045 -0.083 -1.228 -1.781 -0.002 -1.381
(0.126) (1.423) (32.147) (392.778) (0.121) (0.303) ' (0.984) (3.641) (0.117) (1.214)
Peer Q uality -0.045 0.778 0.751 -8.832 -0.026 0.055 0.613 0.932 0.006 0.858
(0.059) (0.505) (11.462) (139.978) (0.040) (0.136) (0.349) (1.661) (0.078) (0.773)
Age D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Year D um m ies / / / / / / / / / /
Individual FE / / / / / / / / / /
U niversity FE
U niversity specific. T im e Trends
/ / / / / / / / /
/
/
/
O bservations 1538 1538 1256 1256 672 866 672 866 1538 1538
#  of researchers 183 183 183 183 106 119 106 119 183 183
Cragg-Donald E V  S ta tistic 8.56 8.56 0.021 0.021 16.38 1.81 16.38 1.81 12.93 12.93
**significant at 1 percent level ^significant at 5 percent level (A ll standard errors clustered at the departm ent level)
2 Studying Abroad and the Effect 
on International Labour Market
E vidence from  th e  Introduction  o f  E R A SM U S
2.1 Introdu ction
International labour market migration has risen dramatically in the recent past, especially 
among university graduates. Lowell (2007), for example, shows an increase in the emigration 
rate of university graduates from about 4 percent in 1980 to about 7 percent in 2000 in devel­
oped countries. The increased demand for skilled labour and the importance of highly skilled 
individuals for innovation has induced many countries to implement policies geared to attract­
ing skilled migrants from abroad (OECD, 2002). Understanding the determinants of migration 
is key to formulating such policies. While attention has traditionally focused on wage differen­
tials, going back to Hicks (1932)27, it is clear that individual characteristics play an important 
role in determining the skilled worker’s propensity to migrate. One possible determinant which 
has received particular attention of policymakers over the past years is student mobility during 
tertiary education. In particular, it has been hypothesized tha t student mobility may act as a 
’stepping stone’ for later labour migration (Guellec & Cervantes, 2001). Numerous countries, 
including the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, attem pt to attract highly skilled 
mobile workers through policies relating to student mobility programs (Guellec &; Cervantes, 
2001).These are based on the assumption tha t student mobility has a genuine effect on later 
labour market mobility. Despite the widespread belief in the link between studying abroad 
and international labour market mobility, empirical evidence is very limited. Establishing a 
causal link between studying abroad and labour market mobility later in life is a challenging 
task because students who decide to study abroad are in many ways different from students 
who undertake all of their education in their home country. The unobserved heterogeneity may 
also affect the decision of working abroad later in life. This may introduce a bias in OLS esti­
mates of the effect of studying abroad on subsequent international labour migration decisions. 
In this chapter, we provide evidence on the causal effect of studying abroad on later labour 
market mobility by exploiting an exogenous change in student mobility: the introduction of the 
ERASMUS student exchange programme.
This programme has been devised by the European Union to foster student exchange in Europe. 
Introduced in 1987 it offers the possibility of studying in another European country for up 
to 12 months at very low cost. Different universities and different departments introduced 
the programme at very different times. We exploit the variation in scholarship availability
27For surveys on determinants of migration, see Greenwood (1975, 1985, 1997).
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as a  source of exogenous variation in a student’s probability to study abroad. In order to 
ascertain a student’s exposure to the ERASMUS programme we construct a unique data set, 
containing annual information on the number of exchange places for each subject at every 
German university. In order to assess the effect of studying abroad on international mobility 
later in life we merge this data to a survey of German university graduates. We first show that 
the ERASMUS programme has a strong impact on a student’s probability of studying abroad. 
We then use the department level variation in international student exchange programs to 
identify the causal effect of studying abroad on the decision of working in a foreign country 
later in life. We find that studying abroad increases a person’s probability of working abroad by 
about 15-20 percentage points. This result suggests a strong causal link between international 
labour market mobility and previous international mobility. Qualitative evidence suggests that 
besides career concerns soft factors such as interest in foreign cultures or living with a foreign 
partner are important determinants for the decision to work abroad, and we suggest that the 
effect of studying abroad may work through these channels.
There are some papers analysing the link between labour market mobility and previous mobility. 
Kodrzycki (2001) provides descriptive evidence on inter-state mobility in the US and finks it to 
the preceding decision of attending college out of state.28 Malamud & Wozniak (2006) study the 
effect of the decision to go to college on interregional mobility in the US. Using an instrumental 
variables approach to control for selection effects they find that attending college increases the 
probability of residing out of state later in fife by about 20 percentage points. The fink between 
international student mobility and the decision to work abroad after graduation has rarely been 
studied to date. One reason is data availability: Most surveys do not contain information on 
study abroad spells during a student’s undergraduate career, and graduates who work abroad 
are generally not sampled in national surveys of the sending countries. The available evidence 
is based on surveys of students. Jahr and Teichler (2001) use data from a survey of European 
university graduates. They investigate the effect of studying abroad on later international labour 
market mobility without controlling for possible selection of formerly mobile students. They find 
that formerly mobile students are between 15 and 18 percentage points more likely to work in a 
foreign country after graduation. Dreher and Poutvaara (2005) investigate the role of student 
mobility in explaining aggregate migration flows in a cross-country panel study, focusing on 
migration to the United States. They find strong effects of previous period’s number of foreign 
students on current period’s number of migrants, indicating tha t a ten percent increase in the 
number of foreign students increases subsequent migration by around 0.5 percent.
The paper which is most closely related to our work is a study by Oosterbeek and Webbink 
(2006). They employ a regression discontinuity design to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
between internationally mobile and non-mobile students. Using data on talented Dutch uni­
versity students they find that studying abroad increases the probability of living in a foreign 
country by about 50 percentage points. A key difference to our work is that they look at a
28 She finds that individuals who attended college out of state are 54 percent more likely to live out-of-state five 
years after graduation. These results, however, cannot be interpreted as causal effects as she does not address 
the selection issues affecting mobility decisions.
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small sample of particularly talented students, while we use a nationally representative survey 
of German university graduates. Another important difference is tha t Oosterbeek and Webbink 
investigate the effect of postgraduate studies abroad. Students pursuing a postgraduate degree 
abroad may remain in the receiving country while looking for work. Part of the effect they find 
may also be driven by the fact that some of the respondents abroad are still enrolled in higher 
education at the time of the survey. In contrast, in our work, the intervention is international 
mobility during the undergraduate career, after which students return to complete their degree 
in Germany. Thus, our research design allows us -  and in fact forces us -  to separate the two 
mobility investments (studying abroad and working abroad). The effect we find is therefore 
informative about the dynamic effects of earlier mobility investments.
This chapter presents evidence tha t previous educational mobility is a very im portant determi­
nant of mobility later in life. We thus establish a causal link of previous mobility decision to 
mobility later in life. This highlights the importance of taking earlier mobility into account in 
economic modelling but also for policy decisions. The European Union, for example, tries to 
foster labour market mobility in the EU (see "Commission’s Action Plan for skills and mobility" 
(2002)). Our research suggests that supporting international student mobility is a very success­
ful policy instrument to  foster labour market mobility later in life. Our results on the effect 
of the ERASMUS programme on the probability of studying abroad also show th a t exchange 
programs are indeed effective in promoting student mobility. This will be im portant to policy 
makers as they spend large public funds on these programs.
2.2 D ata
We use data on German university graduates, which has been collected by the Higher Edu­
cation Information System (HIS) institute. This survey is conducted to  provide a nationally 
representative longitudinal sample of university graduates in Germany. A sample of university 
graduates has been drawn from cohorts graduating in the academic years 1988-89, 1992-93, 
1996-97, and 2000-01. In the following, we will refer to these four cross-sections as graduate 
cohorts 1989, 1993, 1997, and 2001. Graduates in each cohort are surveyed twice. The first 
survey takes place about 12 months after graduation (the Initial Survey). The same individuals 
participate in a follow-up survey about 5 years after entering the labour market (Follow-Up 
Survey).29 The following Figure 2.1 illustrates the timing of the different surveys.
29For the 2001 cohort, only the initial survey is available so far.
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G raduate
Cohort
Year
1989
Initial1993
1997
2001
F igure  2.1: Graduate Cohorts in the Sample
The data contains detailed information on the students’ background, study history, and labour 
market characteristics. This allows us to relate study decisions, in particular international 
educational mobility, to later labour market outcomes. A large advantage of this dataset lies 
in the fact that individuals graduating from a university in Germany are followed even if they 
move to a foreign country. This feature makes this dataset particularly valuable to investigate 
questions concerning international mobility.
The data and the sampling process is described in detail in Briedis &; Minks (2004). The 
sample was drawn as follows: For each cohort, university-subject-degree combinations where 
sampled randomly, and the respective universities mailed the questionnaire to each student 
who had graduated within the corresponding academic year. This procedure ensures that the 
sample contains individuals from a large number of different institutions and subjects. One key 
advantage of the data is that the population of interest includes all university graduates who 
completed their studies during a given academic year at any institution of higher education in 
Germany. The higher education system in Germany consists of a number of different university 
types catering to different types of students. We include five main types of higher education 
institutions in our estimation. This includes not only the traditional universities (Universitaten) 
but also the so-called Universities of Applied Sciences (Fachhochschulen), the Comprehensive 
Universities (Gesamthochschulen), the Colleges of Art and Music (Kunst- und Musikakademien) , 
and the Theological Universities (Theologische Hochschulen).30 The response rate to the survey 
is around 25%. While of course a higher response rate would be desirable, an analysis conducted 
by the HIS has come to the conclusion that the characteristics of the survey respondents are close 
to those of the target population. The total number of respondents in our data corresponding 
to the four cohorts is 8,153 (1989), 6,737 (1993), 6,220 (1997), and 8,103 (2001).
The key information for our purposes is whether the student has studied abroad during her
30A ll in s t itu t io n s  in our sa m p le  w ou ld  b e  ca lled  u n iv ersities  in m o st cou n tr ies  o u ts id e  G erm any.
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undergraduate studies, and whether the graduate works abroad at the time of the survey. We 
infer undergraduate mobility from the first question of the questionnaire, which asks the student 
to report her complete enrolment history. Respondents are instructed to report each change of 
degree programme or university. The questionnaire makes explicit reference to study abroad 
as one form of change in status in the 2001 survey. We use this information to construct an 
indicator of whether the student studied abroad during her undergraduate career. In order to 
exclude university mobility after finishing the first degree (e.g. to obtain a Master abroad), 
we only look at international mobility before the graduation date of the first degree. It is 
important to note that only students who obtain their degree in Germany are surveyed. We 
are, therefore, not able to observe students who first enrol in Germany and subsequently move 
to a foreign university and obtain their degree abroad. Also Germans who complete all of their 
higher education abroad are not included in our sample. These individuals may be different 
to students who study abroad as part of their degree in Germany. It is quite likely that those 
who complete their higher education abroad are even more likely to work in a foreign country 
after graduation than students who obtain their degree in Germany. If this was true we would 
underestimate the effect of studying abroad. Unfortunately, our data is not suitable to test this 
hypothesis.
For all students who have ever participated in the labour market, both the initial and the 
follow-up surveys contain questions about the current (or the last) employment, including the 
location of work. We infer from this question whether a former student now works in Germany 
or abroad, and create an indicator accordingly.
The following figure shows the percentages of studying abroad and working abroad (from the 
initial survey, one year after graduation) for the four graduation cohorts.
P e r c e n ta g e  A broad
1989 1993 1997 2001
Graduate Cohort
Studying Abroad —  +—  W orking Abroad 1 year  after graduation
Figure 2.2: International Mobility in HIS Data
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It can be seen that both studying abroad and working abroad occurs more frequently among 
students of later graduation cohorts. It is important to  note tha t we include dummies for 
the four graduation cohorts in all our regressions. Therefore, we do not identify the effect of 
studying abroad from the overall time-trend in the two variables. In fact, in our sensitivity 
analysis, we show that our results are robust to allowing for not only a general time trend, but 
also for subject-specific time trends.
These percentages can be compared to information on international mobility from other data 
sources. Isserstedt & Schnitzler (2002) point out tha t different data sources use different ways to 
collect data and different definitions of a stay abroad. These differences may result in different 
estimates of student mobility. W ith this caveat in mind, we compare the incidence of interna­
tional educational mobility in our data to data from the 16th Social Survey (Sozialerhebung), 
a  large-scale survey of German students in 2000. Of all students surveyed in the Social Survey, 
about 13 percent of advanced students indicate that they spent part of their studies at a foreign 
university. While this number is larger than ours, it seems roughly comparable: The students 
interviewed in the Social Survey in 2000 will on average belong to a later graduate cohort than 
the academic year 2000/2001, which corresponds to our last cohort. Also, our definition relies 
on students spending at least one term at a foreign university. Thus, short term exchange will be 
included in the figure of the Social Survey, but not in ours. The figures from the Social Survey 
also replicate the strong over-time increase in the fraction of students who study abroad.
W ith similar caution we use data from the OECD Factbook 2006 to investigate the reliability of 
our data with respect to international labour market mobility. The OECD estimates tha t about 
5.5 percent of Germans holding a university degree worked as expatriates in an OECD country 
in the year 2001. This number is lower than the percentage of people working abroad for the 
2001 cohort in our dataset. This can be explained by the following two facts: First, the OECD 
calculates its estimate of expatriates by considering migration to the OECD countries only, 
while our number includes people working abroad anywhere in the world. Second, differences 
may also be driven by different methodologies of estimating outmigration: the OECD captures 
stocks of people abroad while we look at the outflow of graduates from a certain cohort.
We conclude tha t both the percentage of people studying abroad and the percentage of people 
working abroad in our data are comparable to estimates from other data sources. This is 
reassuring as there may be a worry tha t response rates to the HIS survey may differ for people 
living abroad. Unfortunately, there is no direct way of testing for differential response rates as 
we do not have any information on the individuals who do not respond to the HIS survey. One 
way of addressing this concern is to show that other data sources with different sampling frames 
exhibit similar numbers to our data.
In addition to the international mobility variables we also use a number of other control variables 
measured at the individual level. We create a measure of potential experience since graduation, 
defined as the number of months from graduation to the time of answering the questionnaire.31
31 There is some variation in experience because students were sampled according to whether their graduation 
fell in a particular academic year. Students graduating at the beginning of the academic year therefore have more 
potential experience than those graduating towards the end of the year. In addition, there is some variation with
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We take this measure of potential experience rather than actual labour market experience, 
because actual labour market experience could be affected by a study period abroad and might 
then be endogenous to our outcome. Other controls include a female indicator and an indicator 
for whether the student completed an apprenticeship before beginning her university studies. 
We also use variables which control for a students’ earlier mobility decisions. In particular we 
include a variable which controls for whether the student’s first university enrolment occurs 
in the state (Bundesland) where she obtained her final high school degree. Furthermore, we 
include the distance between the state of her university enrolment and the state where she 
obtained her high school degree.
We use a number of variables to control for a student’s parental background. To control for 
parental education we use a variable that indicates the highest grade completed by either parent, 
where we split parental education into three categories to account for the characteristics of 
the education system in Germany. The omitted category contains students with parents who 
obtained up to 13 years of education. This group consists of students with parents who did not 
receive a school degree (very few), parents with lower types of secondary schooling (Hauptschule 
or Realschule) usually followed by an apprenticeship, and parents who obtained a high school 
degree but no further education (very few). The second group is comprised of students where 
the better educated parent either obtained an advanced craftsmanship degree (Meister) or some 
higher education, such as a degree from a university of applied science (Fachhochschule)  but 
not a degree from a university. The third group includes students who have at least one parent 
holding a university degree.32 We also construct indicator variables in five categories for each 
parent to control for parental occupation. As a proxy for credit constraints we use an indicator 
variable whether the student ever received federal financial assistance (BAFOEG). Students are 
eligible to this assistance if parental income is below a certain threshold. This threshold varies 
according to  the number of children who are enrolled in a formal education programme.
In order to  implement our Instrumental Variables strategy we combine the HIS graduate survey 
data with a unique dataset of ERASMUS participation. There is no readily available data on 
the ERASMUS exchange programme for our time period of interest. We obtained data on the 
number of ERASMUS scholarship holders for each year and each participating institution on 
a subject-by-subject basis from 1993/94 to 1999/2000 from The German Academic Exchange 
Service (DAAD). To obtain the data for the earlier years we proceeded as follows: The DAAD 
provided us with the number of scholarships allocated to each ERASMUS inter-university agree­
ment (Inter-university Cooperation programme, ICP). We combined this information with pub­
lished listings of all ICPs, which give details about the participating universities and the subjects 
covered for each inter-university agreement (see, for example, DAAD (1992)). This allows us 
to construct a panel data set at the university-subject-year level that covers the entire history 
of the ERASMUS programme in Germany. We use the following approach to establish when 
the typical student goes abroad: We compute the median academic year in which students go
respect to when the questionnaires were sent out and how quickly graduates responded.
32Using a linear years of parental education variable or controlling for mother’s and father’s education separately 
does not affect our results.
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abroad, separately by graduate cohort, subject and university type (University, University of 
Applied Science, Comprehensive University, Theological University or College of Art). We then 
assign to each student the exposure to the ERASMUS programme in tha t academic year. This 
approach is preferable to simply assigning ERASMUS characteristics at a fixed point in the 
student’s study period (say the first or second year): since our graduates are sampled when 
they exit university, and since there is substantial variation in length of studies, there might 
be a systematic relationship between individual study duration and other unobservable factors. 
All our regressions include fixed effects both for the graduate cohort and for the year in which 
the typical student studies abroad, which was used to assign the ERASMUS exposure.
We restrict our sample to those observations for which all variables of interest are observed. As 
mentioned before, students from the graduate cohorts 1989, 1993, and 1997 have been surveyed 
twice, the first time one year after graduating from university and a second time five years 
after graduation. We thus have two observations for the location of work for most individuals 
from those cohorts. In the estimation below, we pool the observations from the initial and the 
follow-up survey for efficiency reasons. This allows us to use the information provided in both 
questionnaires. Means and standard deviations of our estimation sample are reported in Table 
2.1. It is evident from comparing columns (2) and (3) that individuals who studied abroad 
are also more likely to work abroad later in fife. One can also see th a t individuals with more 
exposure to ERASMUS (as measured by ERASMUS ratio or ERASMUS indicator, which are 
described in further detail below) are more likely to study abroad. In the following section we 
explain how we use the ERASMUS programme to identify the causal link between studying 
abroad and international labour market mobility later in life.
2.3 Identification  Strategy
In order to investigate the effect of studying abroad on international labour market mobility we 
estimate the following equation.
(1) Work Abroad = (31+ /32 Study Abroad +  /?3X +  /34Cohort FE +  /?5Year Abroad FE  
+  ^ S u b ject FE +  /37University FE + u
Where Work Abroad and Study Abroad are dummy variables indicating whether an individual 
worked abroad or studied abroad, respectively. X is a vector of personal characteristics, which 
may affect the decision to  work abroad, such as gender, work experience or an individual’s 
family background. We also include a full set of dummies for each graduate cohort, the year 
a typical student goes abroad (as explained in the previous section), a student’s subject, and 
university. Our main interest lies in obtaining consistent estimates of
The summary statistics presented in the previous section clearly indicate that students who 
study abroad differ systematically in their observable characteristics from those who remain in 
Germany throughout their undergraduate studies. Although our data set is rich in observed 
characteristics of the student, many dimensions which are likely to affect the students’ mobility
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decision remain unobserved. A possible factor could be, for example, the students’ unobserved 
motivation. If these unobserved factors are correlated with the outcome, estimating equation
(1) using OLS would yield biased estimates, because we would mistakenly attribute the effect 
of the unobserved covariates to the stay abroad. While it is generally difficult to characterize 
these unobserved components in its entirety, there is some direct evidence of what factors 
may play a role. In their sociological analysis of determinants of studying abroad, Muessig- 
Trapp k  Schnitzler (1997) identify as critical factors affecting the decision to study abroad the 
student’s financial situation, whether she holds any part-time job, foreign language skills, the 
expected labour market benefit of going abroad, and her motivation and personality structure. 
Clearly, many of these dimensions will be unobserved to the econometrician. Thinking about 
our outcome of interest it is likely tha t the same unobserved factors which drive the decision 
to study abroad will also affect the decision of where to look for a job. It is therefore not clear 
what at all can be learned from a comparison of means of those who study abroad versus those 
who do not. This underlines that this context requires a credible identification strategy to learn 
about the causal impact of the study period abroad. We use the ERASMUS programme as 
an instrumental variable to identify the causal effect of studying abroad. As our first stage we 
estimate the following equation:
(2) Study Abroad = 7i + 7 2ERASMUS + 7 3X +  7 4Cohort FE + 7 5Year Abroad FE
+ 7 6Subject FE + 7 7University FE + e
ERASMUS is a variable measuring a student’s exposure to the ERASMUS programme, which 
we describe in further detail below. In addition to the main variables of interest we include the 
same control variables as in equation (1).
Our identification strategy relies on the large scale introduction and expansion of the ERAS­
MUS programme. In 1987, the Council of Ministers of the European Community passed the 
European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS). The 
main objective of ERASMUS is "to achieve a significant increase in the number of students [...] 
spending an integrated period of study in another Member State." Student mobility was to 
be increased through the creation of a European university network, individual scholarships, 
and mutual recognition of academic credits. Since then, ERASMUS has continually expanded. 
Looking across all participating countries, 1.37 million students have taken part in ERASMUS 
in the period of the academic years 1987/88 to 2004/05, with 15.7% of those outgoings com­
ing from Germany.33 The magnitude of the expansion can be clarified by relating ERASMUS 
outgoing students to the number of students in a given cohort. For example, of those grad­
uates surveyed in 2001, about 5% of German students studied abroad with an ERASMUS
33 One argument why outmigration of skilled workers does not lead to brain drain is that there may be off-setting 
immigration from other countries. Statistics on the ERASMUS program indicate that within the ERASMUS 
student exchange, German outgoing students are not matched by corresponding incoming students from other 
countries: In 2004/05, German outgoing ERASMUS students exceed incoming ERASMUS students by about 30 
percent.
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scholarship.34 The overall incidence of studying abroad for the 2001 cohort is 8 percent. The 
ERASMUS programme therefore accounts for more than half of international undergraduate 
mobility in Germany in our last cohort. Particularly noteworthy is the over-time change in the 
number of ERASMUS scholarships. Figure 2.3 shows the number of German outgoing students 
for each year since the introduction of the programme.
ERASM US Students from Germ an U niversities
cnz>
U L J
1985 1990 2000 20051995
Year
Source: DAAD
F igure 2.3: ERASMUS in Germany
The dramatic expansion is clearly visible. Students in our four graduate cohorts are therefore 
affected quite differently by the programme. It is important to be precise about the variation 
we exploit to identify the effect of ERASMUS. We account for systematic differences between 
universities by including university fixed effects. Our empirical strategy thus relies on over­
time changes in scholarship availability. At the same time, we include dummies for our four 
graduate cohorts, so that any difference that is common to all students in a cohort is taken out 
as well. This ensures that we are not relying on any long-term trends (which may possibly affect 
both the instrument and the outcome). Furthermore, we include dummies for the year a typical 
exchange student begins her stay at a foreign university. We define this year as the year when the 
median exchange student in a given subject and graduate cohort enrols at a foreign university. 
We allow this year to vary across different subjects because students in different departments 
integrate their stay at a foreign university at different times of their degree. We also allow this 
timing to vary across different university types. In addition to that we include subject fixed 
effects in our estimation. This accounts for any systematic difference in international mobility
34This number is obtained as follows: In the 2001 graduate cohort, the median student started her tertiary 
studies in the academic year 1995/96. In that year, about 262,000 students entered university. The typical 
exchange student in that cohort studied abroad in the third year of her studies. In that year 13785 students from 
German universities participated in the ERASMUS program. This corresponds to about 5% of the entire cohort.
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of students in different subjects. We therefore rely on over-time changes in programme intensity 
at a given subject and university combination. Probing the robustness of our findings we also 
include subject specific time trends in our specifications. These allow for a separate linear trend 
in the probability of studying abroad for each subject. The nature of our results is not affected 
by including those time trends. In another robustness check we further control for possible 
unobserved heterogeneity by including fixed effects for the interaction of a student’s faculty 
(such as humanities or science faculty) and her university. We show below that our findings are 
robust to using these fixed effects.
Students participating in the ERASMUS programme apply for an exchange scholarship at their 
home university. The award of the scholarship not only secures them a place at a certain 
partner university abroad but also provides them with a small mobility grant. In the academic 
year 1997/1998 (the year a typical student from the 2001 graduation cohort went abroad) an 
outgoing student from Germany received about 138 Euros per month for her stay abroad. In 
addition to receiving the mobility grant the ERASMUS student receives a tuition fee waiver at 
the foreign university. Another important benefit of ERASMUS is tha t it significantly reduces 
the student’s application costs and the time the student needs to apply in advance to be able 
to organize a stay at a foreign university.
In order give a insight into the variation, which is exploited in our identification strategy, we 
show the raw data on the number of ERASMUS students at four departments at the two large 
universities in Munich in the following figure.35 The introduction of the ERASMUS programme 
at a certain department occurred at different points in time at the two universities. After the 
introduction of the programme the number of students going abroad varies over time.
35 We choose the Ludwig-Maximilians University and the Technical University Munich for our descriptive analyis 
because they are located in the same city and are of similar quality and reputation. This is exemplified by the 
fact that these two unversities were among only three universities to be selected as winner of the "Initiative for 
Excellence". This initiative allocates federal funding to German universities which are considered to have the 
potential to become world-class research universities. This potential was evaluated based on the universities’ past 
performance and on their strategic plans for the future.
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F igure 2.4: ERASMUS at Universities in Munich
We construct two different measures of a student’s exposure to the ERASMUS programme. The 
first variable measures the exact number of ERASMUS scholarships, offered by each department 
at every university in a given year. In order to account for differences in size of different de­
partments, we normalize the number of scholarships with the number of students competing for 
these scholarships. We use the number of first year students in the fall semester of the academic 
year 1992/93 for this normalization. Again, these student numbers are at the university-subject 
level. In the following we refer to this variable as ERASMUS ratio. This measure for a student’s 
exposure to the scholarship programme varies at the university, subject, year level.
The second ERASMUS measure is an indicator, which takes the value one if the student’s 
department offered an ERASMUS scholarship in the relevant year. In almost all cases this 
variable is 0 until a certain department joins the ERASMUS programme and 1 thereafter, 
because very few departments leave the programme after they have joined. We denote this 
variable ERASMUS indicator, which varies in the dimensions university, subject, and year as 
well. On the one hand this variable is less powerful than the other measure because it does not 
capture changes in the number of ERASMUS scholarships provided, which certainly affect a 
student’s probability of studying abroad. On the other hand, however, this disadvantage may be 
an advantage if student demand affects the number of ERASMUS places. This would affect the 
credibility of any instrument using the actual number of ERASMUS scholarships. Even though 
we believe that this is not an important concern in practice we propose our ERASMUS indicator 
variable as an alternative, which deals with this concern. The ERASMUS indicator variable 
is 0 if a department does not offer any ERASMUS scholarships and 1 if any ERASMUS 
scholarship is offered. Using the ERASMUS indicator as an instrument amounts to a classical
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difference-in-differences estimator comparing students before and after the introduction of an 
exchange programme for their subject at their university. The only way in which student 
demand may affect this instrument is through triggering the introduction of ERASMUS in 
the relevant department, which we believe is extremely unlikely. Administrative hurdles when 
setting up the programme stand in the way of any short term responses to student demand. 
If a  certain department wants to join the ERASMUS programme, the university has to apply 
for a certification at the European Commission. Moreover, the department has to find partner 
universities, which are willing to exchange students with the given department. Clearing these 
administrative hurdles takes time. It is therefore very unlikely tha t departments are able to set 
up a new ERASMUS programme in time for a certain cohort to be able to benefit from that 
introduction.
Where does the over-time variation in ERASMUS come from? University participation in 
ERASMUS operated through Inter-University Cooperation Programs (ICP), in which groups of 
university departments from different countries formed a network covered by an ICP agreement, 
typically initiated through an active professor who happens to have contacts with professors 
a t foreign universities. Departments enter the programme at different times, and this provides 
us with a lot of variation in programme participation. One way to interpret the evolution 
in ERASMUS scholarships is to think of the cooperations as an emerging network. Many 
departments would at some point enter ERASMUS with a few links to departments at foreign 
universities. Over time other foreign departments would be taken into the network. Similarly 
the German department itself would enter other (possibly new) cooperation networks.
In order to  visualize how students are affected by these shocks of being faced with more or less 
exchange opportunity, we perform the following event study: For each student’s initial university 
and subject choice, we observe whether there was at any point an ERASMUS cooperation in 
the time period we observe. We group students by whether they entered the university before 
or after the introduction of the ERASMUS scheme, and by how many years. In the following 
figure we plot the time difference between the introduction of ERASMUS and university entry 
against the probability of going abroad. Keeping in mind that students usually start two or 
three years before going abroad, we get the following prediction: According to our hypothesis, 
the probability of studying abroad should be flat for the cohorts starting more than three 
years before the introduction. The cohorts starting three or two years before the introduction 
of ERASMUS would then be the first ones to be affected, and we expect an increase in the 
proportion of students studying abroad from then on. The results can be seen in Figure 2.5. 
The figure provides evidence tha t the ERASMUS scheme affects the different cohorts in a very 
precise way. Closely following our prediction, the probability of studying abroad is low and 
flat before the introduction of ERASMUS, and goes up steeply afterwards. Furthermore, our 
data provides evidence that institutions which have not yet introduced ERASMUS are similar 
to those which never introduce ERASMUS: Students at institutions which never introduce 
ERASMUS have a probability of studying abroad of 2.6%, which closely matches the average 
for the not-yet-affected students in the graph.
2 STUDYING ABROAD AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR M OBILITY 73
Event Study ERASMUS
ID
o
o
-5 0 5 10-15 -10
Difference between university entry and introduction of ERASMUS (years)
F igure  2.5: Event Study ERASMUS
The usefulness of ERASMUS as an Instrumental Variable (IV) depends on two conditions: 
First, the IV needs to be correlated with the endogenous variable (studying abroad). Second, 
it needs to be uncorrelated with the error term u of the outcome equation. The rank condition 
can be verified by looking at the first stage regression, which we present in the following section 
of this chapter.
The exclusion restriction requires that there is no direct effect of the instrument on the out­
come except through the endogenous variable. Since ERASMUS scholarships are restricted to 
educational exchange for undergraduate students, this is arguably satisfied. Furthermore, it is 
required that our IV is not correlated with any other variable which affects the outcome. We 
argue that this is satisfied through our empirical strategy. We address possible concerns in turn. 
In particular, we consider the ’university quality’ argument, the ’big push’ argument, and the 
’student selection’ argument.
One concern may be that university quality affects both scholarship availability and the out­
come: If good universities offered more ERASMUS scholarships, and if at the same time good 
universities produced higher skilled graduates who are more likely to find a job in a different 
country, the exclusion restriction would be violated. A similar argument applies if students at 
good universities were particularly motivated and able, making them more mobile even in the 
absence of ERASMUS. We take care of this problem by including university fixed effects (FE) 
in all our regressions, which control for any permanent university attribute. A closely related 
criticism is that even within a given university some faculties, such as sciences, may be better 
than other faculties. We show that our results also hold if we include faculty times university 
fixed effects, which control for any permanent difference between faculties even within a given
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university.
A common concern in IV estimation is that using a particular policy may carry the risk of not 
accounting for other policies which were implemented at the same time. Consider a university 
which at some point decides to raise its profile, and implements a number of measures designed 
to increase the attractiveness of the institution. For example, it could engage in more active 
exchange activities also outside Europe and possibly implement other measures at the same 
time. One way to demonstrate that this is unlikely to be the case is by showing tha t the 
ERASMUS programme had a very precise and narrow impact. We use information of where 
students went to study abroad, grouped into three categories (Europe, United States, and other 
areas). We show below that the ERASMUS programme only affected the exchange to Europe 
but not to other areas. This provides additional reassurance tha t our instrument has a very 
precise effect, only affecting a student’s probability to study abroad in Europe.
Another concern is tha t students may choose a particular university-subject combination be­
cause of scholarship availability. Particularly mobile students might choose universities and 
departments offering a large number of ERASMUS scholarships. This would again bias our 
IV results. We do not think tha t this is likely to occur, however. Since most of our sampled 
individuals started their university career long before the widespread availability of the inter­
net, information about exchange programs was extremely difficult to obtain. Even nowadays 
it is hard to obtain information on the availability of ERASMUS scholarships on departmental 
websites of German universities. It is much more likely that enrolment decisions are based on 
factors such as reputation of the university or closeness to home. We also address the student 
selection argument directly by controlling for distance between the state of a student’s high 
school degree and her university. Controlling for earlier mobility does not affect our results. A 
related worry is tha t students may change university or department after they figured out that 
their university and/or department offers little opportunity to study abroad. Using the ERAS­
MUS measures from a student’s first enrolment enables us to avoid any problems of selective 
mobility after university entry of the student.
In summary, we believe that in our empirical framework ERASMUS scholarship availability 
provides us with exogenous variation in the student’s decision to study abroad. After control­
ling for university FE, subject FE, graduate cohort FE, and year abroad FE we argue that 
the remaining variation can be understood as random shocks to the student. Depending on 
the cohort, subject, and university she belongs to, she will find a different set of international 
cooperations at her disposal. These differences in scholarship availability will then translate 
into variation in the decision to study abroad. Using ERASMUS as an instrumental variable 
we can therefore estimate equations (1) and (2) to find the causal effect of studying abroad. In 
all the regressions reported below we account for any dependence between observations by clus­
tering all results on a university-subject level. This leaves the error correlation within clusters 
completely unrestricted and allows for arbitrary with-in cluster dependence. The clustering, 
therefore, not only allows arbitrary correlations of errors for students from a graduate cohort at 
a certain university and subject combination but also allows the errors of a university-subject
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combination to be serially correlated. The following sections discuss the results we obtain using 
our identification strategy.
2.4 F irst Stage R esu lts
Table 2.2 presents the results from our first stage estimates. In this context the first stage 
regressions are interesting in its own right as one can learn about the factors affecting an 
individual’s decision to study abroad. We regress an indicator for studying abroad on our 
measure for exposure to the ERASMUS programme and other control variables. In column 
(1) we use the ratio of ERASMUS places to the number of students in the relevant cohort as 
our measure for a student’s exposure to ERASMUS. The coefficient on ERASMUS is highly 
significant with an F-statistic of 17.4. The coefficient indicates that an increase in the ratio 
of ERASMUS places from say 5 percent to 10 percent increases an individual’s probability of 
studying abroad by about 1 percentage point. Analysing the effect of our control variables one 
can see tha t a student’s gender does not seem to affect her probability of studying abroad. 
Students who have completed an apprenticeship before enrolling at the university are about 1.3 
percentage points less likely to study abroad during their undergraduate studies.
In column (2) we use an indicator for whether the student’s department participates in the 
ERASMUS programme as our measure for exposure to the ERASMUS programme. Once 
again the coefficient on the ERASMUS measure is highly significant with an F-statistic of 9.1. 
The coefficient indicates tha t a student’s probability of studying abroad increases by about 1.4 
percentage points if her department participates in the ERASMUS programme. The coefficients 
for the control variables are very similar to the ones reported in column (1).
In columns (3) and (4) we add controls for a student’s parental background to our specifica­
tions. Parental occupation is measured in five categories for each parent. We include a full 
set of dummies for these categories in these specification. To save space we do not report the 
coefficients on all those dummies.36 Parental education is measured in three categories as the 
education level achieved by the parent with more education. The results indicate tha t students 
with better educated parents are significantly more likely to study abroad. Students with a 
parent whose education level falls in our second category are about 1 percentage point more 
likely to study abroad than students with parents who have at most 13 years of education. 
Students with a parent holding a university degree are about 3.4 percentage points more likely 
to study abroad. The coefficients and standard errors of our ERASMUS measures are hardly 
affected by including the controls for parental background. This is reassuring as it indicates that 
explicitly accounting for socioeconomic background does not alter the power of our intervention 
on students’ behaviour.
The specifications reported in columns (5) and (6) include controls for a student’s mobility at the 
beginning of her studies. The first mobility measure is an indicator for whether the student has 
her first university enrolment in the federal state (Bundesland) where she graduated from high
36More detailed results with reported coefficients for the occupational dummies are available from the authors 
upon request.
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school. We add a further control, which measures the distance from the state where a student 
obtained her high school degree to the state of her first university enrolment. The results indicate 
that students who study in the state of their final high school degree are about 1.4 percentage 
points less likely to  study abroad. Even though the coefficient on the distance measure for pre­
university mobility has the expected positive sign (those who enrol at a university further away 
from the state where they obtained their high school degree &re more likely to study abroad), 
this variable is not significantly different from 0. The estimates for the effect of the ERASMUS 
programme are not affected by including the controls for early mobility.
In the following we show that the ERASMUS programme has a very specific effect on studying 
abroad, as it only affects the probability of studying abroad in a European country but not in 
countries outside Europe. This is a clear indication tha t the introduction of ERASMUS was 
not one of many policies to improve university quality, which in turn  could affect the outcome 
as well. In order to demonstrate the precise effect of studying abroad we create three indicator 
variables, which take the value 1 if an individual studied abroad in Europe, the USA, or in any 
other foreign country respectively. We expect that our instrument only affects the probability of 
studying abroad in Europe as the ERASMUS programme only offers scholarships for studying 
abroad in European partner universities. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.3 we replace the 
dependent variable of our usual first stage regression (studying abroad in any country) with an 
indicator for studying abroad in Europe instead. The specification reported in column (1) is 
estimated using the ratio of ERASMUS scholarships. In column (2) we present the results from 
using the ERASMUS dummy as our measure for exposure to the programme. The coefficients 
on the ERASMUS measures are strong and highly significant. The magnitude of the ERASMUS 
coefficient is similar to the one obtained when we use the general definition of studying abroad. 
We use an indicator for studying abroad in the US as our dependent variable for the specifi­
cations reported in columns (3) and (4). The coefficient on the ERASMUS measures is not 
significantly different from 0. Furthermore, the point estimates of the ERASMUS measures 
are very close to 0. In columns (5) and (6) we report specifications where we use an indicator 
for studying abroad in any country outside Europe or the US as the dependent variable. The 
results indicate tha t the ERASMUS programme has no effect on the probability of studying 
abroad in countries outside Europe or the US. The evidence from Table 2.3 strongly suggests 
that the introduction of the ERASMUS programme was not correlated with the introduction 
of a broader set of policies, which might themselves affect later labour market outcomes. These 
results increase our confidence for using the ERASMUS programme as an instrumental variable 
for studying abroad. In the following section we use this IV to obtain estimates of the effect of 
studying abroad on the probability of working in a foreign country later in life.
2.5 M ain  R esu lts and S en sitiv ity  A nalysis
The OLS results reported in column (1) of Table 2.4 confirm that graduates who spent some 
time at a foreign university are more likely to work abroad later in life. Our OLS result
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indicates tha t the effect of studying abroad is about 6  percentage points. Note that as before, 
all our standard errors are clustered at the university-subject level. As discussed before we do 
not want to attribute causality to the OLS results. This is because the factors affecting an 
individual’s decision to study abroad are likely to affect her decision to work abroad later on as 
well. Therefore, we now turn  to our IV results.
In column (2) of Table 2.4 we present the first set of IV results using the ratio of ERASMUS 
scholarships to the total number of students in the department as an instrument. We find that 
studying abroad increases an individual’s probability to  work in a foreign country by about 24 
percentage points. Given the relatively large standard error this effect is significant at the ten 
percent level. We also find tha t females are about 0.6 percentage points more likely to work 
abroad. Furthermore, we find tha t individuals who completed an apprenticeship before they 
enrolled at university are about 0.4 percentage points less likely to work abroad, although this 
effect is not significant. People who complete an apprenticeship may be more likely to go back to 
work at the same firm where they completed their apprenticeship, which will usually be located 
in Germany. We also find that labour market experience has an effect on the probability of 
working abroad. The coefficient indicate tha t individuals with one more year of experience in 
the labour market are about 0.5 percentage points more likely to work abroad. W ithin a survey 
wave, there is relatively little variation in potential experience, and this estimate also captures 
the increased probability of working abroad from the initial to the follow-up survey. Over and 
above this annual measure of potential experience, the indicator variable for the follow-up survey 
does not show up significantly.
Column (3) adds interactions of the ERASMUS ratio with a full set of subject dummies as in­
struments. Including these interactions allows the impact of ERASMUS to differ across subjects. 
This may be relevant as it is quite likely that a student exchange programme has a different 
impact for students studying different subjects. Since all our specifications include subject fixed 
effects, identification does not exploit any permanent differences between subjects. Instead, this 
specification allows the effect of the ERASMUS to vary by subject in the first stage. Including 
the interactions strongly increases the precision of our estimates. The coefficient on studying 
abroad is significant at the 5 percent level and indicates that studying abroad increases an 
individual’s probability of working abroad later in life by about 14 percentage points. The 
coefficients on the control variables are very similar to the ones reported in column (2 ).
Even though we do not believe that student demand has a large impact on the number of 
ERASMUS scholarships we address this concern by using the ERASM US indicator as our 
instrument in the specifications reported in columns (4) and (5). In column (4) we present the 
results from using the ERASMUS indicator as the only instrument. The standard errors on the 
coefficient for studying abroad increases a lot, because the dummy for offering any ERASMUS 
scholarships is a much less precise measure of a student’s exposure to exchange opportunities. 
The point estimate, however, is very similar to the one we obtain if we use the ERASM US ratio 
instrument.
In column (5) we show tha t using the interactions of the ERASMUS indicator with a full
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set of subject dummies increases the precision of our estimates. The estimated coefficient on 
studying abroad indicates that studying abroad increases an individual’s probability of studying 
abroad by about 19 percentage points. As before, the coefficients on the other variables are 
hardly affected by using the indicator measure instead of the ratio measure of ERASMUS. Even 
though we lose some precision by using the ERASMUS indicator as our instrument the results 
are very similar to ones obtained if we use the ERASMUS ratio. Given these results we are 
confident to say that our results reflect a supply-side increase in scholarship availability, rather 
than students’ demand. One common concern in IV estimation is a potential bias due to weak 
instruments (see Bound, Jaeger & Baker (1995) and Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002)). The 
F-statistic from the first stage, reported at the bottom of Table 2.4, show that for most of our 
estimates, weak instruments are not likely to pose a problem even using conservative cut-off 
values for the F-statistic. In the ERASMUS indicator specification with subject interactions 
(column (5)), the F-statistic is comparatively lower, but the coefficient is very similar to the 
previous ones, suggesting that weak instrument bias is not likely to be a problem here.
In summary, our IV results indicate that studying abroad increases the probability of working 
abroad by around 15 to 20 percentage points. In the following, we show tha t our results are 
robust to  a number of specification checks.
There may be a worry that students from different family backgrounds not only choose universi­
ties with different provision of ERASMUS scholarships but also exhibit different propensities to 
work in a foreign country. As long as this effect is constant over time we deal with this problem 
by estimating all equations including university fixed effects. It could be possible, however, 
that people from different backgrounds react differently to the introduction of an ERASMUS 
programme or changes in the number of scholarships. In order to address this concern we add 
controls for parental education and occupation to our main specification. It is evident from 
looking at Table 2.5 that including the measures for parental background hardly affects our 
estimates of the effect of studying abroad. The results indicate that students from better ed­
ucated parents are between 0.5 and 1 percentage points more likely to work abroad, although 
this effect is not always significant.
Another concern is that students with a taste for mobility chose universities or departments 
with a lot of ERASMUS scholarships. Our IV estimates would be biased if these individuals 
were more likely to work abroad later in fife. In the following we present a powerful test, which 
directly addresses this concern. We add two variables which control for a student’s mobility 
at the start of her university career. The first variable indicates whether the student enrols in 
university in the state (Bundesland) where she obtained her high school diploma (Abitur). The 
second mobility variable measures the distance from the state where she obtained her high school 
diploma to the state of her first university enrolment. Including those two mobility variables 
hardly affects the estimates for the effect of studying abroad as can be seen from looking at 
Table 2.6. The coefficient on the distance measure for early mobility indicates tha t individuals 
who chose to study further away from the state where they received their high school diploma 
are more likely to work abroad later in life. At the same time, the results from Table 2.6 indicate
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tha t the effect of studying abroad remains unchanged.
Individuals may be more likely to work abroad if they know more foreigners. There are at 
least two channels through which the number of contacts to foreigners may affect the likelihood 
of working abroad. One channel may be an increased number of contacts to future business 
partners. A further channel may be that contacts to foreigners increase an individual’s taste 
for foreign cultures which may affect her probability of working abroad. As the ERASMUS 
programme is at least partly reciprocal, universities offering more ERASMUS scholarships may 
also enrol more foreign students. This could then increase the student’s propensity to work 
abroad later on and therefore bias our IV results. In Table 2.7 we present the results from 
adding the university wide ratio of foreign students over the to tal number of students in a 
student’s cohort37 to our specification. Adding this control does not change the coefficient on 
studying abroad at all. The coefficient on our measure for the exposure to foreign students 
is highly significant but rather small in magnitude. The estimated coefficient indicates that 
increasing the percentage of foreign students at a student’s home university from say 5 to 15 
percent increases her probability of working abroad by about 0.08 percentage points. This 
exercise is interesting also because it adds university-specific covariates which vary over time, 
and it is reassuring tha t the results remain unchanged.
In the following we check whether our results are driven by time trends in our variables of 
interest. Including graduate cohort FE (as in all specifications) guarantees tha t we do not 
identify the effect of studying abroad on working abroad from overall time trends. There 
may be a worry, however, that students studying certain subjects exhibit time trends in both 
studying abroad and working abroad. To address this issue we include linear subject specific 
time trends. The results of this exercise are reported in the second panel of Table 2.8. Apart 
from the specification reported in column (3) the inclusion of the subject specific time trends 
hardly affects the coefficient of studying abroad.
It may be the case tha t groups of departments within a university differ in quality or in their 
ability to foster international exchange. We address this concern by including a full set of 
department group times university fixed effects. We thus use a separate fixed effects for say 
sciences or languages at a certain university. Including this fine level of FEs hardly affects 
the estimates using the ERASMUS ratio instrument. Not surprisingly the estimates using the 
ERASMUS indicator instrument are slightly more affected. The order of magnitude of the 
estimate, however, is preserved.
It is reassuring tha t the inclusion of time trends or a finer set of fixed effects does not have 
a huge impact on our estimates. This and the fact that our estimates are hardly affected by 
including controls for parental background, for early mobility, and for the number of foreign 
students at the home university makes us confident that using the ERASMUS programme as a 
source of exogenous variation is a credible identification strategy to  estimate the causal effect 
of studying abroad on later labour market mobility.
One defining feature of our results is that the IV results are substantially higher than the
3 7  We use the ratio at the middle of the average student’s university career as the relevant measure for contacts 
to foreigners.
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corresponding OLS result. We interpret this finding in terms of heterogeneity in returns: It 
is unlikely tha t all students will be affected in the same way by the intervention of studying 
abroad. It is much more likely that the effect of studying abroad itself varies across the student 
population. We follow Imbens &; Angrist (1994) and interpret our estimates as a Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE): The IV results show the average effect for the subgroup which has 
been affected by the instrument. In the context of our instrument, this group is well-defined: It 
is the group of students who would not have studied abroad without the ERASMUS programme, 
but study abroad when ERASMUS is implemented. Since they are the students who have been 
affected by the ERASMUS programme, our estimates are of immediate interest to policy makers. 
W hat are the characteristics of these switchers? In the absence of credit constraints, this will be 
the group of students for whom the cost of studying abroad is slightly above the returns without 
ERASMUS. The introduction of ERASMUS can be understood as a price change which makes 
the investment into studying abroad worthwhile for these marginal students. In the presence 
of credit constraints, some students will not be able to invest in studying abroad even though 
this investment offers a positive return. These students are prevented from realizing the returns 
to studying abroad by being credit constrained. The following analysis suggests th a t credit 
constraints are likely to play a role. We follow Kling (2001) in interpreting the IV estimate as 
a weighted average of the causal effect of studying abroad, where the weight of each subgroup 
j  is given by the following formula:
(Q \  t n p i n h t  ■ — * j & ( S t u d y  Abroad) j
w  w e i g n i j  — w  . Xj A ( S t u d y  Abroad) j
Here Wj is the sample fraction of each subgroup j , Aj  is the variance of the instrumental variable 
for subgroup j  conditional on all other regressors x, and A (Study Abroad) j  is the impact of the 
ERASMUS instrument on the probability of studying abroad for subgroup j .  The last term 
is obtained from estimating the first stage regression separately for each subgroup.38 We use 
this decomposition to compute the corresponding weight for two subgroups: students who are 
credit constrained and a subgroup which is unlikely to be credit constrained. We proxy credit 
constraints with an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the student ever received any 
federal financial assistance in the BAFOEG scheme during the course of study. In our sample, 
this is about 41% of all observations (see column (1) in Table 2.9). Here, we use the ERAS­
MUS indicator variable as instrument. Not surprisingly, the overall proportion of students who 
study abroad is smaller for the credit-constrained group than for the non-credit constrained 
group, reflecting differences in investment behaviour between these two groups. Interestingly, 
column (2) indicates that the first stage is stronger for credit constrained students: They react 
more strongly to the introduction of ERASMUS. This seems sensible as it indicates tha t credit- 
constrained students rely more heavily on the ERASMUS programme. Exposure to ERASMUS 
as measured by the conditional variance A is similar between the groups (column (3)). Com­
puting the resulting weights, column (4) states that the IV estimate places a weight of 54% 
on the group of the credit constrained students, which make up only 41% of the sample. This
3 8  See Kling (2001) for further details.
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underlines tha t credit constrained students contribute disproportionately to our IV estimates 
of the effect of studying abroad.
2.6 H ow  Studyin g  A broad A ffects International labour M arket M ob ility
The results presented in the previous sections indicate tha t individuals who study abroad are 
more likely to work in a foreign country. It is interesting to understand how studying abroad 
affects an individual’s decision to migrate to a foreign country later in life. We address this in 
two ways: First, we make use of observed location choices to study the type of skills acquired 
during the stay abroad. Second, the survey provides us with direct qualitative evidence on 
why graduates move abroad, and we show how this varies depending on whether the student 
studied abroad earlier. As these qualitative questions were only administered to one cohort 
we cannot apply our instrumental variable strategy here. We therefore provide a descriptive 
analysis, which -  if only suggestive -  may shed light on the way studying abroad affects later 
labour market mobility.
We can think of the effect of studying abroad as affecting the set of skills the student acquires 
during her studies. One im portant question is whether these skills have a strong location-specific 
component. We can shed some fight on this question by investigating whether individuals who 
have studied abroad return to work in the same country when they decide to work in a foreign 
country. There are a number of reasons why mobile graduates may be more likely to work abroad 
in the countries where they studied abroad before: During their study period abroad they may 
have obtained skills that are of particular relevance in tha t labour market, e.g. language skills, 
knowledge about the local labour market, or personal contacts which facilitate a match. On 
the other hand, it is possible tha t studying abroad affects the probability of working abroad 
equally for different work destinations. This would be the case, for example, if studying abroad 
widens the horizon of the student generally and leads her to  search for a job internationally, 
independent of where she studied before. Especially, studying abroad could operate as a stepping 
stone to increase the set of feasible destinations. This question is also highly relevant from a 
policy perspective: The ability of the ERASMUS scheme or other student mobility programs 
to achieve an integrated European labour market depends on the assumption tha t students 
who went abroad to study in Europe are internationally mobile after graduation, but remain in 
Europe.
Here we present descriptive evidence to address this question for the cohorts 1993, 1997, and 
2001.39 We again group location choices into Europe, US, and other areas, and restrict attention 
to students who work abroad. For each study abroad treatment and study abroad location, 
Table 2.10 shows the conditional probability of being in each work location. Table 2.10 provides 
evidence tha t choices about study abroad locations are sticky, that is tha t students tend to return 
to work to the region where they studied abroad. In particular, of the students who studied 
abroad in Europe and worked internationally after graduation, two thirds end up working in a
39For the cohort 1989, we do not have information on locations of study abroad.
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European country. A x2-test of independence between the study abroad location and the work 
abroad location is rejected at the one percent level with a test statistic of 28.5.
We now turn to qualitative evidence from the survey on why graduates moved abroad. The HIS 
questionnaire asked individuals who had already worked abroad to  give reasons for why they 
had chosen to do so. Unfortunately, this question was only administered to individuals from 
the 1997 graduation cohort.
Students who had worked in a foreign country for at least one month in the five years since 
graduation were asked to identify the reasons for their decision to work abroad. In Table 2.11 
we present the percentage of the people who indicated that a certain reason had been important 
in their decision to work abroad. The table shows that the main reasons for working abroad are 
interest in foreign cultures, interesting offers from abroad, and the initiative of the employer. 
We split the sample into those who complete all their university education in Germany and 
those who study abroad for some time during their undergraduate education. Interestingly, 
while the means are similar in some categories, there are a number of noteworthy differences. 
Those who have studied abroad are more likely to  indicate that their interest in foreign cultures 
has led them to seek employment abroad. It may be the case that studying in a foreign country 
increased the individual’s taste for living abroad, which may in turn increase her probability of 
migrating later in fife. Students who have studied abroad are also significantly more likely to 
indicate tha t they chose to work abroad to be with their partner. The answers to this question 
may suggest tha t people who studied abroad may have met their partner while studying abroad 
and therefore consider to work abroad later in life. Of course, this difference may also be driven 
by assortative mating with more mobile people having more mobile partners, and the way this 
question was asked makes it impossible to distinguish between these alternatives. Meeting a 
partner abroad may, nonetheless, be a possible channel of the effect of studying abroad. The 
summary statistics also indicate that those who have studied abroad are somewhat more likely 
to say tha t they work abroad because of better employment opportunities in the foreign labour 
market, where we obtain a p-value of 0.06 when we test for a significant difference in the means 
of the two groups for this response. I t is possible that a stay at a foreign university makes 
it easier to realize opportunities in foreign labour markets, either because those who studied 
abroad have better information on the foreign labour market or because employers are more 
willing to offer employment to those individuals. Interestingly, rather than the employment 
outlook, it is the career prospects abroad where the means are significantly different at the 
1% level, suggesting that those with international study experience seem to be more likely to 
consider a career abroad.
The statistics presented here provide some suggestive evidence of how studying abroad may 
alter later international labour market mobility. Further research is necessary to get a better 
insight into the channels of the effect of studying abroad on working abroad later on.
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2.7 C onclusion
Using exogenous variation in scholarship availability, we are able to identify a causal effect of 
undergraduate student mobility on later international labour migration. Our strategy exploits 
the introduction and expansion of the ERASMUS scholarship programme. The extent to which 
students were exposed to the scholarship scheme varied widely. We exploit cross-sectional and 
over time-changes in scholarship availability. Accounting for permanent differences between 
different institutions, different subjects, and different graduate cohorts, our identification relies 
only on differential over-time change, and can be interpreted as a Difference-in-Differences 
estimator. Our first-stage shows that the ERASMUS scheme has indeed a strong effect on 
the students’ decision to go abroad, which is not surprising given its scale. We show tha t the 
instrument is precise in that it only affects the decision to study in Europe, but not in other 
locations. Our event study adds further credibility to our instrument, by showing tha t the 
probability of studying abroad is low and flat before ERASMUS is introduced, and increases 
strongly for those students affected by the scholarship.
Our OLS results indicate that the group of students who studied abroad are about 6 percentage 
points more likely to work abroad later on, controlling for a set of background characteristics, 
institution and time fixed effects. Our IV results are substantially higher than that, and indicate 
that the effect of study abroad is between 15 and 20 percentage points. We also provide 
results which interact the instrument with the students’ degree subject. That allows for a 
differential effect of ERASMUS in different subjects, and adds precision to the results. We 
interpret the difference between OLS and IV as an indication of heterogeneity in effects: The 
population which is affected by our instruments reacts particularly strongly to the incentives 
of the mobility programme. This Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) interpretation is of 
particular interest to policy makers, since it evaluates the effect for the affected subgroup. We 
show that individuals who are credit constrained axe particularly affected by the ERASMUS 
instrument, and suggest channels through which the effect of studying abroad may operate. 
Our results suggest that educational mobility programs may have a potentially large role in 
affecting students’ behaviour in their labour market mobility decision. It implies tha t an oppor­
tunity to attract talented graduates is to provide student exchange opportunities. Attractive 
universities and scholarship programs may yield a return through attracting students, part of 
whom will remain as skilled workers later on. In the context of the policy change under consid­
eration, ERASMUS is successful in that this student mobility scheme appears to contribute to 
the development of an integrated European labour market. This is especially so if we take into 
account the descriptive evidence from the previous section that location choices are sticky, i.e. 
that mobile students tend to return to the region where they studied before.
More generally, our work allows insight into the dynamic implications of educational mobility 
decisions. Our results indicate that the effects of educational mobility programs go far beyond 
affecting the decision to study abroad for some time period, but rather reach far into the labour 
market, and it will be interesting to follow the sample of graduates as their careers unfold. But 
already at this early stage our results indicate tha t even short-term mobility investments can
2 STUDYING ABROAD AND INTERNATIO NAL LABOUR M O B ILITY
t
lead to significant further mobility investments later on.
2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Study Study Work Work
All A broad=0 A b ro a d = l A broad=0 A b ro a d = l
W orking abroad 0.035 0.031 0.107 0.000 1.000
(0.184) (0.175) (0.309) (0.000) (0.000)
U ndergraduate study  abroad 0.045 0.000 1.000 0.042 0.138
(0.207) (0.000) (0.000) (0.120) (0.345)
ER A SM U S ratio 0.024 0.023 0.047 0.024 0.039
(0.055) (0.054) (0.072) (0.055) (0.063)
ER A SM U S indicator 0.436 0.425 0.662 0.429 0.622
(0.496) (0.494) (0.473) (0.495) (0.485)
Female 0.421 0.419 0.463 0.419 0.496
(0.494) (0.493) (0.499) (0.493) (0.500)
Experience 2.824 2.830 2.696 2.817 3.015
(2.030) (2.030) (2.021) (2.028) (2.093)
A pprenticeship 0.309 0.315 0.183 0.312 0.234
(0.462) (0.465) (0.387) (0.463) (0.424)
M other’s E ducation  (years) 11.825 11.741 13.609 11.775 13.222
(3.306) (3.275) (3.453) (3.295) (3.290)
Father’s E ducation  (years) 13.331 13.247 15.120 13.28 14.736
(3.644) (3.637) (3.332) (3.649) (3.216)
Final U niversity G rade1 2.068 2.078 1.859 2.074 1.906
(0.685) (0.627) (0.660) (0.686) (0.644)
Bafoeg indicator2 0.414 0.418 0.346 0.417 0.355
(Financial A ssistance) (0.493) (0.493) (0.476) (0.493) (0.479)
O bservations 38527 36798 1729 37182 1345
xT he final university degree is only available for 37644 students in our sam ple. (T he best grade is 1.0 the  w orst 4.0) 
2T he question  on financial assistance has only been adm inistered since 1993. W e have inform ation on B afoeg for 
24405 individuals in  our sam ple.
Note: T his tab le contains sam ple m eans and (in brackets) standard deviations.
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Table 2.2: First Stages
D ependent Variable: Indicator for S tudy Abroad (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
E R A SM U S R atio 0.1866 0.1847 0.1819
(0.0447)*** (0.0442)*** (0.0440)***
E R A SM U S Indicator 0.0136 0.0134 0.0135
(0.0045)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0045)***
Female -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0041 -0.0042 -0.0040 -0.0041
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Apprenticeship -0.0131 -0.0130 -0.0086 -0.0084 -0.0089 -0.0088
(0.0031)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0030)***
Experience -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0020
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Parental E ducation  D um m y 2 0.0101 0.0102 0.0096 0.0097
(0.0036)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0035)***
Parental E ducation  D um m y 3 0.0339 0.0338 0.0327 0.0326
(0.0043)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0043)***
Studying in S tate o f H ighschool D egree -0.0136 -0.0137
(0.0067)** (0.0067)**
D istance to  High School S tate  (100km ) 0.0018 0.0018
(0.0018) (0.0017)
Follow-up Survey (D um m y) 0.0076 0.0078 0.0073 0.0076 0.0074 0.0077
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Parental O ccupation D um m ies / / / /
G raduate Cohort FE / / / / / /
Year Abroad F E / / / / / /
Subject FE / / / / / /
U niversity FE / / • / / / /
I n s tr u m e n ts :
ER A SM U S R atio Indicator R atio Indicator R atio Indicator
N 38527 38527 38527 38527 38527 38527
R-squared 0.066 0.065 0.073 0.072
F -sta t o f Instrum ent(s) 17.41 9.09 17.43 8.89 17.11 9.04
***significant at the  1% level **significant at the 5% level ^significant at the 10% level
(A ll standard errors are clustered at the  university*subject level)
Table 2.3: Falsification Test: First Stages with Different Destinations
D ependent Variable: Study Abroad in
(1)
Europe
(2)
Europe
(3)
U SA
(4)
U SA
(5)
R est
(6)
R est
E R A SM U S R atio 0.1840 0.0142 0.0046
(0.0419)*** (0.0155) (0.0070)
E R A SM U S Indicator 0.0159 -0.OO18 0.0009
(0.0039)*** (0.0019) (0.0012)
Female -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0015
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009)* (0.0009)*
Apprenticeship -0.0049 -0.0048 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0025)* (0.0025)* (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Experience -0.0011 -0.0012 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Parental E ducation  D um m y 2 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Parental E ducation  D um m y 3 0.0154 0.0151 0.0037 0.0036 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0033)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Studying in S tate o f H ighschool Degree -0.0105 -0.0106 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0054)** (0.0054)** (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
D istance to  High School S tate  (100km ) 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Follow-up Survey (D um m y) 0.0045 0.0048 -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0014 0.0014
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0012)
Parental O ccupation D um m ies / / / / / /
G raduate Cohort FE / / / / / /
Year Abroad FE / / / / /
Subject FE / / ✓ / / /
U niversity FE / / / / / /
In s tr u m e n ts :
ER A SM U S R atio Indicator R atio Indicator R atio Indicator
N 38527 38527 38527 38527 38527 38527
R-squared 0.064 0.063 0.074 0.074 0.032 0.032
F -stat o f Instrum ent (s) 19.29 16.82 0.83 0.08 0.44 0.57
***significant at th e  1% level **significant at the 5% level *significant at the 10% level
(A ll standard errors are clustered at the  university*subject level)
Table 2.4: Main Results
D ependent Variable: Work Abroad  
E stim ation  M ethod
(1)
OLS
(2)
IV
(3)
IV
(4)
IV
(5)
IV
Study Abroad 0.0611 0.2386 0.1444 0.2342 0.1890
(0.0092)*** (0.1416)* (0.0582)** (0.2556) (0.0820)**
Female 0.0060 0.0064 0.0062 0.0064 0.0063
(0.0024)** (0.0025)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0024)***
A pprenticeship -0.0065 -0.0042 -0.0054 -0.0043 -0.0048
(0.0023)*** (0.0029) (0.0024)** (0.0039) (0.0026)*
Experience 0.0047 0.0051 0.0049 0.0051 0.0050
(0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0014)***
Follow U p Survey (D um m y) -0.0038 -0.0053 -0.0045 -0.0052 -0.0049
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0053)
G raduate C ohort FE / / / / /
Year Abroad F E / / / / /
Subject FE / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / /
In s tr u m e n ts :
E R A SM U S
Interactions w ith  subject
R atio R atio Indicator Indicator
/
N
R-squared
38527
0.038
38527 38527 38527 38527
F -sta t First Stage 17.41 11.11 9.09 3.66
***significant a t the  1% level **significant at the  5% level *significant at the 10% level
(A ll standard errors are clustered at th e  university*subject level)
D ependent variable is an indicator for w hether the  respondent works abroad at th e  tim e of the  survey.
S tudy  abroad  is an indicator for w hether the  student spends part o f her university career at a foreign university.
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Table 2.5: Sensitivity Analysis 1: Parental Background
D ependent Variable: Work Abroad 
E stim ation  M ethod
( i )
OLS
(2)
IV
(3)
IV
(4)
IV
(5)
IV
Abroad 0.0589 0.2354 0.1408 0.2404 0.1858
(0.0091)*** (0.1424)* (0.0586)** (0.2602) (0.0840)**
Fem ale 0.0051 0.0059 0.0055 0.0059 0.0057
(0.0024)** (0.0025)** (0.0024)** (0.0027)** (0.0025)**
Apprenticeship -0.0043 -0.0028 -0.0036 -0.0028 -0.0033
(0.0023)* (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0024)
Experience 0.0047 0.0051 0.0049 0.0051 0.0050
(0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0014)***
Follow Up Survey (D um m y) -0.004 -0.0054 -0.0046 -0.0054 -0.0050
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0053)
Parental E ducation  D um m y 2 0.0076 0.0057 0.0066 0.0056 0.0061
(0.0027)*** (0.0031)* (0.0028)** (0.0039) (0.0028)**
Parental E ducation  D um m y 3 0.0103 0.0043 0.0075 0.0041 0.0060
(0.0031)*** (0.0056) (0.0036)** (0.0095) (0.0043)
Parental O ccupation  D um m ies / / / / /
G raduate C ohort FE / / / / /
Year Abroad F E / / / / /
Subject FE / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / /
In s tr u m e n ts :
ER A SM U S R atio R atio Indicator Indicator
Interactions w ith  subject  
N 38527 38527
/
38527 38527
/
38527
R-squared
F -sta t First Stage
i.i_i or. i__«i
0.040
__j. ~i.
17.429
 ^ll M C GA 1 »a1
10.907
____ a
8.893
 ^  ^ 1 A0/. 1
3.419
***significant at the 1% level **significant at the  5% level *significant at the  10% level
(A ll standard errors are clustered at the university*subject level)
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Table 2.6: Sensitivity Analysis 2: Early Mobility
D ependent Variable: Work Abroad  
E stim ation  M ethod
(1)
OLS
(2)
IV
(3)
IV
(4)
IV
(5)
IV
Abroad 0.0581 0.2305 0.1378 0.2451 0.1789
(0.0091)*** (0.1434) (0.0569)** (0.2592) (0.0830)**
Female 0.0052 0.0059 0.0055 0.0060 0.0057
(0.0024)** (0.0025)** (0.0024)** (0.0027)** (0.0024)**
A pprenticeship -0.0046 -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0030 -0.0035
(0.0023)** (0.0014)** (0.0024)* (0.0032) (0.0025)
Experience 0.0047 0.0051 0.0049 0.0051 0.0050
(0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0014)***
Follow Up Survey (D um m y) -0.0040 -0.0053 -0.0046 -0.0054 -0.0050
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0053)
Parental E ducation  D um m y 2 0.0072 0.0056 0.0065 0.0055 0.0061
(0.0027)*** (0.0031)* (0.0028)** (0.0038) (0.0028)**
Parental E ducation  D um m y 3 0.0096 0.0040 0.0070 0.0035 0.0057
(0.0031)*** (0.0055) (0.0035)** (0.0091) (0.0042)
S tudying in H ighschool S tate 0.0021 0.0045 0.0032 0.0047 0.0038
(0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0070) (0.0060)
D istance to  High School State 0.0033 0.0030 0.0031 0.0029 0.0030
(100km ) (0.0016)** (0.0016)* (0.0016)** (0.0016)* (0.0016)*
Parental O ccupation D um m ies / / / / /
G raduate C ohort FE / / / / /
Year Abroad FE / / / / /
Subject FE / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / /
Instruments:
ER A SM U S R atio R atio Indicator Indicator
Interactions w ith  subject 
N 38527 38527
/
38527 38527
/
38527
R-squared  
F -stat First Stage
0.040
17.107 11.126 9.035 3.425
***significant at th e  1% level **significant at the 5% level *significant at the 10% level
(A ll standard errors are clustered at the  university*subject level)
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Table 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis 3: Foreign Students at Home University
D ependent Variable: Work Abroad  
E stim ation  M ethod
(1)
OLS
(2)
IV
(3)
IV
(4)
IV
(5)
IV
Abroad 0.0581 0.2307 0.1373 0.2475 0.1781
(0.0091)*** (0.1434) (0.0566)** (0.2592) (0.0826)**
Fem ale 0.0052 0.0059 0.0055 0.0060 0.0057
(0.0024)** (0.0025)** (0.0024)** (0.0027)** (0.0024)**
A pprenticeship -0.0046 -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0035
(0.0023)** (0.0026) (0.0024)* (0.0032) (0.0025)
Experience 0.0047 0.0050 0.0049 0.0054 0.0049
(0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0014)***
Follow Up Survey (D um m y) -0.0039 -0.0053 -0.0045 -0.0054 -0.0049
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0053)
Parental E ducation  D um m y 2 0.0072 0.0056 0.0065 0.0054 0.0061
(0.0027*** (0.0031)* (0.0028)** (0.0038) (0.0028)**
Parental E ducation  D um m y 3 0.0096 0.0040 0.0071 0.0034 0.0057
(0.0031)*** (0.0054) (0.0035)** (0.0091) (0.0042)
Studying in H ighschool State 0.0021 0.0045 0.0032 0.0047 0.0038
(0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0070) (0.0059)
D istance to  High School S tate 0.0032 0.0030 0.0031 0.0029 0.0030
(100km ) (0.0Q16)** (0.0016)* (0.0016)** (0.0016)* (0.0016)**
Foreign S tu d en ts/T o ta l Students 0.0083 0.0077 0.0080 0.0077 0.0079
(0.0018)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0018)***
Parental O ccupation  D um m ies / / / / /
G raduate C ohort FE / / / / /
Year Abroad F E / / / / /
Subject FE / / / / /
U niversity FE / / / / /
I n s tr u m e n ts :
ER A SM U S R atio R atio Indicator Indicator
Interactions w ith  subject 
N 38527 38527
/
38527 38527
/
38527
R-squared  
F -sta t First Stage
0.040
17.11 11.12 9.06 3.42
***significant at the  1% level **significant at the 5% level *significant at the 10% level
(A ll standard errors are clustered at th e  un iversity*subject level)
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Table 2.8: Sensitivity Analysis 4: Time Trends and Additional FE
D ependent Variable: W ork Abroad (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
B aseline specification coefficient 0.0581 0.2305 0.1378 0.2451 0.1789
(as in Table 2.6) (st. err.) (0.0091)*** (0.1434) (0.0569)** (0.2592) (0.083)**
F-sta t  1st stage 17 .107 11 .126 9.035 3 .425
Including Subject-Specific coefficient 0.0576 0.2438 0.0776 0.2235 0.1860
T im e Trends (st. err.) (0.0091)*** (0.1515) (0.0605) (0.2953) (0.1138)
F -sta t  1st stage 15.793 8.682 6.809 1.898
Including
University * Subject group FE
coefficient 
(st. err.)
F -sta t  1st stage
0.0568
(0.0092)***
0.2892
(0.1690)*
16.851
0.1122
(0.0609)*
13.789
0.3243
(0.2817)
8 .130
0.1161
(0.0837)
2.971
D istance hom e-college variables / / / / /
H ighest Parental E ducation  D um m ies / / / / /
Parental O ccupation D um m ies / / / / /
G raduate Cohort FE / / / / /
Year Abroad FE / / / / /
Subject FE / / / / /
Instruments:
ER A SM U S R atio R atio Indicator Indicator
Interactions w ith  subject / /
N 38527 38527 38527 38527 38527
***significant at th e  1% level **significant at the 5% level *significant at the 10% level
(A ll standard errors are clustered at the  university*subject level)
Note: T his table only show s results for the coefficient of interest, studying abroad. R egressors not listed include female indicator, apprenticeship, potentia l experience. P anel 1 reports the  
results from Table 6. Panel 2 adds tim e trends for each subject to  the m ain specification. In these regression we also include university FE as before. Panel 3 adds F ixed  Effects at the  
university*subject group level to  the m ain specification. The specifications reported in Panel 3 do not include university FE because we use th e  finer level o f un iversity*subject group FE. 
See tex t for details.
T ab le  2.9: Heterogeneity in Returns and Credit Constraints
(i) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction in Sam ple
W j
D elta  (First Stage) 
A  {S tu d y  Abroad)  j
Lam bda
A,
Kling W eight
F inancial Aid =  0 0.59 0.011 0.11 0.46
F inancial Aid =  1 0.41 0.016 0.12 0.54
T ab le  2.10: Destinations of work abroad
Europe
Work abroad location
US' R est T otal
S tu d y  abroad =  0 55.7 8.1 36.2 100.0
Europe 66.4 4.9 28.7 100.0
Study abroad =  1 in US 45.5 27.3 27.3 100.0
R est 16.7 0.0 83.3 100.0
Note: For all graduates working abroad, th is table show s conditional probabilities o f working abroad in one of th e  three
locations E urope, U S, and rest o f world, conditional on th e  study abroad treatm ent and the destination  of the stay  ab­
road. Based on 1,316 observations from graduate cohorts 1993, 1997, and 2001.
T able 2 .1 1 : Reasons for working abroad
A ll
Study  
A broad =  0
Study  
Abroad =  1
Difference in 
m eans (p-value)
Interest in Foreign Cultures 52.95 50.93 67.21 0.000
(1.59) (1.71) (4.27)
R eceived Interesting Offer 35.85 35.35 39.34 0.389
(1.53) (1.63) (4.44)
A t Em ployer’s Instance 33.40 34.07 28.69 0.239
(1.51) (1.62) (4.11)
B etter  Career P rospects 25.36 25.81 22.13 0.382
in G erm any after R eturn (1.39) (1.49) (3.77)
O btain  Q ualifications Abroad 16.80 16.86 16.39 0.897
(1.19) (1.28) (3.37)
International R esearch P roject 14.77 14.65 15.57 0.788
(1.13) (1.21) (3.30)
Partner 10.90 9.77 18.85 0.003
(0.99) (1.01) (3.56)
E m ploym ent O utlook Abroad 8.66 8.02 13.11 0.061
(0.90) (0.93) (3.07)
Career P rospects Abroad 6.52 5.70 12.30 0.006
(0.79) (0.79) (2.99)
Num ber of O bservations 982 860 122
Note: Based on all respondents from the 1997 follow-up survey w ho have work experience abroad. Table shows per­
centage of respondents who indicate th a t a particular reason led them  to  take up work abroad. Exam ple: 50.93% of 
respondents indicate th a t interest in foreign cultures led them  to  take up work abroad.
93
94
3 D oes Tracking Exacerbate the Role 
of Family Background for Students’ 
Test Scores?
3.1 Introduction
The results from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) have triggered a 
serious debate about the functioning of education systems.40 An important finding of PISA is 
the widely varying influence of a student’s family background on her educational achievement 
across different countries. There are a number of possible explanations for this phenomenon, 
with features of the schooling system being widely seen as key factors. A frequently discussed 
feature is ability tracking of students. Ability tracking, or simply tracking, means placing 
students into different school tracks according to some measure of their ability. For the purposes 
of this chapter I refer to tracking as a policy which places students of different abilities in 
different schools.41 In practice, the use of tracking varies greatly across countries; some educate 
all children in the same type of school until high-school graduation while others separate children 
as soon as they reach the age of 10. Differences in tracking policies and the widely varying impact 
of family background on educational outcomes across different countries has lead politicians but 
also people involved in educational research to argue that tracking has a causal impact on the 
importance of family background for educational achievement.
One of the main theoretical arguments is tha t children develop gradually and ability levels are 
difficult to observe at early ages. In a system that tracks students early, children from higher 
socioeconomic backgrounds may be more likely to be placed in academic tracks for reasons 
independent of their true ability. The reasoning behind this argument is that parents from 
higher socioeconomic backgrounds are more aware of the importance of sending their children 
to the more academic school tracks.
Also in untracked schooling systems do parents from higher socioeconomic backgrounds have 
the possibility to  ensure a better education for their children; albeit through different chan­
nels: parents may move closer to a better school or place their children in a private school. 
Whether tracking actually exacerbates the importance of parental background for educational 
achievement is ultimately an empirical question.
The findings of PISA and other cross-country educational studies show a positive correlation be­
tween tracking and the importance of the family background for students’ test scores. Nonethe­
less, I argue in this chapter that it may be overhasty to interpret this correlation as a causal
401 thank Holger Breinlich, Rocco Macchiavello, Steve Machin, Ralph Ossa, Matthias Parey, Giacomo Rodano, 
Justin Smith and especially Steve Pischke for very helpful discussions and comments. I also thank seminar 
participants at the LSE and the CEPR conference on the Economics of Education in Padua for helpful suggestions.
4  Placing students of different abilities into different classes within a school type is less strong form of tracking.
In this paper, however, I do not analyze this within-school tracking.
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effect. In fact, I use a difference-in-differences methodology to show that tracking does not 
exacerbate the importance of parental background for students’ test scores once controls for 
pre-tracking differences are added to the econometric specification.
I use cross-country differences in tracking policies to identify the impact of tracking on the im­
portance of family background for students’ test scores using data from three large international 
educational studies: PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), PIRLS (Progress 
in International Reading Literacy Study), and TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and 
Science Study).
The following two graphs illustrate the effect I estimate in this chapter. For Figure 3.1, I first 
regressed post-tracking reading test scores on the three parental background characteristics 
shown on the vertical axes of the graphs, separately for each country. I then plot each country’s 
coefficient against its tracking grade for those background characteristics.42
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F igure  3.1: Family Background and Tracking PISA 2003 (Grades 9/10)
Figure 3.1 shows clearly that background has a higher impact on reading test scores in early 
tracking countries for all parental background measures. In Figure 3.2 I use the same methodol­
ogy as for Figure 3.1 but replacing PISA reading scores with TIMSS mathematics scores. This 
figure shows that the same relationship exists for mathematics.
42 T h e  e s tim a tin g  eq u a tio n  is: T e s t S c o r e  =  +  /32 P a r e n t B a c k g r o u n d  +  /33 S t u d e n t C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  +  e. T h e
/32 coeffic ien t for each  co u n try  is th e n  p lo tte d  on  th e  v ertica l a x is  o f  each  graph .
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Importance of Family Background for Mathematics Test Score
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Figure 3.2: Family Background and Tracking TIMSS 1995 (Grades 7/8)
The visual evidence from Figures 3.1 and 3.2 clearly indicate that family background is more 
important for secondary school students’ test scores in early tracking countries. The fact that 
similar relationships exist for different studies (PISA and TIMSS, which are carried out by 
different organizations and use different methodologies) hints that this relationship is not a 
random feature of any particular dataset. The graphs do not, however, provide evidence about 
whether tracking has a causal impact on the importance of parental background on students’ 
test scores. It may well be the case that there exist unobserved country-level factors which affect 
the impact of parental background on educational test scores. If these unobserved factors are 
correlated with a country’s tracking regime, estimates using a simple cross-section of students 
would be biased.
A simple way to investigate the role of unobserved factors is to repeat the graphical analysis 
from Figures 3.1 and 3.2 using tests administered to students before tracking has taken place 
in any of the countries in the sample. In the absence of anticipation effects there should be no 
relationship between the tracking regime (which affects students after taking the test) and the 
importance of the students’ parental background. For reading, I use data from the Progress in 
International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), which tested primary school students in grade 
4. It is important to note, that none of the countries in the sample tracks students before the 
end of grade 4. Applying the same techniques used in the previous graphs, Figure 3.3 shows 
the relationship between the importance of family background for test scores and the tracking
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grade (which will eventually affect students) for this new data. Figure 3.4 then repeats this 
exercise with the grades 3 and 4 mathematics data from TIMSS.43
Importance of Family Background for Reading Test Score
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Figure  3.3: Family Background and Tracking PIRLS 2001 (Grade 4)
Apart from the number of books variable for the reading test score, there is a negative rela­
tionship between the importance of parental background and the tracking regime even before 
tracking has taken place in any country. This suggests that there are unobserved factors affect­
ing the impact of parental background that are correlated with a country’s tracking regime.
43 Unfortunately, the TIMSS data for the primary school grades does not include parental education. Therefore, 
I omit this variable from the graphical analysis for mathematics test scores of primary school students.
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Im p ortan ce o f  Fam ily B ack grou n d  for M a th em a tics  T e s t  S c o r e
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F igu re  3.4: Family Background and Tracking TIMSS 1995 (Grades 3/4)
Investigating the effect of tracking therefore requires an identification strategy that controls for 
these preexisting differences across early and late tracking countries. To address this problem, 
I use a difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology. The DiD results presented below indicate 
that, once the "pre-tracking” level of the family background effect on children’s test scores is 
controlled for, tracking no longer affects the impact of family background.44 
These results cast serious doubt on the conclusions of a number of concurrent papers, such as 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) or Ammermueller (2005), which find that tracking increases 
educational inequality and exacerbates the effect of family background for students’ test scores. 
I show, however, that slight changes in tracking variables, samples, or specifications renders the 
results of the relevant cross-country studies insignificant.
Understanding whether ability tracking intensifies the impact of parental background is impor­
tant not only for educational researchers but also for policy makers. Countries that would like 
to increase educational equity should delay tracking if it increases the importance of family 
background for educational outcomes. Delaying the tracking age, which is often suggested as 
a way to reduce the link between parental background and educational outcomes, has been 
an important aspect of school reform in a number of different countries. Since the 1960s, the 
UK, some Scandinavian countries, Spain, and most recently Poland delayed their tracking age. 
If tracking, however, does not intensify the importance of family background, any such move 
would induce large costs without benefit. Careful studies on the effect of tracking are therefore 
needed to understand its effect on educational inequality.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3.3 presents the identification strategy used to identify the causal 
effect of tracking. Section 3.4 discusses the data coming from a number of cross-country school 
studies: PIRLS, PISA and TIMSS. Section 3.5 presents the main regression results for reading 
and mathematics test scores separately. Section 3.6 probes the sensitivity of my findings and
44 It is worthy to note that this method does not control for anticipation effects of parents or students which 
may affect the importance of family background already before tracking has taken place.
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Section 3.7 discusses these results and concludes.
3.2 P reviou s R esearch
There are a number of studies that investigate the effect of tracking on educational equity. I 
classify these studies into three broad categories: those using educational reforms of the tracking 
grade within a country, those using existing within country variation in tracking, and those using 
cross-country differences in tracking regimes to identify the effect of tracking.
A widely studied educational reform is the abolishment of ability tracking in Britain during the 
1960s and 1970s (see for example Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005)). In spite of the attention 
paid to this reform, Pischke and Manning (2006) show tha t no existing study has successfully 
solved selection effects into tracked and untracked schools during the transition period from a 
selective to a comprehensive schooling system.
Another strand of the literature uses existing within-country variation in tracking to identify its 
effect on educational equity. Using data mostly from the United States, the general finding is 
tha t there are at most small effects of tracking on educational equity.45 Papers exploiting within- 
country variation of tracking, however, suffer from three main problems. First, the tracking 
measure is based on teachers’, headteacher’s or students’ judgements about whether a school 
tracks students. It is not clear whether these measures for tracking are treated consistently 
across schools. A second problem with these studies is tha t unobserved factors that affect test 
scores (student motivation, for example) could be correlated with attending a tracked or an 
untracked school, producing biased results. A third problem is tha t tracking regimes have little 
variation within a country; there is much more variation in tracking regimes across different 
countries.
These problems have led a number of researchers to use cross-country variation in tracking to 
identify the effect of tracking. The reasoning is that data from different schooling systems may 
alleviate the problem of having a noisy tracking measure. Furthermore, one may deal with 
the second problem stated above, as it is unlikely that individual student unobservables are 
correlated with a country level measure for tracking. These advantages, however, come at the 
expense of another omitted variable bias problem. It could be the case that the cross-country 
variation in tracking is correlated with country-level unobservables, which influence test scores. 
The increasing availability of data with internationally comparable test scores has triggered 
research on the effect of tracking on students’ test scores in the very recent past.46 Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2006) carry out an analysis which uses cross-country variation in tracking 
to identify its effect on the within-country variance of educational test scores. They address 
the problem of unobserved country level variables by using a DiD approach. Their findings 
"provide (...) reasonably strong support for the disequalizing effects of early tracking." One of
45See Betts and Shkolnik (1998), Rees, Brewer and Argys (2000) and Figlio and Page (2000) for studies which 
try to control for sorting of students across tracked and untracked schools.
46Brunello and Checchi (2006) investigate the effect of tracking for outcomes later in life and find that tracking 
does not affect the importance of family background for reading literacy of adults. They find, however, that 
tracking exacerbates the effect of parental background for wages later in fife.
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the main problems of their study, however, is the use of country-level data of the dispersion of 
test scores, since this leads to extremely small sample sizes. Furthermore, I show below that 
using a different measure for the tracking regime renders their results insignificant. Their results 
are further weakened by restricting their sample to OECD countries, only.
There are two recent studies which are more closely related to the research presented here, as 
they are trying to investigate whether tracking affects the impact of the family background 
on students’ test scores. Schuetz, Ursprung, and Woessmann (2005) interact a measure for a 
country’s tracking system with the students family background to  see whether tracking changes 
the impact of parental background for educational achievement. Using data on secondary school 
students tested in TIMSS they find that "the family-background effect is larger...the earlier 
a country tracks its students into different school types by ability." They try  to  control for 
confounding country-level factors by including some controls for other institutional features of 
the education system. It is virtually impossible, however, to control for all unobserved country 
level factors tha t are correlated with the tracking measure and affect the importance of parental 
background on students’ test scores. Any unobserved factor may bias the results, casting doubt 
on the findings of studies that do not control for pre-tracking differences in the importance of 
parental background for students’ test scores.
The second paper looking explicitly at the importance of the socioeconomic background is 
a study by Ammermueller (2005). Using PISA 2000 and PIRLS data, he finds that "(T)he 
social origin of students ... increases its effect on student performance in countries with a 
differentiated schooling system...". Ammermueller’s tracking measure uses the number of tracks 
in a schooling system. This measure does not capture the differential timing of tracking across 
different countries, which should have an impact on the influence of tracking. In checking the 
robustness of his results, I show that using a slightly different specification I do not find an 
effect of tracking even using Ammermueller’s tracking measure.
3.3 Identification
Like recent research on ability tracking, I exploit the fact that different countries have different 
tracking policies. I use cross-country variation in tracking to identify the effect of tracking on 
the importance of parental background for children’s test scores. One strategy to investigate 
whether tracking exacerbates the impact of parental background for educational achievement 
would be to  estimate a standard education production function adding an interaction term 
of the parental background variables with the tracking regime. This is the approach used by 
Schuetz, Ursprung, and Woessmann (2005) and Brunello and Checchi (2006). They estimate 
an equation similar to equation (1):
( i) F isc  — P i  +  /?2S T i SC +  f a F u c  +  7i {F isc * E T C) +  f i ± S Q Sc +  P s C c +  S isc
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Where T  is a test score for individual i in school s and country c. ST is a vector of individual 
characteristics of student i in school s and country c. F is a vector of family characteristics of 
student i in school s and country c. ET is a dummy variable indicating whether a country tracks 
students at an early stage of their student life. SQ is a vector of school quality variables of school 
s in country c. C is a vector of country dummies, e is an error term. The main interest then lies 
in obtaining consistent estimates of 7 ^  the interaction of the family background measures with 
the tracking regime. Finding 7 X to be positive would then be evidence that parental background 
is more important in early tracking countries.
As in most cross-country studies, the major concern is tha t any country level variable (in this 
case the tracking measure) is correlated with unobserved country level variables. This is not an 
issue as long as these variables do not affect the importance of parental background for students’ 
test scores because the regression includes country fixed effects. It is quite likely, however, that 
some country level unobservables affect the influence of family background on test scores, like 
for example pre-primary care. The coverage of pre-primary care may be correlated with the 
tracking regime. At the same time, pre-primary care may affect the impact of the family 
background on students’ educational achievement and thus biasing the estimates of in equation
(1). The graphical analysis presented in the introduction already indicates tha t unobserved 
variables may pose a severe problem in this context. I showed above that parental background 
seems to  be more important in early tracking countries even before actual tracking has taken 
place.
To solve this problem, I use a difference-in-differences strategy, with test scores taken at two 
points of a child’s educational career. The first point is in primary school, before tracking has 
taken place in any of the countries in the sample. The second is in secondary school, after 
tracking has occurred in some countries. I then compare the change between the early and the 
late test in the importance of family background in early versus late tracking countries.
This is a legitimate strategy to control for unobserved country level variables under the identify­
ing assumption tha t the unobserved country characteristics do not change between the primary 
and secondary school grades.47 In a regression framework this difference-in-differences method­
ology is implemented by estimating equation (2 ) .48
(2) TiSCt =  Pi +  f32 STiSCt +  ^ F isct +  ^S E C O N D  ARYt + P^SQsct +  PgCc
“b T i  {Eisct *  ETc) +  7 2  (Eisct *  S EC ON DARYt)
+ 7 3  {Eisct *  ETc *  SECONDARYt) +  £isct
The abbreviations are the same as for equation (1). The subscript t  indicates the two cohorts: 
primary school students and secondary school cohorts. Compared to the first specification this 
specification now adds the dummy variable SECONDARY, which indicates tha t an observation 
is taken from the late test examining secondary school students. This variable controls for any
47It is worthy to note that the differences are not taken for the same individual. Therefore, a further identifying 
assumption is that the random assignment of the studies ensured that they tested a representative sample.
48In results not reported here I also allow the student characteristics to vary across the two different studies. 
This does not affect the findings on y 3.
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systematic difference between the two test scores.49 The main interest now lies in identifying the 
coefficient 7 3 . If turns out to be positive family background becomes relatively more important 
in early tracking countries between primary and secondary school. If 73  was negative family 
background becomes relatively less important in early tracking countries after actual tracking 
has taken place. This model is estimated using the pooled data from a study testing primary 
school students and a study testing secondary school students. To allow for arbitrary correlations 
of the error term for students within one country all standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. The following part describes the data I use to estimate equation (2 ).
3.4  D a ta
3.4.1 D ata on Test Scores, Student Characteristics, Family Characteristics, and 
School Quality Variables
The data on test scores, student characteristics and family background originates from the 
microdatasets of three school studies. The data on reading skills comes from PISA and PIRLS, 
while the data on mathematics comes from TIMSS. I only use data from OECD countries 
because I want to compare countries with a similar development of the educational sector. 
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the countries in the different estimation samples.
Data for the Reading Results
To implement the DiD strategy, I use two reading test scores taken at different points in time of 
the students’ school career. Firstly, I use test scores from PIRLS 2001, a study testing students 
before tracking has occurred in any country. This study was carried out by the International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) in the year 2001. PIRLS 
tested students in grade 4 of primary school, before tracking has taken place in any country of 
the sample. Each student obtained a test score tha t was scaled to have an international mean 
of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. In addition to testing the reading skills of primary 
school students, the students’ parents were asked to provide information on the student and on 
family background characteristics. Every participating school had to provide information on 
class sizes and other measures of school quality.
Secondly, I use a test score from a study testing students after tracking occurred in some coun­
tries. For the reading results I use data from PISA in the years 2000 and 2003. Administered 
by the OECD, this study evaluated reading skills of 15-year-old students, usually attending 
grades 9 or 10 of secondary school. Like PIRLS, the PISA study was scaled to have an in­
ternational mean of 500 and a standard deviation of IOO.50 The information on the parental
4 9  As both test scores may not have tested the same skills one has to assume that systematic differences in the 
two tests are uncorrelated with the family background measures and the tracking regime to obtain consistent 
estimates of 7 3 .
50The scores obtainable in the database are plausible values, which are not exactly test scores. "They are 
random numbers drawn from the distribution of scores that could be reasonably assigned to each individual...". 
Refer to the Technical Reports of PISA for more information.
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background variables and the student characteristics is taken from the student questionnaire; 
the information on school quality variables from a questionnaire which had to be answered by 
each participating school.
The DiD estimation requires a primary school and a secondary school test score for each country. 
Therefore I can only use observations from countries tha t participated in both the PISA 2003 
and the PIRLS studies in the main specification for reading.51 The second column of Table 3.1 
lists all countries in this specification. Column 3 lists the countries used in a robustness check 
with data from PIRLS and PISA 2000.
D ata for the M athematics Results
To estimate the specification for the mathematics results I use data from TIMSS. Carried out 
by the IEA, TIMSS 1995 tested mathematics and science skills of two different age cohorts 
(one cohort of primary school students and one of secondary school students) across different 
countries. I use the test results of the primary school cohort (attending grades 3 or 4) as an 
early test score before tracking has occurred in any of the participating countries. TIMSS also 
tested the mathematics skills of secondary school students attending grades 7 and 8 , which I 
use as the later test score after which tracking has taken place in the early tracking countries. 
Again, I complement the data on test scores with data from student questionnaires and from 
the answers to the school questionnaires. The countries in this sample are shown in column 4 
of Table 3.1.
In 1999 the primary cohort was re-tested when they were in grades 7 or 8 . As a robustness check 
for the mathematics results, I combine the TIMSS data from grades 3/4 of 1995 and grades 7/8 
from 1999 as can be seen from the last column of Table 3.1.
Parental Background Variables Used for Estimation Purposes
For my estimation I rely on the parental background data available in the above datasets. An 
important parental background factor for children’s educational attainm ent is parental educa­
tion. More educated parents may be better informed about good parenting practices and may 
create a home environment, which stimulates the learning of their children. In the tables re­
ported below, I use highest parental education, which is measured as the years or education of 
the parent with more education. To save space I do not report the specifications where I use 
father’s and mother’s education separately. The results are very similar and do not affect any 
of the conclusions drawn below.
Furthermore, I use the number of books in a student’s home as an alternative measure for 
parental background. This variable is frequently used by educational researchers, and may
51 In PIRLS England and Scotland are sampled independently. PISA, however, did not sample them separately. 
To estimate my results I combine the information of these two countries. Furthermore, in PIRLS Canada 
is represented only by the provinces Ontario and Quebec whereas PISA sampled students from all Canadian 
provinces. In the reported results for the difference-in-differences specification I include the combined data on 
Great Britain and data on Canada. Discarding all observations from these two countries does only have a small 
effect on the estimated coefficients and does not affect the significance or insignificance of the results.
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capture parents’ valuation of education or serve as a proxy for income as books are consumption 
goods.52 Finally, I also use a variable indicating whether children speak the language of school 
instruction at home as another measure of parental background.
3.4.2 D a ta  on Tracking
I complement the data on test scores, student characteristics, parental background, and school 
quality variables with a country level measure of the tracking regime. Some countries educate 
students in the same type of school up to the end of secondary school. Other countries, however, 
separate students at early stages of their schooling career. Figure 3.5 demonstrates the tracking 
policy of a representative late tracking country, Finland, and a representative early tracking 
country, Austria. Whereas Finland does not track students up to the end of grade nine, students 
in Austria are placed in different school tracks after four years of schooling.
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Figure 3.5: Tracking Policies in Finland and Austria
I construct a measure that indicates after how many grades tracking occurs in each of the 
countries of my sample. For the purposes of this chapter I define tracking as educating students 
in different types of schools. This constitutes the strongest form of tracking. Therefore, I do not 
consider specialization tracks for certain subjects within a school as tracking. Instead, I focus 
on a very strong definition because the effects of tracking are potentially largest for this stark 
form of tracking. Furthermore, other definitions would result in a much more noisy tracking 
measure.53 Table 3.2 gives an overview of the grade after which tracking takes place in the 
countries of my sample.
My tracking measure is very similar to the one developed by Hanushek and Woessmann (2006).54
52 See Schuetz et al. (2005) for a discussion on using the number of books as a measure for parental background.
53 Some countries exhibit within-country variation of tracking; with some regions tracking students at differ­
ent grades than others. Unfortunately, I cannot distinguish different regions in the PISA, PIRLS and TIMSS 
databases. I therefore assign the grade at which most regions track as the tracking measure for these countries.
541 thank Ludger Woessmann for kindly providing me with their measure of tracking.
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Their measure captures the age at which tracking takes place. Mine, on the other hand, re­
lates to  the grade after which tracking takes place, which will capture differences in the school 
starting age across countries. They classify some countries differently to my classification, yet 
a comparison of the two measures indicates that they are quite similar, which is indicated by 
the correlation of .81 between the two measures as reported in Table 3.3. I show, in fact, that 
my results hold up when I use the Hanushek and Woessmann tracking measure.
Alternatively, Ammermueller (2005) uses a tracking measure that counts the number of school 
tracks of a country in lower secondary education. This does not capture how many years a 
student is exposed to ability tracking, which is a disadvantage as it is likely that possible effects 
of tracking are stronger the longer students are educated in different tracks. Nevertheless, this 
measure has an advantage over measures using tracking grade or tracking age, as it captures 
how many school tracks exist in each country. By construction, higher values of the number of 
school track index indicate more tracking. According to my measure, however, a higher tracking 
grade indicates less tracking. Therefore the two measures should be negatively correlated. Table 
3.3 confirms a negative correlation of the two measures of -0.75. I show below that my results 
hold even if I use the number of tracks measure.
To estimate equation (2), I define an early tracking threshold that indicates whether a country 
tracks students early or late. I vary the early tracking threshold between tracking after grade 
4 and tracking after grade 8 . I show below that my conclusions do not vary if I use different 
threshold levels for early tracking, indicating that the results are not driven by an arbitrary 
choice of the early tracking threshold.
For the countries with later tracking it is sometimes problematic to define the correct tracking 
grade. To overcome this problem, I use a dummy variable early versus late tracking. This 
provides a good measure because it is not affected by whether a later tracking country tracks 
at grade 9 or grade 10. The measurement problems are much less severe for the early tracking 
countries, as most of these have very clear tracking rules. In particular, the grade 4 to grade 6 
thresholds provide measures of tracking, which should be free from major measurement error. 
I use these tracking measures to identify the effect of tracking on the importance of parental 
background for educational attainment, with results presented in the following section.
3.5 M ain R esu lts
3.5.1 Reading Results
I use data from PIRLS as the early test score (grade 4 students) and data  from PISA 2003 
(grade 9 or 10 students) as test score of secondary school students to estimate the reading 
results. Pooling the data from these two educational studies, I estimate equation (2), and 
present results in Table 3.4.55 The specification used to generate these results takes grade
55 All specifications reported in the table include school quality variables. Excluding school quality increases 
the sample in each country because of fewer missing values and also allows to keep France in the estimation 
sample. Results from these regressions are reported in Table 3.13 of the appendix.
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5 as the early tracking threshold: countries which track at the end of grade 5 or before are 
classified as early tracking countries and countries tracking at later stages of a student’s career 
are classified as late tracking countries. I show below that the results are robust to different 
definitions of the early tracking thresholds, such as grade 4, grade 6  or grade 8 .
To summarize the results, the coefficients on the student characteristics have the expected signs 
and are all highly significant in all specifications. Females do significantly better than males 
in reading, and native pupils do better than immigrants. Not surprisingly, children living with 
only one of their parents or those who live without their parents (because they live with other 
guardians) do significantly worse than students who live with both parents.
In column (1) I report the specification tha t uses highest parental education as the sole parental 
background variable. Students whose better-educated parent has one more year of education 
score about 6  points better in reading. Interestingly, the importance of parental education for 
reading is as important for primary school students as it is for secondary school students. This 
is verified by inspecting the very small and insignificant coefficient on the interaction of parental 
education with a dummy for the secondary school test. The positive and significant interaction 
of parental education and an indicator for early tracking countries, on the other hand, indicates 
that parental education is more important in early tracking countries. The point estimate shows 
that an increase of one year of parental education (for the better educated parent) increases 
the student’s reading test score by about 5 points more in early tracking countries compared 
to countries with later tracking grades. This coefficient just indicates th a t parental education 
is more important in early tracking countries. Whether early tracking itself is causing parental 
education to be more important or whether other unobserved country level factors, that are 
correlated with the tracking regime, play a role has to be investigated in greater detail. To 
assess this directly, I include the triple interaction of parental education, an indicator for early 
tracking, and a dummy for the secondary school test into equation (2 ). To make this variable 
more visible in the tables it is reported in bold characters. The negative and insignificant 
coefficient on this interaction indicates that the importance of parental education for students’ 
test scores does not increase between the grades tested in PIRLS and PISA in early tracking 
countries. This suggests that parental background does not become more im portant after actual 
tracking has taken place.
Column (2) of Table 3.4 reports the results from a specification using the number of books in 
the students’ home as the relevant family background variable. The coefficient on the number 
of books variable indicates tha t an increase of 100  books in the student’s home increases her 
test score by 13 points.56 The results on the interaction of the number of books variable with 
the secondary school dummy indicates that the number of books in a student’s home is more 
important for secondary school students than for primary school students. The positive and
56The number of books variable is coded in 6 categories. I assigned each student the category midpoint as the 
number of books at her home. This imposes some restrictions on the functional form of the relationship between 
the number of books and test scores. Reestimating this specification by using dummy variables for each book 
category gives similar results, namely that the number of books is significantly more important in early tracking 
countries. It does not become more important after actual tracking has taken place, however. For the sake of 
clear exposition I only report the results from the continuous number of books measure.
3 TRACKING AND  THE ROLE OF FAMILY BACKGROUND 107
significant interaction between the number of books variable and the indicator for early tracking 
countries demonstrates that the number of books in a student’s home is more important in early 
tracking countries. The fact that the triple interaction of the number of books, the indicator 
for early tracking, and the dummy for the secondary school test is negative and insignificant 
shows tha t the number of books in a student’s home do not become more important in early 
tracking countries after actual tracking has taken place.
In column (3) I report the specification using an indicator whether the student speaks the test 
language with his parents. Speaking the test language at home is a significant and important 
factor of doing well in reading. The interaction of the language indicator with the secondary 
school dummy shows tha t this factor is less important in secondary school compared to primary 
school. This is not surprising given that secondary school students have many more opportu­
nities to speak the language of the country they live in with people other than their parents. 
The positive and significant interaction of speaking the test language and the indicator for early 
tracking countries shows tha t speaking the test language is more important in these countries 
compared to countries which track later. Once again, however, the triple interaction of speaking 
the test language, the early tracking dummy, and an indicator for the secondary school test is 
negative and insignificant.
Including all parental background measures in the same specification does not affect the conclu­
sions drawn before. The results reported in column (4) indicate tha t the importance of parental 
background does not increase in early tracking countries after actual tracking has taken place. 
These results therefore cast serious doubt on interpreting the correlation of tracking and the 
importance of the family background as causal.
3.5.2 M athematics Results
To further investigate the role of tracking in intensifying the importance of parental background, 
I present results with mathematics scores as the outcome. Unfortunately, TIMSS 1995 did not 
assess parental education for the students in the primary school cohort. Therefore, I only report 
results for the number of books and the language measures of parental background.57 
Table 3.5 presents the results from estimating equation (2) using the TIMSS data. The coef­
ficients on the student characteristics all have the expected signs and are similar to the ones 
obtained for the reading test score. The main differences are tha t being native matters less for 
mathematics, and that girls do worse in mathematics.
In the first column I use the number of books in a pupil’s home as the relevant parental 
background measure, which appears to be an important factor affecting student performance. 
Increasing the number of books by 100 increases a student’s test score by about 15 points. The 
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of the number of books variable and an 
indicator for the secondary school cohort indicates that the number of books are more important
57 Again these results are reported for the sample including the school quality controls. The results without 
school quality data which result in a larger sample with more countries are reported in Table A2 in the appendix. 
As can be seen, the results do not differ in any significant way.
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in later stages of a student’s career. The coefficient of interest, the triple interaction, is negative 
and marginally significant, indicating tha t family background becomes less important in early 
tracking countries after tracking has taken place.
The specifications reported in column (2) of Table 3.5 use an indicator for speaking the test 
language at home as the relevant parental background measure. Speaking the test language 
at home has a strong and significant effect on mathematics test scores, but seems to be less 
im portant in secondary school. The coefficient on the interaction of the language indicator 
and the dummy for the secondary school cohort, however, is not significant. Speaking the test 
language at home seems to be more important in early tracking countries but also the coefficient 
on the interaction of the language dummy with the indicator for early tracking countries is not 
significantly different from 0. The coefficient on the triple interaction again is not significantly 
different from 0 and has a point estimate which is very close to  0. Speaking the test language 
at home does not become more important in early tracking countries after actual tracking has 
taken place.
Including both family background measures at the same time does not affect any of the above 
conclusions as can be seen be inspecting the results reported in column (3) of Table 3.5.
The results for mathematics confirm the reading results presented before. There is clearly no 
support for the hypothesis tha t tracking exacerbates the importance of family background after 
actual tracking has taken place.
3.6 S en sitiv ity  A nalysis
These results run contrary to the findings of the existing studies using cross-country data to 
investigate the impact of tracking on educational equality. This section therefore investigates 
the robustness of my findings. My first test uses different thresholds for the grade identifying 
early versus late tracking countries. The results of these regressions are reported in Tables 3.6 
and 3.7 for the reading and mathematics test scores respectively. To save space I only report the 
results for the specification using all parental background variables in the same regression.58 For 
the reading test score this is the equivalent to the specification reported in column (4) of Table 
3.4. Table 3.6 shows tha t the coefficient on the triple interaction term of family background, 
early tracking, and the dummy indicating whether the observation comes from the secondary 
school (PISA) sample is hardly ever significantly different from zero. The only exception is the 
specification using grade 4 as the early tracking threshold. In this case the coefficient on the 
triple interaction for parental education is marginally significant but with a negative coefficient. 
This would indicate that parental education becomes less important in early tracking countries 
after actual tracking has taken place. The results reported in Table 3.6 do not support the 
hypothesis tha t tracking exacerbates the importance of family background for students’ test 
scores.
Table 3.7 reports the results for the mathematics test score. Using the end of grade 4 as
58 Using the other specifications does not affect the conclusions drawn from this exercise.
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the threshold for early tracking, the coefficients of the triple interactions indicate tha t family 
background becomes more important in early tracking countries between grades 3/4 and grades 
7/8. Using any other grade as the threshold to divide the sample into early versus late tracking 
countries I find no evidence that the importance of family background increases between grades 
3/4 and grades 7/8.
As mentioned above, there is more than one way to measure the extent of tracking. Hanushek &; 
Woessmann and Schuetz et al., for example, use the age at which tracking takes place as their 
measure. Ammermueller defines tracking slightly differently by the number of school tracks 
that exist during secondary school in a certain country. Table 3.8 compares the results from 
using my tracking measure (grade after which tracking occurs), and the other two defined in 
this paragraph. The triple interactions of the family background variable, the tracking measure, 
and the dummy indicating whether the observation is from the secondary grades are mostly not 
significantly different from zero, independent of the tracking measure used in the estimation. 
The results presented in column 2 of Table 3.8 show that the number of books at home is 
relatively less important in countries with later tracking ages in grades 9/10 compared to grade 
4. This result, however, is only significant at the 10 percent level. Speaking the test language 
seems to  be less important in later grades in countries with more tracks (thus more tracking). 
Again, this coefficient is only significant at the 10 percent level. These two marginally significant 
triple interactions propose conflicting conclusions on whether more tracking increases or reduces 
the importance of family background for children’s reading test scores. All other coefficients 
on the triple interaction terms are not significantly different from zero and indicate no effect of 
tracking after tracking has taken place.
For the mathematics test score, with results reported in Table 3.9, none of the coefficients on 
the triple interaction terms is significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the point estimate 
of these coefficients is always close to 0. There is no evidence that tracking influences the 
importance of parental background for educational attainment after tracking has taken place. 
Another worry may be that factors varying at the country level and affecting the importance of 
the family background are not constant over time, and would thus not be controlled using the 
fixed effects strategy. Using tests administered in alternative years may address this problem. 
Because PISA 2003 and PIRLS 2001 were not carried out in the same year, there may have been 
changes in the schooling systems affecting the importance of the family background on students’ 
test scores between 2001 and 2003. Unfortunately there are no comparable international pupil 
ability tests testing reading skills of different cohorts in the same year. Nonetheless, using the 
PISA 2000 data instead of the 2003 wave of PISA may be a suitable way to deal with this 
problem. This is because changes between 2001 and 2003 will not have had an effect on the 
PISA 2000 results.
Table 3.10 reports the results from the same specifications as reported in Table 3.4 but using 
PISA 2000 and PIRLS 2001 as the data sources. The coefficients on the triple interactions show 
that there is no evidence that the importance of family background increases relatively more in 
early tracking countries between grade 4 and grades 9/10.
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The DiD results for the mathematics test score presented above were estimated using the 1995 
wave of TIMSS, which tested students of both the grades 3/4 and grades 7/8 cohorts. Nonethe­
less, these results may be problematic because the factors affecting the importance of family 
background for mathematics test scores may have changed in a year shortly before 1995. Stu­
dents from the two cohorts may have been exposed to this changing environment at a different 
age. I use the 1999 wave of TIMSS which tested students in grades 7 or 8 to address this 
potential problem. Table 3.11 reports the results from this exercise. Note that the number 
of countries which can be used for estimation purposes is very small, so any conclusion drawn 
from this exercise should be handled with caution .59 Again, the triple interactions are almost 
always insignificant. The only exception is the interaction involving the language spoken at 
home if considered as the only family background variable which is reported in column 2. In 
this case, the coefficient indicates tha t family background becomes relatively more important 
in early tracking countries between grades 3/4 and grades 7/8.
3 .7  D iscu ssion  and C onclusion
The results obtained from estimating equation (2) show that family background is more im­
portant in early tracking countries. I find, however, that family background does not become 
more important after tracking occurs in the early tracking countries. In the absence of antic­
ipation effects this is evidence that tracking does not causally affect the importance of family 
background for educational attainment. While this result is interesting in itself, it is even more 
interesting tha t at the same time, two other papers find tha t tracking exacerbates educational 
inequalities using some of the datasets I use in this chapter. One study was carried out my 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) and one by Ammermueller (2005). I discuss the likely reasons 
for obtaining different results in turn.
Hanushek and Woessmann do not look at the specific effect of family background on test scores 
but look at whether tracking increases inequality measured by the within country standard 
deviation, the 75th-25th or the 95th-5th percentile differences of test scores. To address the 
concern of bias due to unobservables, they employ a similar DiD strategy to the one in this 
chapter: they look at the change in inequality between a primary school test score (no tracking 
in any country) and a test score for secondary school students (after tracking in some countries). 
In their main specification they use data on reading from the same data sources I use for my 
main specification on reading test scores. In order to assess the reasons of obtaining different
591 use a different set of student characteristics compared to all other regressions presented in this paper to 
estimate the specification reported in Table 11. In all other regressions I was using the same set of student 
characteristics: a gender dummy, age, a dummy whether the student was born in the country and dummies 
indicating whether the student fives with a singleparent or without parents. If I did include the dummies 
indicating the family structure in this estimation the sample would be reduced by about 30 percent and I would 
lose 3 out of 8 countries because 3 countries did not report the family structure variables. This affects the results 
in a non-random way. Therefore I omit the two dummies indicating whether the student fives with a singleparent 
or without parents. Table A3 shows that omitting these 2 variables does not have an impact on the results 
obtained from estimating the difference-in-differences results for the original TIMSS 1995 sample as can be seen 
from comparing the results presented in Table A3 and Table 5. This makes me confident that omitting these two 
variables is the preferred option for having a more representative sample.
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findings, I replicate their results and show that these results are not stable if one considers a 
different measure for tracking and a slightly different sample. Column (1) of Table 3.12 reports 
the second column of their main table (Table 2 in Hanushek and Woessmann (2006)).60 They 
regress the within country standard deviation (appropriately normalized) for secondary school 
students on an indicator for early tracking. As a measure for tracking they use a threshold of 
tracking before the age of 15. To control for pre-existing levels of inequality they also include 
the within-country standard deviation of test scores for primary school students. They conclude 
that inequality is higher for early tracking countries based on a positive and significant coefficient 
on the early tracking dummy as reported in the first column of Table 3.12. In column (2) of 
Table 3 .12,1 show, however, tha t using the same sample but a different tracking measure (here 
tracking at the end of grade 5 or before) the results axe no longer significantly different from 
0. Furthermore, using a sample of OECD countries only, which reduces the sample by only 
three countries, further weakens their results. Using small variations in their specification I can, 
therefore, no longer replicate their findings and obtain results which are in line with the results 
presented in this chapter. Namely, that tracking does not increase educational inequality.
My results are also slightly different from the ones obtained by Ammermueller (2005) even 
though the identification strategies used are very similar and he uses data  from PISA and 
PIRLS as well. He finds that the number of books at a students home do not become more 
important in tracking systems with more tracks after actual tracking has taken place which is 
the same result as I find. He finds that speaking the test language becomes less important in 
countries with more tracks (and thus more tracking). This is similar to the finding on speaking 
the test language in this chapter of my thesis. On the other hand, he finds tha t students with 
native parents do better in tracked countries after actual tracking has taken place. Furthermore, 
he finds tha t the importance of parental education increases in countries with more tracking. 
Therefore 2 of his 4 results indicate that tracking does not affect or reduces the importance 
of family background for students’ test scores. The results on the other 2 family background 
variables indicate that tracking exacerbates the importance of family background.
How can I reconcile this with my findings? Ammermueller uses a different definition for parental 
education, namely having a parent with a university degree whereas I use a linear years of 
education measure. Furthermore, he drops 2 countries (Canada and England) because not all 
regions in those countries were sampled. Re-estimating my results with this reduced sample 
does not change the conclusion from my work: tracking does not intensify the role of family 
background for students’ education. The factor which probably explains a big- part of the 
difference between our work is that I cluster my standard errors at the country level, while he 
is clustering the standard errors at the school level. Clustering at the country level allows for 
any arbitrary correlation of the error terms of students within one country. This is the level 
of clustering which is appropriate in this setting. Clustering at the school level leads to much 
smaller standard errors, and thus to significant coefficients which may well be insignificant if 
one clusters at the country level.
601 thank Ludger Woessmann for providing me with details on the way they estimate their results.
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My results clearly indicate tha t the estimates in the existing literature are not stable to using 
slightly different tracking measures, samples, and specifications. This further increases the con­
fidence in my finding that tracking does not exacerbate the importance of parental background 
for educational test scores. The question remains why tracking does not affect the importance 
of family background. As mentioned above, parents have the possibility to self select according 
to socioeconomic status even in untracked systems, so one path may be through residential 
segregation. This is exemplified by the literature on the effect of school quality on house prices 
which mainly uses evidence from the US and the UK - both untracked countries.61 
Another way of improving a child’s education even in untracked systems is to enrol the child 
in a better and possibly expensive private school. Furthermore, choosing certain subjects (e.g. 
learning ancient languages) may lead to better peers and thus better learning even in a system 
which has no official tracking policy. Thus even untracked systems give parents and students 
opportunities to select into better schools. Further research is needed to pin down the factors 
which enable parents to improve their child’s education and may thus create inequalities in op­
portunity for children from different backgrounds. Nonetheless, my findings could be consistent 
with the view tha t tracking has a causal impact on the importance of family background for 
children’s test scores if the above mentioned effects of tracking happened before actual tracking 
takes place. I use studies which tested students in grades 3 or 4 as a baseline level of the role of 
parental background. This is just a short time before some of the early tracking countries sort 
students according to ability. Parents may anticipate the effect of tracking and motivate their 
children to do better in school already before tracking takes place. My DiD methodology may 
fail to pick up these anticipatory effects of tracking. Given that my results are independent of 
the tracking threshold I choose may be an indication that anticipation effects are not very im­
portant. Research strategies which circumvent this problem may shed more light on the debate 
of the effect of tracking. I conclude, however, that the cross-country evidence to date, if carried 
out carefully, does not suggest that tracking exacerbates the importance of family background 
for students’ test scores.
61 See Black (1999) and Figlio and Lucas (2004) for careful studies of the effect of school quality on house prices.
3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Countries in Different Estimation Samples
Secondary School Test PISA 2003 PISA 2000 TIMSS 1995 7 / 8 2,3 + TIMSS 1999 7 /8  +
Prim ary School Test PIRLS1 PIRLS TIMSS 1995 3 /4 4 TIMSS 1995 3/4
Main Robustness Main Robustness
Check Specification Check
Reading Reading M athem atics M athem atics
Australia ■
Austria □
Canada ■ ■
Czech Republic ■ ■
France □ ■
Germany ■
Greece ■ □
Hungary ■
Iceland ■ ■
Ireland
Italy ■
Korea ■
Netherlands ■ □
New Zealand ■ ■
Norway ■ □
Portugal
Slovakia
Sweden ■
Turkey
United Kingdom ■ ■
USA ■
Number of Countries 14/15 12 11/15 8
■  including school quality □  without school quality
1The US drops out because the parental background information is m issing for all students in PIRLS. 2A lso France and 
Japan participated in TIM SS. As the information on being born in the country is missing for all observations they are 
not in my sam ple. 3School quality is missing for all observations from Austria, Greece and Norway. 4T he information on 
school quality for the Netherlands is missing for the Grade 4 wave.
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Table 3.2: Countries in the PISA 2003 and TIMSS 95 (Secondary) Samples, Tracking Grade, and Means of Relevant Variables
Tracking
Grade
Country M ean Test 
Score Reading  
PISA  2003
M ean Parental 
E ducation  
P ISA  2003
M ean Num ber 
of Books 
PISA  2003
Speaking Test 
Language (%) 
PISA  2003
M ean Test 
Score M aths 
TIM SS 95-8
M ean Parental 
E ducation  
TIM SS 95-8
M ean Num ber 
o f Books 
TIM SS 95-8
% Speaking  
Test Language  
TIM SS 95-8
4 A ustria 497.4 13.1 170.2 91.5 535.3 12.4 136.9 88.5
4 Germ any 497.5 13.1 206.7 92.8 498.5 10.6 140.3 88.4
4 Hungary 480.7 12.9 243.7 99.3 522.0 12.5 178.4 98.7
4 Slovakia 475.2 13.8 161.3 97.0 527.8 12.1 124.7 88.9
5 Czech R epublic 505.4 13.9 251.9 99.1 538.7 11.8 164.3 98.5
6 Ireland 517.6 12.5 158.4 97.4 515.3 11.5 124.4 97.5
6 N etherlands 518.0 12.8 181.1 85.4 534.8 12.0 129.8 90.2
6 N ew  Zealand 523.7 13.5 205.7 90.7 493.3 12.7 178.7 90.8
8 Canada 516.1 14.3 209.0 89.3 505.2 13.2 155.1 82.9
8 Italy 500.3 12.7 178.1 73.9
8 Turkey 444.0 9.0 82.9 97.3
9 France 500.1 12.0 162.9 93.9 518.1 11.5 118.0 94.7
9 Greece 467.2 13.0 140.3 96.3 464.0 10.7 95.7 95.5
9 Korea 533.4 12.4 172.1 99.9 592.4 11.8 127.7 95.3
9 Portugal 476.1 9.1 128.8 98.6 440.9 8.2 98.3 97.0
9 Sweden 513.2 13.5 236.6 92.7 513.7 12.9 177.2 91.3
10 A ustralia 524.1 13.1 232.6 91.9 524.3 12.3 181.7 92.2
10 Iceland 491.7 14.5 251.8 98.3 469.8 12.0 168.3 95.5
10 Norway 499.6 14.6 251.1 94.8 485.9 13.0 184.9 94.3
12 UK 512.0 12.9 175.5 96.9 485.0 12.0 133.8 94.2
12 U SA 493.8 13.5 160.1 90.9 483.1 13.4 136.3 87.2
T he differences in the m eans of th e  fam ily background variables across PISA  and TIM SS originate from the fact th a t the tests  were carried out at different tim es, for students in 
different grades, and by different organizations w ith  different questionnaires. T he particularly big differences for the number o f books variable can be explained by the fact that  
for PISA  the  top  category for books is "more than  500 books", whereas for TIM SS the  top  category is "more than  200 books".
Table 3.3: Correlations of Tracking Measures
Tracking
Grade
Tracking
A ge
Num ber of 
Tracks
Tracking G rade 1
Tracking A ge 0.81 1
Num ber of Tracks in Secondary School -0.75 -0.69 1
T able 3.4: Difference-in-Differences Reading (PIRLS 2001 and PISA 2003)
D ependent Variable: R eading Score (1) (2) (3) (4)
H ighest P arental E ducation  (years) 6.16 4.68
(0.81)*** (0.62)***
H PE *PISA 0.14 -0.39
(1.05) (0.82)
H PE *Earlytrack 4.78 3.44
(1.27)*** (1.29)**
H P E * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y -1.28 -1.24
(0.73) (1.25)
Num ber o f  B ooks 0.13 0.10
(0.02)*** (0.01)***
N oB *P ISA 0.06 0.06
(0.02)** (0.02)**
NoB*E arlytrack 0.05 -0.01
(0.02)** (0.02)
N o B  * E a r ly  tr a c k *  S e c o n d a r y -0.03 0.04
(0.02) (0.03)
Language 38.35 33.51
(4.23)*** (3.76)***
Language*PISA -18.74 -20.98
(6.72)** (7.37)**
Language*Earlytrack 19.02 7.51
(8.22)** (5.37)
L a n g u a g e * E a r ly tr a c k *  S e c o n d a r y -10.64 -6.93
(7.73) (11.19)
Female 28.33 25.49 26.44 25.97
(1.27)*** (1.16)*** (1.28)*** (1.33)***
A ge of Student 6.71 5.03 3.83 6.89
(3.24)* (3.29) (3.39) (2.90)**
N ative Student 26.14 22.09 20.75 17.39
(3.95)*** (4.25)*** (4.78)*** (4.18)***
Living w ith  Singleparent -11.55 -9.50 -14.08 -8.87
(2.44)*** (2.37)*** (2.30)*** (2.19)***
Living w ithou t Parents -39.84 -39.27 -46.56 -36.34
(6.98)*** (5.32)*** (5.69)*** (6.11)***
Secondary School Test D um m y / / / /
School Q uality / / / /
Country F E / / / /
Num ber o f Countries 14 14 14 14
O bservations 116366 118690 124826 113018
R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.22
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
(All standard errors clustered at the country level)
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Table 3.5: Difference-in-Differences Mathematics (TIMSS 95 Grades 3/4 and Grades 7/8)
D ependent Variable: M athem atics Score (1) (2) (3)
Num ber o f Books 0.15 0.14
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
N oB* Secondary 0.05 0.05
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
N oB*E arlytrack 0.07 0.05
(0.02)** (0.02)**
N  o B  * E a r ly tr a c k *  S e c o n d a r y -0.04 -0.01
(0.02)* (0.04)
Language 33.89 30.67
(4.77)*** (4.23)***
Language*Secondary -7.91 -12.00
(7.56) (6.86)
Language*Earlytrack 6.78 3.69
(4.61) (4.84)
L a n g u a g e * E a r Iy tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 0.86 -1.54
(8.50) (5.04)
Female -4.98 -4.81 -5.19
(1.36)*** (1.53)** (1.36)***
Age 14.5 13.51 14.82
(3.56)*** (3.72)*** (3.39)***
N ative 7.75 5.69 2.8
(4.96) (5.54) (5.07)
Living w ith  Singleparent -12.31 -16.17 -12.47
(2.01)*** (1.96)*** (1.97)***
Living w ithou t Parents -27.61 -31.19 -25.82
(4.66)*** (4.80)*** (4.47)***
Secondary School T est D um m y / / /
School Q uality / / /
Country FE / / /
Num ber o f Countries 11 11 11
O bservations 102245 96873 95616
R-squared 0.20 0.16 0.21
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
(A ll standard errors clustered at the country level)
Table 3.6: Sensitivity Analysis 1: Early Tracking Thresholds (Reading)
D ependent Variable: R eading Score Grade 4 Grade 5 G rade 6 Grade 8
H ighest P arental 4.88 4.68 4.73 5.57
E ducation  (years) (0.61)*** (0.62)*** (0.62)*** (0.48)***
H PE *Secondary -0.40 -0.39 -0.45 -1.34
(0.83) (0.82) (0.80) (0.94)
H PE *E arlytrack 3.33 3.44 2.34 -0.36
(1.74)* (1.29)** (1.15)* (0.76)
H P E * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y -2.07 -1.24 -0.81 0.99
(1.15)* (1.25) (0.99) (0.84)
Num ber o f  B ooks 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
N oB * Secondary 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.11
(0.02)*** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)***
N oB*E arlytrack -0.02 -0.01 -0 .00 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)**
N o B * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)**
Language 34.30 33.51 34.10 37.15
(3.48)*** (3.76)*** (3.63)*** (6.98)***
Language*Secondary -22.61 -20.98 -22.26 -26.54
(6.99)*** (7.37)** (7.63)** (10.68)**
Language*Earlytrack 7.26 7.51 4.59 -2.36
(6.71) (5.37) (5.92) (7.23)
L a n g u a g e * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 2.38 -6.93 -2 .90 4.23
(7.98) (11.19) (9.04) (12.27)
Secondary School T est D um m y / / / /
S tudent C haracteristics / / / /
School Q uality / / / /
Country FE / / / /
Num ber o f Countries 14 14 14 14
O bservations 113018 113018 113018 113018
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
T able 3.7: Sensitivity Analysis 1 : Early Tracking Thresholds (Mathematics)
D ependent Variable: M athem atics Score Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 8
Num ber o f B ooks 0.15 0.14 . 0.14 0.17
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
NoB * Secondary 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
N oB*E arlytrack 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)** (0.03) (0.03)
N o B * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01)*** (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Language 31.20 30.67 29.46 34.12
(3.90)*** (4.23)*** (4.45)*** (7.48)***
Language*Secondary -12.85 -12 -12.33 -15.74
(6.68)* (6.86) (7.07) (10.3)
Language*Earlytrack 3.25 3.69 8.56 -5.91
(5.99) (4.84) (5.92) (7.80)
L a n g u a g e * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 20.15 -1.54 1.33 6.75
(5.90)*** (5.04) (6.15) (7.97)
Secondary School Test D um m y / / / /
Student C haracteristics / / / /
School Q uality / / / /
Country FE / / / /
Num ber o f Countries 11 11 11 11
Observations 95616 95616 95616 95616
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
(A ll standard errors clustered at th e  country level)
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Table 3.8: Sensitivity Analysis 2: Tracking Measures (Reading)
D ependent Variable: R eading Score Grade of Tracking A ge of Tracking Num ber o f Tracks
H ighest Parental 4.68 9.71 5.25
E ducation  (years) (0.62)*** (2.77)*** (1.26)***
H PE *Secondary -0.39 -2.36 -0.42
(0.82) (2.28) (1.13)
H PE*Tracking M easure (TM ) 3.44 -0.28 0.11
(1.29)** (0.17) (0.72)
H P E * T M * S e c o n d a r y -1.24 0.11 -0.19
(1.25) (0.14) (0.49)
N um ber o f  B ooks 0.10 0.06 0.10
(0.01)*** (0.05) (0.03)***
N oB *Secondary 0.06 0.18 0.02
(0.02)** (0.05)*** (0.04)
N oB*Tracking M easure (TM ) -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
N o B * T M * S e c o n d a r y 0.04 -0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.00)* (0.02)
Language 33.51 37.09 34.91
(3.76)*** (14.38)** (5.83)***
L anguage*Secondary -20.98 -66.34 -3.12
(7.37)** (31.90)* (10.53)
L anguage*TM 7.51 -0.17 -0.16
(5.37) (0.88) (3.78)
L a n g u a g e * T M * S e c o n d a r y -6.93 2.80 -10.38
(11.19) (1.85) (5.45)*
Secondary School T est D um m y / / /
Student C haracteristics / / /
School Q uality / / /
Country FE / / /
Num ber o f Countries 14 14 14
O bservations 113018 113018 113018
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22
Table 3.9: Sensitivity Analysis 2: Tracking Measures (Mathematics)
D ependent Variable: M athem atics Score Grade of Tracking Age o f Tracking Num ber of Tracks
Num ber o f B ooks 0.14 0.28 0.11
(0.02)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)**
N oB * Second ary 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.01)*** (0.08) (0.04)
N oB*Tracking M easure (TM ) 0.05 -0.01 0.03
(0.02)** (0.00)** (0.03)
N o B * T M * S e c o n d a r y -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.00) (0.03)
Language 30.67 39.81 20.9
(4.23)*** (16.09)** (9.44)*
Language*Secondary -12.00 -7.51 -13.66
(6.86) (22.45) (10.54)
Language*Tracking M easure (TM ) 3.69 -0.51 8.56
(4.84) (0.88) (5.92)
L a n g u a g e * T M * S e c o n d a r y -1.54 -0.26 1.33
(5.04) (1.11) (6.15)
Secondary School T est D um m y / / /
Student C haracteristics / / /
School Q uality / / /
Country F E / / /
Num ber of Countries 11 11 11
O bservations 95616 95616 95616
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
(A ll standard errors clustered at the  country level)
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T able 3.10: Sensitivity Analysis 3: Different D ata Reading: PIRLS 2001 and PISA 2000
D ependent Variable: R eading Score (i) (3) (4) (5)
H ighest Parental 5.99 4.67
E ducation (years) (0.40)*** (0.35)***
H PE* Secondary 2.52 0.96
(0.76)*** -0 .74
H PE*Earlytrack 4.06 1.74
(0.64)*** (0.26)***
H P E * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 0.13 1.69
(0.56) (1.18)
Num ber of Books 0.13 0.09
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
NoB*Secondary 0.09 0.08
(0.01)*** (0.02)***
NoB*Earlytrack 0.04 0.01
(0.02)** (0.01)*
N o B * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y -0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Language 36.35 29.93
(3.05)*** (3.37)***
Language*Secondary 6.17 -2 .23
(5.29) (5.15)
Language*Earlytrack 14.11 11.67
(11.25) (7.18)
L a n g u a g e * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y -7.72 -28.73
(5.87) (14.49)*
Secondary School Test D um m y / / / /
Student Characteristics / / / /
School Q uality / / / /
Country FE / / / /
Num ber of Countries 12 12 12 12
O bservations 73108 76323 82500 71242
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.23
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant a t 10%
(All standard errors clustered at the country level)
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Table 3.11: Sensitivity Analysis 3: Different Data Maths: TIMSS 95 3/4 and TIMSS 99 7/8
D ependent Variable: M athem atics Score (1) (2) (3)
N um ber o f B ooks 0.16 0.15
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
N oB* Secondary 0.05 0.06
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
N oB*E arlytrack 0.06 0.05
(0.03) (0.02)**
N o B * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Language 35.22 30.90
(4.28)*** (3.71)***
Language*Secondary -14.90 -17.40
(10.77) (9.74)
Language*E arlytrack 4 .55 5.24
(5.58) (6.80)
L a n g u a g e * E a r ly  tr a c k *  S e c o n d a r y 20.44 6.22
(6 .41)** (5.14)
Secondary School Test D um m y / S /
Student C haracteristics / S /
School Q uality / s /
C ountry D um m ies / s /
Num ber o f  Countries 8 8 8
O bservations 60228 56436 55756
R-squared
*** __ :c ____ .  _ j. 10/  * *  _______ .  cO*
0.19
*  __ _______j. ~  i. m W
0 .15 0.21
*** significant a t 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
(A ll standard errors clustered at the country level)
Table 3.12: Robustness of Hanushek and Woessmann Results
D ependent Variable: Country-Level SD of R eading Score ( I ) 1 (2) (3)
Early Tracking M easure A ge of Tracking Grade 5 or before Grade 5 or before
Sample Full Sam ple Full Sam ple O EC D
Early Tracking 0.25 0 .17 0.12
(0.11)** (0 .14) (0.16)
Inequality in P rim ary School 0.59 0 .48 0.40
(0.13)*** (0 .16)*** (0.20)**
N um ber o f Countries 18 18 15
R-squared 0.48 0.38 0.26
1C olumn (1) is th e  sam e as colum n (1) o f Table 2 in H anushek and W oessm ann (2006)
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3.9 A pp en dix  for C haper 3
Table 3.13: DiD Reading (PIRLS 2001 and PISA 2003) Without School Quality
D ependent Variable: R eading Score (1) (2) (3) (4)
H ighest Parental 6.27 4.66
E ducation  (years) (0.69)*** (0.52)***
H PE *PISA 0.01 -0.50
(1.08) (0.80)
H PE *E arly track 4.99 3.67
(1.31)*** (1.04)***
H P E * E a r ly tr a c k * P I S A -1.25 -1.27
(0.67)* (1.08)
N um ber of Books 0.14 0.10
(0.02)*** (0.01)***
N oB *P ISA 0.06 0.06
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
N oB*E arlytrack 0.05 -0.01
(0.02)** (0.02)
N o B * E a r ly tr a c k * P I S A -0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Language 35.58 31.07
(3.83)*** (3.26)***
Language*PISA -10.98 -14.58
(7.49) (7.89)*
Language*Earlytrack 20.35 9.59
(8.49)** (3.85)**
L a n g u a g e * E a r ly tr a c k * P I S A -12.06 -7.86
(8.25) (13.54)
Secondary School Test D um m y / / / /
S tudent C haracteristics / / / /
School Q uality
Country FE / / / /
N um ber of Countries 15 15 15 15
O bservations 146631 150348 158682 143957
R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.19
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
(A ll standard errors clustered at the  country level)
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Table 3.14: DiD Mathematics (TIMSS 95) Without School Quality
D ependent Variable: M athem atics Score (1) (2) (3)
Num ber of Books 0.15 0.13
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
N oB *Secondary 0.05 0.06
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
N oB*E arlytrack 0.05 0.06
(0.02)** (0.02)***
N o B * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 0.00 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Language 35.74 31.96
(2.69)*** (2.54)***
Language*Secondary -7.75 -11.71
(5.61) (5.09)**
Language*Earlytrack 17.26 11.74
(5.60)*** (4.58)**
L a n g u a g e * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 11.38 9.97
(6.51) (4.76)*
Student Characteristics / / /
School Q uality
Country FE / / /
Num ber of Countries 15 15 15
O bservations 210224 189915 185947
R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.19
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
(A ll standard errors clustered at the country level)
T able 3.15: DiD Mathematics (TIMSS 95) Omitting Family Structure
D ependent Variable: M athem atics Score (1) (2) (3)
Num ber of Books 0.15 0.14
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
N oB*Secondary 0.05 0.05
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
N oB *Earlytracking 0.07 0.05
(0.02)** (0.02)**
N o B * E a r ly tr a c k in g * S e c o n d a r y -0.04 -0.02
(0.02)* (0.04)
Language 34.60 31.17
(4.89)*** (4.33)***
Language*Secondary -8.10 -12.30
(7.61) (6.90)
Language*Earlytrack 7.03 3.94
(4.71) (4.90)
L a n g u a g e * E a r ly tr a c k * S e c o n d a r y 0.34 -1.55
(8.54) (5.06)
Student C haracteristics / / /
School Q uality / / /
Country FE / / /
Num ber of Countries 11 11 11
O bservations 102522 97310 95864
R-squared 0.20 0.16 0.20
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
(A ll standard errors clustered at the country level)
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